Yet Fearon goes on to define civil war in an oddly broad fashion:
A civil war is a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies. [emphasis added]
So violent Vietnam War opponents were proof we were in a civil war forty years ago? And the Animal Liberation Front is proof we are currently in a civil war here in America? Or weren't they organized, battling our government, and trying to change our policy?
This Fearon statement is consistent with the approach that seeks to prove that there is an ongoing pogrom against Minority A by using statistics that say 50% of Minority A have been victims of violence based on their minority status or perceive hostility or mistrust based on their minority status. Only when you read the details do you find that the study authors have deliberately padded a tiny record of violence with massive numbers of perceived slights to achieve their paper crisis. This is a meaningless definition of civil war.
Then Fearon oddly goes on to state:
When they do finally end, civil wars typically conclude with a decisive military victory for one side. Of the roughly 55 civil wars fought for control of a central government (as opposed to for secession or regional autonomy) since 1955, fully 75 percent ended with a clear victory for one side. The government ultimately crushed the rebels in at least 40 percent of the 55 cases, whereas the rebels won control of the center in 35 percent. Power-sharing agreements that divide up control of a central government among the combatants have been far less common. By my reckoning, at best, 9 of the 55 cases, or about 16 percent, ended this way. Examples include El Salvador in 1992, South Africa in 1994, and Tajikistan in 1997.
It is odd to say we have civil war in Iraq and then go on to say that the government crushes the opposition in most cases. And by excluding all civil strife that doesn't involve a struggle for control of the central government, Fearon seems to rule out a lot of civil strife well above that "change government policy" that Fearon in the first place says count as civil war. What gives?
We have civil strife going on in Iraq. But there are too many players across all sectarian divides to say it is a civil war. (Alternatively, if your definition of civil war is expansive enough to include the current fighting, the civil war has been going on for decades.) Some Sunni Arabs want to control the government. Some Sunni Arabs want to cooperate with the new government. Some Sunni Arabs just want to kill infidels. Most Shias want a democracy where their numbers will give them power (and justifiably so). Some Shias want a religious dictatorship. Some Shias love the Iranians. Some Kurds want an independent state. Some Kurds want to be part of a free and democratic Iraq. Various other minorities would just dearly love rule of law to preserve themselves.
There is too much Iranian, Syrian, and jihadi support for various factions that do not want democracy to call it a civil war. Without external support, the insurgents and terrorists would be defeated by now.
And mostly, there is too little chance of the Sunnis grabbing central power to call it a civil war (we have tossed that insane idea that fighting to change government policy counts as a civil war, haven't we?). When Shias represent about 70% of Iraq's population, how is it possible to think that Shias won't rightly dominate the security apparatus and government? How is it possible to think that a remotely fair fight between Shias and Sunni Arabs will result in a Sunni Arab victory? With the government having oil to sell, the government will have the resources to fight the Sunni and Shia thugs.
But Fearon thinks that we should balance the sides and push for power sharing:
To avail itself of more attractive policy options, the Bush administration (or its successor) must break off its unconditional military support for the Shiite-dominated government that it helped bring to power in Baghdad. Washington's commitment to Maliki's government undermines U.S. diplomatic and military leverage with almost every relevant party in the country and the region. Starting to move away from this commitment by shifting combat troops out of the central theaters could, accordingly, increase U.S. leverage with almost all parties. The current Shiite political leadership would then have incentives to try to gain back U.S. military support by, for example, making more genuine efforts to incorporate Sunnis into the government or reining in Shiite militias. (Admittedly, whether it has the capacity to do either is unclear.) As U.S. troops departed, Sunni insurgent groups would begin to see the United States
less as a committed ally of the "Persians" and more as a potential source of financial or even military backing.
This is hogwash. We should side with the Sunni Arabs who oppressed Shias and Kurds for centuries and who continue to slaughter Shias in terror bombings? Betraying the Shias will make them more cooperative? Why is it wrong for the Shias and their Kurdish allies to defeat the Sunni Arab terrorists? And why would a Shia-Kurd victory (with increasing numbers of Sunni Arabs joining) mean that we won't get a democracy in Iraq over time even if it doesn't appear tomorrow? First, why wouldn't the Shias want democracy to legitimize their numerical advantage? And why wouldn't continued American support to ensure rule of law help democracy along? We won't have instant full democracy in Iraq any more than we had it in 1777. We had a long road from 1776 to 1865-and even longer to 1965. But to argue that we are doomed to fail in Iraq seems incredibly short-sighted and shamefully eager for failure.
And even in his history to support his view, Fearon gets the entire Bosnia settlement wrong. He states:
Each side needs to come to the conclusion that it cannot get everything it wants by violence. For example, the Dayton agreement that divided power among the parties to the Bosnian war required not only NATO intervention to get them to the table and enforce the deal but also more than three years of intense fighting, which had brought the combatants essentially to a stalemate by the summer of 1995.
This is absolutely wrong. Yes, by the summer of 1995 there was stalemate. But Fearon ignores the August 1995 Operation Storm which coincided with our small aerial campaign. Operation Storm was a ground offensive that led Croatian and Bosnian Moslem forces to kick Serbs out of their holdings of Croatian and Moslem territory. The fighting could end under our watchful eyes because the Croatians and Bosnian Moslems captured their objectives in a lightning campaign and the Serbs feared losing even more if they kept fighting!
To argue for balancing based on misreporting the victory of one side as stalemate is outrageous. This seems like an essay designed to argue against a victory that we will achieve if we don't hand victory to the enemy in an unseemly display of panic or revulsion that we might win. Why does today's foreign policy "realism" always seem to focus on ways to save our enemies and deny us victory? You'd think "realists" would welcome even an imperfect Shia-Kurd victory that results in an authoritarian regime friendly to America rather than conspiring against such a victory.
Come on people, turn that fear switch to the fully off position. Dare to win. And dare to believe we should win.
