Commanders said a series of ongoing, coordinated operations between units throughout Ramadi would help to destabilize the enemy. At the same time however, Silverman said he and other commanders were not about to underestimate their foes.
“These guys have been involved since 2003,” Silverman said. “These guys are at their pinnacle. In some ways, they are almost as good as a professional army. Don’t get me wrong — I’m not enamored of the enemy. They are savages, absolutely. But they are not poorly trained savages.”
During the 3rd ID’s 2005 deployment to the areas of Balad, Tikrit, Samarra and Beiji, it was common for groups of 15 or 20 attacking insurgents to flee after two or three of them had been killed. Here, however, the same sized group will press their attack until most of them have been cut down, commanders say.
In a vivid example, officers said that U.S. snipers methodically killed 10 insurgent attackers recently as they attempted to crawl up a creek bed toward a combat outpost downtown.
The phenomenon, officers say, is linked to a breakthrough alliance here between U.S. forces and a majority of local tribes who once aided the Islamist groups. Until late last year, more than two-thirds of enemy fighters here were considered to be local Baath Party loyalists and/or from criminal groups. Now many of those local tribe members have opted out of the fight or joined the Iraqi police.
Those enemy who remain, officers say, are mostly hard-core Islamists who are increasingly desperate to break the alliance between tribes and the coalition.
The Americans interviewd call these enemies well trained, but well-trained insurgents wouldn't reinforce failure by continuing an attack until most are dead. The insurgents need the element of surprise, and if surprise wears off before the insurgents can inflict damage on defenders without suffering much themselves, they need to get the heck out of Dodge and try again another time. The counter-insurgent side with the power of the state can afford higher losses than the insurgents or terrorists. Direct combat while enduring losses is a mistake for insurgents. That's why the enemy usually uses IEDs and assorted suicide bombs.
The Americans quoted are mistaking fanatical for well trained, I think. Oh, the enemy may be skilled in terms of individual fighting abilities and small-unit tactics, but a well-trained insurgent enemy wouldn't persist in battering themselves against well-trained troops who are successfully shooting back. This is the difference between being a warrior and being a soldier. Fortunately for us, it is the difference between dead and living enemies.
The loss of the Baathists who were trained but not prone to welcoming martyrdom among the enemy ranks is a welcome change. It will help us kill more of the enemy. Determined and dead is fine by me.
