The Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait

I'm on record as thinking the Chinese are preparing to invade Taiwan. Indeed, if I was in charge, I'd invade on the eve of the 2008 Summer Olympics in Peking.

Not that I am predicting this is what the Chinese will do, I should add. Although I wouldn't be surprised at all. My basic point is that once the Chinese had no chance of successfully putting ground forces on Taiwan. At some point in the future, the Chinese will clearly have the ability to cross the strait. We are now in an in-between stage. I think the Chinese could throw troops across the strait now and have a decent chance of winning if they are prepared to endure the casualties to win.

Arthur K. emailed this interview with a Taiwanese expert on China, Lin Chong-Pin. Some of the questions and answers, after the anti-satellite questions:

How strong is the U.S. commitment to help defend Taiwan?
I think right now it still remains pretty strong. Washington has said officially that if there is a conflict not caused by Taipei’s provocation, then the U.S. is obliged to intervene. But when you compare the statements over the years, you can see that the resolve of partner states is gradually weakening. Of course we understand, [the U.S.] has a bleeding war abroad and a triple deficit at home. So you have to think twice about [intervening in a Taiwan conflict] in the future.

Lin starts off saying we are committed then immediately back tracks. But not if Taiwan "provokes" a crisis (Like declaring independence from China. I do wish Taiwan had done that in 1996 during the missile crisis). And he says that our being at war reduces our commitment. Plus trade and budget deficits (what is the third deficit anyway? The national debt?) Taiwan should have a greater sense of urgency under these circumstances.

Could China be calculating that the United States might stay out of a Taiwan conflict?
That doesn’t seem to be the case. China’s new grand strategy is to squeeze out the leading influence of the United States in East Asia without war, but with economy and culture. The rapidly modernizing military capabilities of [China’s People’s Liberation Army] will serve as a backbone of Beijing’s extra-military instruments, like diplomacy.

There’s a very strong consensus among the leaders in Beijing [that] the most important thing for China now is to seize this window of opportunity, which has not occurred in centuries: “There’s no serious threat outside China, this is the time when we can make economic growth.” So they want to have a peaceful environment and achieve economic growth first.

This seems too convenient, to me. China is too focused on getting rich so don't worry about their expanding military capabilities? They will just support the Chinese economic and cultural offensive that will conquer Taiwan? The way Peking whips up xenophobia as a replacement for democracy does not bode well for the future. If the rulers ever have a choice between control and war with Taiwan and maybe America on the one hand and revolution and no external war, don't be confused about what they will choose. They aren't the Soviets of 1989-1991 and they will not go that route of capitulation to events.

How much has the cross-strait military balance tilted in China’s favor?
We can say that the naval qualitative crossover has already occurred. The [Taiwanese] Air Force is still there competing, it’s balancing, but if Taiwan does not try harder, it will be tipped over. And in ballistic missiles, there’s no comparison: They have them, we don’t.

As I said, there is movement for China and against Taiwan. I think the ground forces are tilted toward China, too. And if the naval balance favors China and the air balance is competitive, those troops might get across the strait. One would think this would inspire the Taiwanese to greater efforts in their own defense.

Given these trends, what should Taiwan do?
Well, militarily speaking, it’s very simple: we should buy weapons. But it’s not that easy. Our economy is not doing well, and the prevailing sentiment of society does not support the purchase of expensive weapons. Young people don’t like military service. And most people do not even think about the military competition.

Taiwan's economy is not doing well? Really? Yes, in the game of life, you get lots of points if your bank account is really full when the communists take over. If the Taiwanese don't like military service so much that we don't believe they will fight for themselves, we will not go to war with China just to find that we arrive to see banners strung up by the PLA saying "Welcome to the PRC." Taiwan's economy is doing great and could support a military that would buy the time we need to help Taiwan remain free. If the Taiwanese don't believe that, as that balance continues to tilt toward Peking, Taiwan will go down.

How likely is it that the cross-strait standoff will lead to war?
Less and less likely. Beijing’s highest priority on Taiwan is what I would call absorption without war. Beijing has an increasing number of instruments to do that, including economy, cultural exchanges, manipulation of media, strangulation of Taiwan’s international space and psychological warfare.

Additionally, if there was a war, Beijing would face the result of bloodshed in Taiwan and the damage to the economic infrastructure. After a conquest, Beijing would have to face a rebellious population … The military option is the last option. And even the military option has never been to strike the U.S. and destroy Taiwan. Rather, it’s to deter the U.S. from coming in, and to seize Taiwan—like grabbing a beautiful, smiling bride into your embrace. That’s the idea.

One, it is certainly possible that even a small invasion force could topple a Taiwanese government unwilling to fight for its freedom. Two, I don't think Peking cares if it conquers a smoking hole where Taiwan once was. And three, that's a bizarre allusion to the US grabbing the Taiwanese bride from the Chinese. Apparently the Taiwanese really just want that shotgun marriage.

How successful has China's strategy been so far?
I’ll give you one example. Before, when Taiwanese leaders inched toward independence, either in rhetoric or in action, Beijing would go ballistic. Now, they do nothing. Then Washington comes out the very next day, jumps up and issues a warning to Taipei. This is what I call going through Washington to contain Taipei. And it’s working.

It is working only if it weakens our commitment. If it keeps the Chinese away in the netherworld of neither independent nor conquered, this is just fine--as long as the Taiwanese can defend themselves, of course.

What about Japan? It’s also seeking a larger security role in the region. What direction do you see China-Japan relations taking?
In November 2004, [China-Japan] tensions rose because of the submarine intrusion [when a Chinese submarine entered Japanese waters]. In the very same month, Tokyo announced to the world that Japan’s trade with China surpassed that between Japan and the United States. It was a point of no return … Japan realized that its economic recovery after 10 years of slump in the 1990s was largely due to its trade with China. And the business community also put a lot of pressure on the government in Tokyo to improve relations. So political relations have already warmed up. But pessimists say that China and Japan’s interests will inevitably clash.

Beijing knows very well they would lose a war with Japan. They know how good the Japanese Navy, and even its Air Force, are. So they’ll try to avoid military confrontation.

While it is true that Japan could beat China with its superior air and naval forces, if the Chinese think they can defeat America--which is far more powerful--they will believe their superior will could break aging Japan dependent on sea lines of communication going past China.

The United States intends to pull back some forces to Guam, and reduce its presence in South Korea and Japan. How will that affect regional security?
For now, I think Beijing prefers to see the presence of the U.S. military in this region, because Beijing is worried about Japan, and thinks the U.S. can restrain Japan. But as the U.S. voluntarily withdraws, because of a lack of capabilities or a lack of economic wherewithal, somebody will have to step in. Will it be Japan, China or both? I think by that time, they will work out something together, because it’s in their best interests … Growing economic interdependence will become more and more important as time goes on, and will constrain military confrontation. And the trend has already begun.

Interesting. We restrain Japan by remaining in the area? True, as long as Japan believes our nuclear deterrent works they will not go nuclear. But if we pull back, Lin says then Japan will come to some agreement with China? That seems contradictory. Plus, moving Marines from Okinawa to Guam is not a retreat. It is pulling them back from a vulnerable front line as Chinese capabilities grow. Defending a line doesn't mean you pile your troops in the front trench--you have outposts with your main strength further back. Keeping our troops on Okinawa just meant that they could be hit early.

I'm not sure what to make of this expert's comments. Am I really to believe that China sees us pulling back from the western Pacific, sees Japan seeking agreement with China, sees the military balance tilting away from Taiwan and toward China, sees America less willing to defend Taiwan, sees Taiwanese unwilling to fight, and yet thinks that China will just let these trends go to waste in order to absorb Taiwan by some nebulous manner that relies on the Taiwanes just becoming Chinese at some undefined point in the future?

I don't buy it. I don't know who Lin is, but I don't buy his analysis as a whole.