Seriously?

The Chinese do have a sense of humor. They want a say in the Arctic Sea and decry Western countries who think that their proximity to the Arctic gives them exclusive rights to the region.

China is eying the natural resources and potential for year-round shipping lanes across the region. They think they should have a say:

So far, China hasn't unveiled an official Arctic policy. But the world's second-largest economy is apparently preparing to play a key role in securing the region's riches.

"Countries closer to the Arctic, such as Iceland, Russia, Canada, and a few other European countries may tend to wish the Arctic were private or that they had priority to develop it," Cui Hongjian, head of the European department of the China Institute for International Studies, told reporters before Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Europe. "But China insists that the Arctic belongs to everyone just like the moon."

Like the moon, they say.

But unlike the Yellow Sea where China gets upset if our warships exercise with the South Koreans.

And unlike the East China Sea which Japan had best vacate if they know best.

And unlike the South China Sea which China says is their home territory-- and is indeed their City of Sansha.

And unlike India, which China claims occupies Chinese territory.

You have to love the chutzpah. If territory is close to China, it is China's territory. If it is close to others? Well, they need to share.

But of course China has a policy that covers the Arctic. The policy is that if China wants it, it is their territory. Simple.

So who knows what could become a core interest of China in the future that everyone else needs to just back the eff off from China's control?

Could be the Arctic. Could be the Moon. Who knows?

I Don't Doubt the Tanks Will Be Sold

Germany won't sell 800 Leopard II tanks to Saudi Arabia. I have little doubt that eastern European NATO members will buy up all that are available before too long.

This is interesting timing:

The German government will not approve a reported deal to sell up to 800 battle tanks to Saudi Arabia, a German Sunday newspaper said, citing government sources.

The sale of the Leopard-2 tanks had been billed as one of the biggest deals for the German armaments industry, Bild reported.

Given how important it is to sell the tanks, would I be assuming too much to think that Poland and other eastern European NATO members will step in to buy these excellent tanks?

And would I be drawing too much of a conclusion to think that the government decision to not push for the sale is in order to keep the tanks in Europe in light of Russia's recent aggression and looming round two with Ukraine?

Putin Has Discovered Our NATO Plot

If Russia moves in to eastern Ukraine to support all those separatists who seem to be active lately, expect to see "proof" of NATO intervention that justifies Russia's aggression.

Russia is denying that they are up to anything.

Russia says it has no military personnel in eastern Ukraine. At the same time Russian mass media is full of stories about American “mercenaries” operating in Ukraine.

Russian claims of NATO mercenaries or even special forces destabilizing Ukraine will be bolstered by captured American equipment that will be put on display. They've done it before.

UPDATE: Russia called for a UN Security Council meeting today:

The U.N. Security Council has called an emergency meeting at Russia's request to discuss the growing crisis in Ukraine.

No word on what is going on, so far.

One can assume that the Russian representative won't tearfully apologize for Russia's responsiblity for the growing crisis.

My worry is that Putin is checking a diplomatic box to pretend he consulted with the world before sending his troops in to the eastern corner of Ukraine.

I honestly didn't think Putin would risk a war with Ukraine that could go badly and tarnish the reputation built on Crimea. But events point to Russia beginning a war.

Hope, Change, and Planting Stories

The Obama administration is planting stories to blame Israel for the failure to keep talks with Palestinians going (tip to Instapundit):

The Obama administration has been waging a secret media war in capitals across two continents blaming Israel for the recent collapse of peace talks with the Palestinians, according to former Israeli diplomats and Washington, D.C. insiders familiar with the peace process. ...

These administration officials have planted several stories in Israeli and U.S. newspapers blaming Israel for the collapse of peace talks and have additionally provided reporters with anonymous quotes slamming the Israeli government.

The primary source of these multiple reports has been identified as Middle East envoy Martin Indyk and his staff, according to these insiders, who said that the secret media campaign against Israel paved the way for Secretary of State John Kerry to go before Congress on Tuesday and publicly blame Israel for tanking the talks.

Huh. The administration is planting stories. False stories.

Oh, no worries. Nobody will get outraged over this.

The people horrified that our military paid to have stories--accurate stories--placed in Iraqi media during the Iraq War to support winning that war will not be equally horrified about this effort.

Everything really is better with hope and change.

Is Putin Leading from Behind?

I've mentioned that even if Putin does not want to invade Ukraine (again), that nationalistic forces that he relies on for his support could push him to invade anyway.

Russia appears to have the capability to move into eastern Ukraine. Whether they have the capability to fight for and hold eastern Ukraine is another question altogether.

Rationally, I think Putin should pocket his easy victory in Crimea that gives him a tremendous propaganda victory that makes it appear his military is awesome, as well as gaining control of an important military base to allow him to project power into the Mediterranean Sea.

As Putin continues to stoke tension with Ukraine by engineering uprisings in Ukraine's east, he could be preparing for round two with an operation justified by a similar effort in Crimea.

Or he could just be trying to influence negotiations with the West over Ukraine's internal governance to loosen Kiev's control of the regions, trying to influence Ukrainian elections coming up, or trying to get the West and Ukraine to accept Russia's conquest of Crimea.

Indeed, the special forces work in eastern Ukraine could be a compromise by Putin between cashing in his Crimea chips or letting the bet ride to gain eastern Ukraine. Perhaps nationalistic elements want to keep going, and unable to simply rein them in, Putin has said, "show me what you can do" and then he'll decide, putting the burden on them to keep expanding Russia.

Putin might be putting the aggressive nationalists within his government in the position of making good on their claims, and if they can't whip up a faux uprising as they did in Crimea, Putin can safely end the crisis.

Yet if they can do that, Putin could have no choice but to continue the war even if he doesn't want to right now.

Regardless of Putin's intentions, nationalistic forces could push Putin to invade even if he does not want to risk a war over eastern Ukraine. Those forces aren't just a passive force to be harnessed in direct support of whatever Putin chooses to do. They are a force that can move in its own direction:

From the moment that Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea cast a new, bitter chill over relations with the West, a sinister jingoistic vibe has pervaded this unsettled capital — stirred up by state-controlled television and Mr. Putin himself.

“Some Western politicians are already threatening us not just with sanctions but also the prospect of increasingly serious problems on the domestic front,” the president said in his speech announcing plans to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation. “I would like to know what they have in mind exactly: action by a fifth column, this disparate bunch of ‘national traitors,’ or are they hoping to put us in a worsening social and economic situation so as to provoke public discontent?” ...

There is also now a website with a name that translates as “traitor.net” that includes photos and quotations of public figures who have spoken out in some way against Russia’s policy toward Ukraine. The bottom of the site has a button inviting viewers to “suggest a traitor.”

At Mr. Putin’s direction, a committee led by his chief of staff is developing a new “state policy in culture.” Widely expected to be enacted into law, the proposed cultural policy emphasizes that “Russia is not Europe” and urges “a rejection of the principles of multiculturalism and tolerance” in favor of emphasizing Russia’s “unique state-government civilization,” according to Russian news accounts that quoted a presidential adviser on culture, Vladimir Tolstoy. ...

Some of the language on Russian television in recent days has been far more charged than anything heard during Soviet times. One of the country’s most prominent television hosts, Dmitry K. Kiselyov, declared during an evening newscast last month that Russia remains “the only country in the world capable of turning the U.S.A. into radioactive ash.”

A force like this could easily conclude that Putin himself deserves to be on a traitors' list if he fails to "return" Ukraine to Russian control and leaves millions of Russians "stranded" and at risk in a foreign land.

So while I think that rationality requires Putin to hold off on invading Ukraine (again), I can't be sure if he defines rational the same way I do. And that assessment of rationality is complicated by the forces of nationalism that Putin is whipping up but which could carry him along on a wave of xenophobia that he does not control and only hopes to survive.

While intentions can change overnight, Russia's military capabilities to begin a war in Ukraine remain intact.

Don't forget that as tensions are stoked by Moscow, Ukraine under pressure might decide that they have no choice but to use their smaller military power to strike first at Russia in the belief that they are making a preemptive strike.

Armed with publicly released satellite photos, might the Ukrainians in the belief that the Russians are coming use air and missile forces to hit Russian airfields and combat units arrayed near their border or in newly annexed Crimea?

The Ukrainians are counter-attacking against the "uprisings" in the east:

Ukrainian security forces launched an operation on Sunday to clear pro-Russian separatists from a police headquarters in the eastern city of Slaviansk, with Kiev reporting dead on both sides as it combats what it calls an act of aggression by Moscow.

Ukraine faces a rash of rebellions in the east which it says are inspired and directed by the Kremlin. But action to dislodge the armed militants risks tipping the stand-off into a new, dangerous phase as Moscow has warned it will protect the region's Russian-speakers if they come under attack.

Once shooting starts, attitudes change. Forces on both sides of the border could react in ways that escalate this beyond the control of anybody--even Putin.

And this is a reminder that it is unfair to blame the West for failing to bring Russia into the West after the Soviet Union fell. I hoped Russians would take the opportunity of defeating Communism to join the West (although I never supported their membership in NATO, not wanting NATO's eastern front to reach the Pacific Ocean facing China). But Russians feel apart from the West in many ways. And that's the way a lot of them like it.

If the Order is Given

China is close to theaters of battle and we are far away. That is the basic imbalance that gives China an opening to make gains by striking into a temporary vacuum. At some point, China may be strong enough to defeat the far forces coming back in. But we're not there yet.

If China grabs the Senkaku Islands from Japan, China has to count on Japan and America deciding not to fight. Our Marines are confident that they could retake the islands if lost. Indeed, the Marines wonder if the Marines' ability to overcome defenders would even be needed, in the end:

“If we were directed to take the Senkakus, could we? Yes. [But] to tell you how it would take place or would it take place or any of that would be pure speculation,” Lt. Gen. John Wissler, the commander of the III Marine Expeditionary Force based in Japan, said at a breakfast with defense reporters in Washington.

“They’re not real big,” he said. “I think sometimes people get this idea that the Senkakus look like the island of Okinawa or, you know, any of the other major islands. It’s a very, very small collection of small islands.” ...

“You wouldn’t maybe even necessarily have to put somebody on that island until you had eliminated the threat, so to speak. And that’s where that whole integration of our full capabilities as a Navy-Marine Corps team would be of value,” he said.

The question is, would the Marines (and the rest of the military) get the order. And then how long would it take to carry out the mission?

The Japanese in 1941 assumed the order would not be given--or would be rescinded in short order as the magnitude of the job became apparent.

Could China think the same way, thinking nuclear weapons would deter any counter-attack, even when the magnitude of the job would be so small?

The Putin Triangle

It appears that Russian special forces are acting in Donetsk. Pro-Russian uprisings in other eastern cities as well force me to question whether Russia does not want to invade Ukraine (again).

I often write that gaining surprise consists of convincing a foe that you plan to do what they think you plan to do, rather than hiding your plans and actions.

I've written that I think the Russians don't want to risk invading Ukraine and having their claims of a revitalized armed forces exposed as hollow should the Ukrainians be able to resist the invasion.

But 40,000 Russian troops close to Ukraine's eastern borders and 40,000 more deeper inside Russia that could follow up that first wave (plus whatever is still in Crimea) added to reports of numerous pro-Russian uprisings in eastern Ukraine force me to question whether Russia is just bluffing and hoping to get a better peace deal to cement their successful subliminal invasion of Crimea.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reports Russian news reports of what I assume are Spetsnaz in unmarked uniforms active in the Ukrainian city of Donetsk.

The Ukrainian regional police chief in the area resigned under pressure from pro-Russians, which will harm reaction to the attacks. Did the chief get a friendly suggestion from actual Russians to get scarce?

Armed men also took a police station in Slovyansk, north of Donetz, while protesters took over other government buildings there, too. Another report says that the men have taken control of the entire city, throwing up road blocks around the place:

Armed separatists took virtual control of a city in eastern Ukraine on Saturday and Kiev prepared troops to deal with what it called an "act of aggression by Russia".

Pro-Russian activists carrying automatic weapons seized government buildings in Slaviansk and set up barricades on the outskirts of the city. Official buildings in several neighboring towns were also attacked.

Mobs took over other government building in Donetsk and in Krasny Lyman and Kramatorsk, which are near Slovyansk.

Add these to takeovers a week ago in Donetsk as well as in Kharkov (since taken back by Ukrainian forces) and Luhansk.

These locations are noted with black blobs below.

Ukrainian authorities say they will regain their ground:

Acting Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov says attacks by pro-Russia separatists in eastern Ukraine are an "act of aggression" by Russia.

Avakov said in a statement on his Facebook page that units of the Ukrainian Interior and Defense ministries "are implementing an operational response plan" to attacks by protesters on police stations and other government buildings in several cities and towns.

A combination of Spetsnaz-orchestrated "uprisings" supported by Russian troops moving in to "restore order" could put Russia in charge of a triangle of Ukrainian territory in the east anchored on the west by Kharkov at the north end and Donetsk at the southern end.

Added to Crimea, Russia will have wounded Ukraine twice.

But will Russia get away with aggression twice?

If Russia moves again, will Ukraine resist? Will Ukraine counter-attack with conventional forces or try to arm pro-Ukrainian local forces to resist the Russians?

Or would the Ukrainians respond by holding in the east while counter-attacking into Crimea or taking over the Russian enclave of Transdniestria on Ukraine's western border?

And does NATO get serious about supporting Ukraine with arms, equipment, intelligence, and supplies?

I've been guessing that the Russians don't want to risk a military failure by pushing for more ground after the flashy Crimea success.

But the plan may have been two-staged all along because of insufficient ready troops to carry out simultaneous operations.

Or maybe the plan was just Crimea, but success in Crimea is putting pressure on Putin to keep going while they are on a hot streak. Riding nationalism can result in being pushed by that nationalism rather than leading it.

Maybe operations in the eastern Ukraine are being allowed for the benefit of the aggressive nationalists to see if the Spetsnaz can recreate the Crimea situation and if so, exploit that with troops. And if they can't recreate the Crimea scenario, just use the exercise to scare the West and Ukraine into coming to terms with Russia's conquest of Crimea alone,

I wish I could remain confident that Russia doesn't intend to invade Ukraine (again). But I'm still not sure rationality is the way to judge this.

UPDATE: One view in Ukraine is that the activity is related to negotiations:

Ukrainian commentator Sergei Leshchenko said the burst of activity by pro-Russian groups was an attempt by the Kremlin to secure a strong negotiating position before the international talks about Ukraine in Geneva next Thursday.

Russia is expected to argue at the talks for a revamp of Ukraine's constitution to give a large degree of autonomy to eastern Ukraine, something Kiev and its Western backers reject.

Not that easterners want to leave Ukraine--not even the Russian speakers as a whole--but if Russia can pretend they do, as Russia did in Crimea, that works, too.

Of course, Ukraine can always tell Russia that Ukraine will be a federal state just as soon as Russia is one.

UPDATE: RFE/RL reports that pro-Russians have taken over the mayor's office in Mariupol, which lies on the Sea of Azov and is at the bottom of the western edge of the triangle that trouble is being engineered in.

UPDATE: RFE/RL also reports Kiev Post story that says pro-Russians have taken over an administration building in Yenakievo, whose mayor is wavering, and which is northeast of Donetsk; and at Kramatorks, between Donetsk and Kharkov, pro-Russians have taken a police station and possibly the city administration building and local airport.

With all these locations experiencing unrest, Russian forces could march into Kharkov from the north and Donetsk from the south, and then move to the numerous cities in between to pinch off the Ukrainian salient; while another force moves into Mariupol to threaten a drive to create an overland link to Crimea.

I just have a very bad feeling about this, today (13th).

UPDATE: Reports on Sunday from RFE/RL of clashes in Zaporizhia between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian demonstrators. This city is on the Dnieper River south of Dnepropetrovsk and ouside the triangle of territory where the Russians appear to be active. This could be a local thing feeding off of the eastern operations. Or it could indicate deeper objectives by Moscow.

UPDATE: More from RFE/RL. Pro-Russian separatists storm mayor's office in Kharkov. Our government says these events in the east clearly show involvement by Moscow.

Bad Metrics

I should probably be upset that we're ranked so high on a metric based on socialism:

The United States remains unmatched by any other large economy when measured by per-person income, but by a new measure of “social progress,” it’s way behind – No. 16 – in delivering a high-quality life to its citizens. That’s the message of the Social Progress Index, a barometer released this month that offers a window into the well-being of people in 132 nations.

There's the problem right there: ranking nations based on how much the state does to deliver a high-quality life to its citizens. When you measure how closely a state resembles an ideal Euro-Socialist cradle-to-grave state, Euro-Socialist-style states will be measured higher.

I'm of the opinion that citizens are responsible for that and the state's role should be more limited in the providing high quality of life role and better in the providing opportunity to achieve high quality of life role.

And how good is this index anyway when the SPI score matches the per-capita GDP so closely? Most countries--including the United States--fall very close to the comparison curve in their report (summary here).

Perhaps you can say some of the outliers have lessons for success or failure, but for most countries just knowing their per capita GDP will tell you as much as the SPI.

Intentions

As news of satellite images showing a Russian build up of troops across from Ukraine comes out, I can see one reason why we haven't been sharing detailed intelligence about the Russians.

Sharing intelligence with the Ukrainians on Russian troop deployments threatening an invasion seemed like a no-brainer to me, but after seeing some of the photos (here, here, and here), I can understand one reason for not wanting to do so--we don't want nervous Ukrainians thinking their small military needs to launch a preemptive air and missile attack to do some damage while they can.

One, I do not believe that the Russians are incapable of hiding deployments if they wanted to. I think the Russians clearly want their troop build up seen by satellites.

Heck, I wonder if we know they are real and not plywood or inflatable?

Aircraft lined up along an airfield are even more bizarre. Really? Lined up wing tip to wing tip to be attacked and not in shelters or even just dispersed?

The latter is what really gets me thinking that the last thing we want Ukrainians--understandably worried about being invaded (again)--to do is use that information to launch a preemptive attack on Russian airfields and units deployed close to Ukraine. Especially if we judge the Russians are not serious about invasion despite the very real deployments and capabilities to move into Ukraine on short notice.

And I'll say again that while the Russians could move into Ukraine with this force, I think it is insufficient to fight a real war without losing the aura of skill that the Spetsnaz-led offensive in Crimea created.

But we can't orchestrate both sides. We'd like Ukrainians to be able to defend against a Ukrainian invasion. But perhaps we don't think Russia will invade and we don't want nervous Ukrainians to strike first in the belief that this is the only way to disrupt a looming Russian attack.

But we don't know if Russian intentions will change overnight, letting them use their capabilities. And we don't know if Ukrainians will use a new capability (based on detailed intelligence) to empower a change of intentions from defense to offense overnight.

The Subliminal Invasion

I've called Crimea the Subliminal Invasion because it was spearheaded by Spetsnaz who AstroTurfed an independence movement, with conventional Russian units really just a reserve force in case the operation went really badly. But it did not go badly at all.

Strategypage describes the operation and the Spetsnaz who carried it out. Which is still going on in eastern Ukraine, actually.

UPDATE: More from Strategypage:

[Now] we know that in Crimea the 22nd and 45th GRU (Military Intelligence) spetsnaz (special operations) regiments were active early and often. There were only a few hundred of spetsnaz ... wearing uniforms with no insignia. Also identified were members of the infamous (for brutal but effective special operations in Chechnya) Vostok battalion and an airborne unit (31st Airborne Brigade) that has showed up in a lot of tricky situations (Bosnia, Chechnya, Georgia). In other words what foreign intelligence agencies have come to regard as The Usual Suspects whenever there is an operation using a lot of special operations troops.

I wonder if these troops have been shifted to eastern Ukraine? Perhaps there really weren't enough Usual Suspects for simultaneous Russian operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

The Weakest Link

China's military power may be growing, but it is far from dominant even in its own region. China would have difficulties defeating Japan alone.

The trend of power balance between China and Japan has worked in China's favor in recent years, but Japan still has the edge:

With the world's biggest military, China far outnumbers rival Japan in manpower, ships, aircraft and defence spending, but analysts say underlying weaknesses leave it still wary of a fight. ...

China's military "remains qualitatively inferior, in some respects, to more technologically advanced armed forces in the region -- such as South Korea and Japan -- and it lags far behind the US", [the IISS Military Balance 2014] said.

If it came to a fight over the Senkakus, I think Japan has the edge and we could avoid direct combat with China while supporting Japan's campaign--which would actually be vital for Japan to fight.

And Japan has decided to refocus their military to the south and come to the conclusion that they must spend more to affect that trend to keep China's advantage from growing too great.

Really, if China wants a war to signal their arrival as a great power, they'd do better to emulate Japan more than a century ago and target Russia rather than tangle with Japan and risk war with America, too.

Make Sure We Pivot to the Western Pacific

Fear is the beginning of wisdom. But terror is the beginning of panic. Don't be too comforted that our allies close to China are arming up and cooperating to oppose China's rising power.

There was a time when America's power superiority over China was so great that our allies without a major land corridor to China could safely rely on our power to hold off China.

We sometimes resented that without appreciating the fact that it meant we were so superior that our allies could afford to slack off.

Today, China's rising power and worries about our ability to defend them are pushing our allies (and creating new allies) to arm up and work together.

Vietnam and the Philippines are a case in point:

The Philippine navy will soon return to a South China Sea island it lost to Vietnam 40 years ago to drink beer and play volleyball with Vietnamese sailors, symbolising how once-suspicious neighbours are cooperating in the face of China's assertiveness in disputed waters.

Diplomats and experts describe the nascent partnership as part of a web of evolving relationships across Asia that are being driven by fear of China as well as doubts among some, especially in Japan, over the U.S. commitment to the region. ...

Among the new network of ties: growing cooperation between Japan and India; Vietnam courting India and Russia; and Manila and Hanoi, the two capitals most feeling China's wrath over claims to the potentially energy-rich South China Sea, working more closely together. The Philippines and Vietnam are also talking to Malaysia about China.

On the surface, this is good. And it is. To a point.

The point it stops being good is if the power balance tilts too much to China and these states take the next step and either build their own nukes to deter China or decide that prudence requires them to make deals with China and switch sides or go neutral.

Yes, these states can increase cooperation with each other. But they all ultimately require American power to hold China at bay:

But for all those neighbors to be willing to stand up to China's power, they have to be confident that we have the power and determination to use it against China and to be confident that other potential partners won't stop absorbing some of China's power by making deals with China to ally with Peking. If these countries don't have confidence that we will help them, they'll cut a deal with China to protect themselves and turn away from us.

So we have to be careful about maintaining our power in the Pacific and maintaining our reputation for supporting allies and fighting until we win. If any nation, like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia, or Vietnam think that they can't count on us for effective military support, they'll withdraw from the potential balancing coalition against China. And once one country defects, the power potential arrayed against China will drop enough to perhaps push another country to defect and align with China rather than with us.

Thus, even a reduction in our military power that may seem marginal to us could be what tips the system against us in a cascade of defections, causing a dramatic drop in coalition power arrayed against China, and denying us the capability of operating in the western Pacific. Instead of being a rear base to support our allies against China, Guam would become an outpost as we are pushed back to the Aleutians-Hawaii line for our line of defense against Chinese naval power.

All these bilateral relationships in local areas require American power to knit them together in ways that hold China at bay. Without our power spanning the entire region, each portion of the growing partnership of nations opposed to China is vulnerable to China--on interior lines--deciding to mass forces against one portion of that partnership and overwhelm it without having to worry about other local points of opposition being able to intervene against China.

In this manner, China can pick off enemies and compel others to wonder where they are on the list--and either go nuclear or switch sides.

Stratfor has relevant thoughts on our defense issues. There is so much to comment on that I'll simply say check it out. I have few quibbles with this analysis. While I'm a ground power guy, his thoughts explain my affection for a powerful Navy and my appreciation for a dominant Air Force to support the Army.

So we're at the end of the "end of history." Nor really, of course. History didn't end. We just pretended it did. At least the lesson was learned in Crimea and not someplace that could decisively harm our security directly.

Putin is Not Our Fault

Once again, Russia is not acting aggressively because we expanded NATO in the late 1990s to include the Baltic states.

Ethnic Russians were seen as a means to reverse the empire's contraction all the way back in 1992:

Mr. Karaganov hypothesized two decades ago that the Russian speakers living in newly independent countries such as Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states would become the prime guarantors of Moscow’s political and economic influence over its neighbours after the fall of the Soviet Union. In a 1992 speech that laid out what became known as the “Karaganov doctrine,” he prophesied that Moscow might one day feel compelled to use force to protect them, and thus its interests, in the former USSR.

Putin didn't adopt this doctrine back then. But the impulse was there waiting for Putin to harness it as Russia recovered some power. Defeat in the Cold War prompted this thinking and not any particular Western action after the events of 1989-1991.

Georgia On My Mind

I've complained that critics of President Bush's response to Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008 both neglect what we did in response and my comment that these critics focus on Bush's 5 months to respond while ignoring President Obama's 5 years to respond. In August 2008, I was speaking of our need to respond in the years ahead.

In this post on responding to Russia even as Russian forces were confronting Georgian forces, I said:

NATO membership and the ability to fight an invasion are the correct lessons to digest.

As time passes, it is possible that Russia's invasion of Georgia will lead those ex-Soviet colonies that seek our friendship to rethink their position and cave to Russian demands. Which is why the months and years ahead will be crucial to making sure that these countries can count on our friendship and their own military to keep the bear at bay.

Of course, even if we had a good reputation, Ukraine isn't in NATO and Ukraine didn't have a military capable of quickly fighting an invasion force. Even setting aside the chaos of a post-Yanukovich government, Ukraine's military was in poor shape. We should at least help with that.

And we need to work on our allies in the months and years ahead in the aftermath of Russia's seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. Right now they have to look to us as the only game in town. But as time passes, they may reconsider their options if they believe we aren't reliable.

Would Europe really be a better place if Russia gains allies at our expense or if countries that don't wish to buckle to Russian demands go nuclear to avoid de-nuclearized Ukraine's plight?

The Putinonic Wars

While I agree that there is little we could do to decisively intervene should Russia invade Ukraine, we can help Ukraine gain the ability to mount a credible defense.

And if we can't do that, we can ship in small arms and garage door openers (for IEDs) to turn Ukraine into a "Ukrainian ulcer" until Russia retreats.

Late to the Party, as Usual

I suppose the one thing to be said in defense of our late decision to oppose Assad by arming Syrian rebels is that we're usually late to the party, hoping things will work out without us.

We will arm Syrian rebels out of our southern base in Jordan:

The U.S. government is finalizing a plan to increase training and small-arms shipments for Syrian rebels, two U.S. security sources said on Friday, as Syrian government troops gain momentum following the collapse of U.S.-backed peace talks.

The United States would increase assistance and send the shipments to moderate rebel factions mostly based in Jordan, along Syria's southern border, the officials familiar with the plan told Reuters.

The additional supplies are likely to be modest and will not include surface-to-air missiles[.]

Even if our help is not large, I assume Saudi-led efforts will be more significant.

And I have no problem with not sending anti-aircraft missiles. That is too risky and the rebels can get by without them.

Syrian air power isn't that impressive, really. And if armed with rockets, recoil-less rifles, and mortars, the rebels can strike at airfields. Heavy machine guns can be used against helicopters and to keep aircraft from flying too low.

And heavy weapons can help the rebels take Assad airfields or put them under siege. Rebel boots on airfields is the ultimate air defense.

Again?

If Syria has used chemical weapons again, I guess that means that they believe they've purchased as much time as they possibly can without giving up too much of their chemical arsenal.

Why hasn't this made the news?

Israel announced that it believes that Syria again used chemical weapons on March 27th, during two operations on the outskirts of Damascus.

This seems like kind of a big deal. If true, of course.

UPDATE: Another portion of Strategypage expands a bit:

The government is apparently using chemical weapons in small quantities, mainly as a psychological weapon to persuade civilians to accept government control. The two attacks outside Damascus caused only 15 deaths but the rebels apparently were able to obtain some physical evidence. The government denies any responsibility and accuses the rebels of making it all up.

The government now controls the areas that are alleged to have been hit with chemicals.

As a psychological weapon, that makes sense. Show the rebels that the Kerry-Lavrov deal didn't even end Assad's ability to gas them anytime Assad chooses to do so.

UPDATE: It makes the news:

Both sides in Syria's bloody civil war said Saturday that a rural village fell victim to a poison gas attack, an assault that reportedly injured scores of people amid an ongoing international effort to rid the country of chemical weapons.

Don't expect any outsiders to confirm who carried this out--or if it was carried out. It's even possible that weapons intended to seem like poison gas without being poison gas are being used just to get the terror aspect of chemical use into rebel minds to demoralize them.

Will the Stans Just Wait Their Turn?

So Ukraine lost Crimea because Russia could argue that ethnic Russians needed Moscow's protection and NATO was far away. The Soviet Union's former Central Asian provinces can't be too happy to see that precedent being set. Luckily for them, China is closer.

Central Asian countries have options to get off of the conveyor belt that is being set up to suck them into Russia's orbit:

China sees an opportunity here. That’s because the former Soviet stans of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have another option; China. The stans have been very receptive to Chinese diplomatic and economic cooperation. This bothers Russia, but not to the extent that threats are being made, as was the case with the former imperial provinces to the west. The stans also have a problem with never having been democracies. When the Russians conquered them in the 19th century the local governments were monarchies or tribes. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, locals who were former Soviet officials held elections and manipulated the vote to get themselves elected "president for life." But many people in the Stans want clean government and democracy, as well as continued independence from Russia. China is no help with that because the Chinese prefer dictators. But China does offer more economic opportunities and protection from what happened to Ukraine and Georgia.

Yes, having lots of ethnic Russians is danger in the Age of Putin. These states might find China a better-placed counterweight to Putin's great power ambitions rather than just patiently wait for Russia to get around to discovering the distress of their own ethnic Russians.

And China can pocket the precedent of rescuing your ethnic brethren if China ever sees an opportunity to revive dormant claims to Russia's Far East.

So Russia may pay a price even if we can't manage to exact one.

Which is just one reason that I never bought the idea that we alienated Russia by not considering them for NATO membership. In what world should NATO's security guarantees have been extended to the Amur river to hold off China?

Hitting the Sweet Spot of Uselessness

I've long been nervous about the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), but was willing to see if the ship types could work out the glitches normal in a new design. The Pentagon seems to think the glitches are a feature rather than a bug.

We clearly won't be buying the full amount of LCS we once thought we'd build:

U.S. Navy officers in the Pacific fleet say the service’s Littoral Combat Ship may lack the speed, range and electronic warfare capabilities needed to operate in Asian waters, according to a congressional audit.

“Several 7th Fleet officials told us they thought the LCS in general might be better suited to operations” in the smaller Persian Gulf, the U.S. Government Accountability Office said in a 56-page report, labeled “For Official Use Only,” obtained by Bloomberg News.

The Navy should consider buying fewer of the ships if its limitations prevent effective use in the Pacific, according to the report by GAO, Congress’s watchdog agency. The report follows others that have questioned the cost, mission and survivability in combat of the ship that’s designed to operate in shallow coastal waters.

You have to love 7th Fleet: We don't want it--give it to 5th Fleet.

But put in the Gulf? I don't think so. If LCS lacks the capabilities for blue water open ocean operations against a peer foe, the LCS also lacks the vital quality of cheapness to justify putting them in shallow, constricted waters close to land-based small craft, missiles, and aircraft:

We need a cheaper ship to provide numbers in the fleet. The LCS, despite cost overruns, will be cheaper than our other larger ships and still reasonably capable and flexible because of mission modules that can reorient the ship's capabilities.

But look at this ship. It is nearly 400 feet long and 3,000 tons. They are larger than our World War II destroyers. This is not a small, coastal combatant. And I have little doubt that these ships will suffer damage and loss if put into coastal waters against masses of cheap enemy ships that will include suicide boats.

This is quite the concept fail. We hoped to have a cheap vessel that we could afford to build in large numbers to use in littoral waters and--with additional mission packages installed--take their place in a task force to control the seas against peer naval foes.

But we seem to have hit the sweet spot of a ship too expensive to risk in the Persian Gulf and not capable enough of fighting a peer foe. And even if we work out glitches so that the ships work with those mission packages as intended, we still haven't solved the basic problems. We'll just have working ships too expensive to risk in littorals and too lightly armed to participate in the blue water battles.

Bravo. Really. Just outstanding.

What Doesn't Anger China?

I grow weary of China's constant anger management issues. Now they are upset that we will sell old frigates to Taiwan.

Cue the anger In Peking:

China's defense ministry expressed anger on Wednesday after the U.S. House of Representatives agreed to authorize the sale to Taiwan of four second-hand U.S. warships, saying the United States had ignored Chinese protests.

It isn't that we ignored China's protests. We received them, considered them, annotated them, and filed them.

May we always give China's anger all due consideration when it comes to helping a free people remain free.

So yeah, we should help Taiwan build submarines, as the Taiwanese president just asked:

"There seems to be a consensus in Taiwan that we should seek foreign technology to help us build (submarines) ourselves," the president said, adding that he hopes the American government will take that into account.

If we won't build them and if we can't convince anyone else to risk China's anger by selling them, we should help Taiwan build them. With any luck, Taiwan will have a thriving export market throughout Southeast Asia.

Ripples of the Iran-Iraq War

Stratfor has an interesting piece on Oman's development of a new port on the Arabian Sea. This continues a trend that both Arab states and Iran began during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s--bypassing the dangerously constricted Strait of Hormuz.

Oman is investing a lot of money for a port that will be useful for trade and American logistics efforts in the region:

A noteworthy geopolitical shift is emerging that the media have yet to report on. In future years, a sizable portion of the U.S. Navy's forces in the Middle East could be spending less time in the Persian Gulf and more time in the adjacent Indian Ocean. Manama in Bahrain will continue to be the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet. But American warships and their crews, as well as the myriad supply and repair services for them, could be increasingly focused on the brand new Omani port of Duqm, located outside the Persian Gulf on the Arabian Sea, which, in turn, forms the western half of the Indian Ocean.

I've never been happy with Bahrain as a base for anything but smaller naval vessels. I especially get nervous when we send a carrier in there since the mining and blocking of the Strait of Hormuz could turn a carrier into a ship-in-a-bottle. So a major port at Duqm (and a major airport, too) close to Iran but not nearly as vulnerable to direct attack or reliant on Hormuz for exit is welcome.

While the article points more to China and Asia as the motive for the port, you can also trace the development to Arab interest in bypassing the vulnerable Strait of Hormuz to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) when the "Tanker War" between Iraq and Iran highlighted the reliance of both combatants on free trade through the strait.

Geography is tough to overcome. And 25 years after that war, efforts are still being made to adapt to a hostile Iran looming over their economic artery through the Strait of Hormuz.

Of Village Idiots Past

A former CIA lawyer writes that the minor Valerie Plame "outing" was only made into a big deal because of a desire to harm the Bush presidency.

Indeed, the lawyer thought nothing would come of the so-called outing but was wrong not because of the facts but because he wrongly assumed:

a marginally harmful leak such as the Plame disclosure wouldn’t be prosecuted simply because of the partisan political pressure being applied at the time by opponents of Bush administration policies in Iraq.

But that pressure was applied. And a man who didn't even "out" Plame--Libby--was sent to prison.

It was always obvious that the charges about Plame were ridiculous.

And I still haven't had it explained to my satisfaction why the buffoon Wilson was sent to Niger on what was supposed to be an important mission?

It Is Better to Look Good Than to Feel Good

I'm just not convinced that Russia wants to risk a test of arms for their military in eastern Ukraine.

Russia is deploying a tank battalion to Crimea:

Russian army armoured battalion has arrived in Crimea equipped with the first main battle tanks (MBT) to be deployed by Russia on the contested peninsula since the start of the stand-off between Moscow and Kiev last month.

The unit, which included more than 30 T-72 tanks, was shown to the international media being unloaded at a railway cargo yard near the large Russian air and logistical base at Gvardeyskoe on 31 March.

The article notes that heavier forces will allow the naval infantry of the Sevastopol garrison to be pulled back and allow the airborne units sent in to be redeployed; and that the armor would make it tougher for Ukraine to counter-attack.

This article is from April 1st, and reality may have already allowed the Russians to pull out forces as I speculated earlier. And with fewer troops there and just 30 tanks, that isn't much of an offensive force.

Other news is that the Russians continue to build up troops at Belgograd, which is on a main road north of Kharkov:

Airbus Defence and Space imagery captured on 21 March 2014 shows Russian troop formations deployed to a training centre west of Belgorod. As current reporting continues to illuminate Russian military deployments in the region, satellite imagery represents a method of verifying both equipment deployments and deployment locations. Troops deployed to Belgorod reportedly originate from the 76th Air Assault Division in Pskov and the 106th Guards Airborne Division in Tula.

Satellite imagery of the bivouac area at the Belgorod training centre, captured on 21 March 2014, indicates a significant presence of military vehicles consistent with those found in an airborne division. Furthermore, a significant number of tents are present to house personnel.

One, there is no way that the Russians are incapable of hiding troops within Russia from satellite surveillance. They are better than that. Which makes me think they want their deployments to be noticed.

Two, why push airborne units forward to the border when they could have remained in their home bases to be airlifted in on the eve of an offensive or landed inside Ukraine? Are the Russians really going to use their airborne force as an overland light mechanized invasion force?

My guess, from my distant vantage point and admittedly incomplete information via open sources that I've found, is that Russia is attempting to cast a giant shadow and appear threatening rather than being a preparation for invasion.

But you never can tell what might push Putin to invade Ukraine anyway if his rhetoric paints himself into a corner of Ukraine.

Liberal Minded

I'm so old, I remember when dissent was the highest form of patriotism.

We've advanced beyond those days, of course:

The ongoing trial involving journalist Mark Steyn – accused of defaming climate change theorist Michael Mann – reflects an increasingly dangerous tendency among our intellectual classes to embrace homogeneity of viewpoint. Steyn, whose column has appeared for years on these pages, may be alternatingly entertaining or over-the-top obnoxious, but the slander lawsuit against him marks a milestone in what has become a dangerously authoritarian worldview being adopted in academia, the media and large sections of the government bureaucracy.

Let’s call it “the debate is over” syndrome, referring to a term used most often in relationship with climate change but also by President Barack Obama last week in reference to what remains his contentious, and theoretically reformable, health care plan. Ironically, this shift to certainty now comes increasingly from what passes for the Left in America.

Yes. I've often complained that it is a horrible assault on our language that "liberal minded" is portrayed as a synonym for "open minded." They are in fact, different.

I'm not arguing that conservatives are uniquely open minded. Nor am I denying liberals can be open minded, of course--but the sets merely overlap a bit rather than being identical.

The urge to just tell opponents to shut up and get with the program has nothing to do with open mindedness.

UPDATE: Related.

UPDATE: More related thoughts on the issue of only looking at information that supports your view (confirmation bias), that too many liberals assume is only a conservative problem:

Mr. Klein couldn’t muster much of an effort to find examples of liberal confirmation bias.

At least he concedes it exists. Even that much of a concession New York Times columnist Paul Krugman cannot abide. He insists conservatives are more prone to confirmation bias because he and all the liberals he knows are so much more open-minded than conservatives. ...

Such arrogant groupthink not only leads to bad policies, but it also reinforces a mass psychology that simply takes it for granted that liberals have sole access to the Truth. It’s like having God on your side without having to believe in God.

To bring this back to at least spitting distance of my usual topics, confirmation bias is how you really gain the element of surprise in war. As I've noted now and again, you often can't hide what you are doing.

But you can put out information that leads your target to draw the wrong conclusions about what they see by making a narrative that explains what is seen according to the target's existing (and incorrect) views.

To think that one part of the political spectrum is immune to that weakness is idiocy. Which would explain Krugman.

Captain Obvious Testifies

This is quite a defense by Secretary of State Kerry of his diplomacy on Syria:

Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kerry said US military action -- ultimately abandoned by President Barack Obama at the 11th hour last year -- would not have had a "devastating impact" on the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.

Air strikes wouldn't have worked?

Then why, pray tell, did Secretary Kerry liken Assad to Hitler and demand strikes before pulling back and assuring the world that any strikes would be "unbelievably small"--thus assuring they would have no devastating impact?

[In] a joint press conference in London with Britain’s foreign secretary, ... [Secretary of State] Kerry said the strike would be able to harm Assad without putting American troops on the ground and with a “very limited, very targeted, short-term effort.”

“That is exactly what we are talking about doing, unbelievably small, limited kind of effort,” Kerry said.

What, exactly, is Kerry talking about?

I don't know about air strikes. But Kerry's hand at the till of our ship of state is having a devastating impact on our diplomatic clout.

Gray Areas Invite Aggression

The threat that China could capture unoccupied Japanese islands and then dare the Japanese (and Americans) to do something about it should be preempted by defending those islands.

Yes, China threatens Japanese islands in the East China Sea and all the way up to Okinawa, in theory. So Japan has to take the lead in defending their territory:

Tokyo and Washington must debunk such thinking. By hardening the Ryukyus against seaborne and airborne assault, they can drive up the costs of an island-hopping expedition to prohibitive levels. Advance precautions can make the islands look unappetizing indeed. And a cautious China is in everyone's interest.

But drawing a line well short of the Senkakus risks a war outside the defensive perimeter the author suggests. If Japan and America resolve to harden the Ryukyus, don't we just tell China that they get a free shot at everything south and west of that hardened perimeter?

By all means, harden the Ryukyus. But that's not enough.

I don't suggest sending troops to those exposed islands south of that perimeter. But Japan can and should send in the robots to defend the more exposed and tiny islands:

It strikes me that Japan could defend their claims to the Senkaku islands by using CROWS and unmanned radar on the islands themselves supported by armed UAVs patrolling the area.

China would at least have to fight to take the islands--assuming Japan is willing to pull the trigger against perhaps unarmed Chinese sent ashore in a first wave to disable the robots (well, remote weapons stations, actually) ashore, thus requiring China to escalate to military forces.

If the Japanese have the capability to rapidly deliver sea mines by air if a Chinese move is detected, more robots could be put in place to keep the Chinese away from the islands in the first place.

It may be that the robots could focus on disabling any Chinese ships nearby while not shooting at unarmed Chinese "fisherman" who come ashore. Then the Japanese could send their coast guard to evict the unarmed occupiers.

Or perhaps some of those CROWS could be armed with water cannons rather than machine guns.

If China does fight to gain the islands, Japanese military assets in the hardened area could then move to defeat or isolate Chinese forces in and around the more distant islands that China takes.

Fighting for land is supposed to be so 19th century. Or was it 20th century thinking? But when the disputes are over land, sometimes you have to fight for the land.

Idiot; Useful: One Ea.

If Seymour Hersh published a book saying that the sun rises in the east, I'd doubt his analysis.

So a book relying on Russian analysis is not high on my reading list:

The investigative reporter Seymour Hersh just published a potentially dynamite claim in the London Review of Books: It wasn't the Syrian government that bombarded a rebel-held district outside Damascus with chemical weapons last year, but the rebels themselves, supplied with sarin gas by U.S. ally Turkey.

The usual suspects will embrace the charge even though the emodiment of hope and change that charged Assad's forces with the act sits in the Oval Office.

Could Bill Clinton Please Explain What 'No-Brainer' Means

Why on Earth would we deny intelligence to the Ukrainians? This should be a no-brainer.

President Obama has repeatedly and publicly expressed solidarity with the Ukrainian people—and warned Russian leader Vladimir Putin that there will be consequences if he takes over any more Ukrainian territory. Yet Obama’s administration has so far been reluctant to hand over the kind of intelligence the Ukrainians could use to defend themselves. U.S. officials and members of Congress briefed on the crisis in Ukraine tell The Daily Beast that senior U.S. military officers have been instructed to refrain from briefing their Ukrainian counterparts in detail about what the United States knows about the Russians troops amassing on the border.

I understand that we don't want to expose methods since Ukraine is infiltrated by Russian intelligence from the Yanukovich days. But surely we can share information that doesn't tell the Russians anything they don't know about our capabilities.

And the fact that Russia has infiltrated Ukraine would be to our advantage if Russia knows that Ukraine knows enough to make an invasion more difficult and costly.

I'd like to point out that we shared satellite information with Saddam's Iraq about Iranian deployments in their war because we recognized that an Iranian victory would be worse than an Iraqi victory in that war. We didn't have any sentiments of solidarity with the Iraqis at that point. Just a sense of realism.

It's still quite possible that we don't think Russia will invade and we are building up expectations of what Russia can achieve in order to deter Russia which surely has an idea that their military can't match those expectations. I lean to that explanation since I think Russia's military isn't the juggernaut that Putin wants the success of Crimea to bolster. War and actual battles with weaker Ukraine would expose Russian weaknesses.

Yes, mobile hospitals are a sign of invasion. But they could also be a sign that the Russians know we'd see those units and then draw the conclusion that the Russians are preparing to invade. This could be bluff to scare Kerry into a better deal.

If so, why not share information with Ukraine to make the reality of war even worse for the Russians?

And if Russia really is getting ready to invade? It is even more important to share information so Ukraine can prepare. Our intelligence didn't think Putin would invade Crimea, after all.

Somebody needs to explain to the Obama administration that "no-brainer" means you don't need a brain to come up with the right answer--not that you lack a brain to make a good decision.

A Moment of Clarity

Secretary Kerry had a rare moment of lucidity while testifying about the Ukraine Crisis:

Kerry was testifying before a U.S. Senate panel in Washington on April 8.

He said, "Everything that we've seen in the last 48 hours, from the Russian provocateurs and agents operating in eastern Ukraine, tells us that they've been sent there determined to create chaos."

And yet still I worry about giving Russia's Lavrov a chance to work on Kerry.

Learning from the Master of Deceit

As Putin is angling to make the argument that ethnic Russians are being oppressed in Ukraine and need rescuing by his troops, President Obama is claiming with as much credibility that women in America are being oppressed by men and need rescuing by his policies.



I'm not sure if it is more disturbing if the Obama administration believes this junk or is just cynically proclaiming it for political advantage.

The Chinese Curse in Action

It seems that women really hate it when men objectify them by noticing that some of them can be really hot.

So men learn coping mechanisms. Like getting a sense of them and looking away.



But mercifully, after decades of being looked at, women can apparently look forward to the day when men will stop being pigs (tip to Instapundit):

Women feel invisible to the opposite sex at the age of 51, it emerged yesterday.

A detailed study of 2,000 women revealed a large percentage felt they no longer received the level of attention they once did after hitting 51.

Many even went as far as to admit they felt ‘ignored’.

Huh. Getting what you want isn't what it's cracked up to be?

Somehow, I'm sure men are to blame for this problem, too.

But for the record, I have no problem seeing women over 50 as really attactive.

Sorry. There I go being a pig. My bad.

Vanguard of the Invasion?

Lebanon's army has moved into the Baalbek region where Hezbollah's rear area for both confronting Israel and fighting in Syria is located. Will Israel take advantage of that?

Hezbollah can't be too happy with the Lebanese army moving into "their" territory:

The Lebanese army deployed into lawless areas of the northern Bekaa Valley over the weekend, shutting down unofficial checkpoints and pursuing car thieves and kidnappers as part of a broader national security plan to mitigate the damage being done by spillover from the civil war in neighboring Syria.

The security plan was devised by the newly-formed Lebanese government in response to the latest outbreak of fighting in Tripoli, Lebanon’s second largest city, between the impoverished neighborhoods of Bab Tebbaneh and Jabal Mohsen whose Sunni and Alawite residents respectively support opposing sides in Syria. Two weeks of fighting in March killed at least 30 people.

The Lebanese army is being bolstered by France, as France and Saudi Arabia cooperate on defeating Assad. So I don't think this army operation is a mere coincidence.

And I think the Baalbek region would be the final stop of an Israeli invasion--should that be carried out--to root out Hezbollah from southern Lebanon and end the rocket threat that Israel's Iron Dome defenses cannot cope with on their own (too many Hezbollah rockets coming in and too few Israeli anti-missiles to intercept them); harm Assad's chances of defeating the rebellion (by cutting off the supply of Hezbollah shock troops); and weaken Iran's ability to threaten Israel via Syria and Israel.

So if something happens, I won't be shocked if Israel moves fast and deep.

About that 98% Consensus

I do get tired of hearing that 98% (or 97%) of scientists agree that mankind is causing global warming. The survey did not say that, and even a "denier" like myself might have been in that so-called consensus, if asked.

This discusses the source of that 97-98% consensus claim.

In brief, 10,257 surveys were sent out.

The surveying outfit received 3,146 replies to the survey request.

Of the respondents, 77 were judged to be climate scientists deserving of a valid opinion.

And of those 77, 75 agreed (97.4%) with two questions that have been sold as saying mankind is responsible for global warming.

The two questions were, one:

“When compared with pre-1800s levels, do you think that mean global temperatures have generally risen, fallen, or remained relatively constant?”

Good grief. I'd absolutely answer "yes" to that one. The end of the Little Ice Age is generally given as 1850 (and the temperature nadir of the Little Ice Age would have been many decades before that endpoint), so I'd be shocked if the planet didn't warm from that time period even if no human life existed on the planet.

The second question:

“Do you think human activity is a significant contributing factor in changing mean global temperatures?”

If by "human activity" you mean things like agriculture and deforestation in addition to sending carbon dioxide into the air from industry, I'd probably say "yes," humans have affected climate.

Maybe even "significantly." But I could never say that humankind's use of fossil fuels is the dominant factor. I take it that this factor is judged by climate scientists to be significant only since 1950. So already we have a century of overall temperature rise that you can't blame on evil oil and coal.

I'll add that you can be a "denier" and believe that it would be good to gradually replace coal use (especially) for energy generation with less polluting energy sources--but don't wreck economies to do it before replacements are ready and affordable.

Say, we could frack natural gas for a much lower carbon footprint than coal, now couldn't we?

Oh. Sorry for mentioning an inconvenient truth.

Yet since 1950, we can point to a period to the late 1970s that witnessed temperature declines (blamed on mankind and said to indicate a new ice age) and since the late 1990s, flat global temperatures until today. So since 1950 we've had but two decades of rising global temperatures to justify claims that mankind is warming the Earth dangerously. Oh, and the climate models, of course. Which are not data. And which don't account for past temperatures very well, so why do we accept their predictions of the future?

But depending on my mood, I could easily have answered "yes" to the second question. Yet I can understand why even 2 climate scientists would not answer yes to both questions.

I guess what makes me a real "denier" is that I see no reason to panic and inflict economic and personal freedom losses on all of us to allow our Warminista elites to guide us to a carbon-free future.

The problem with this survey and how it is portrayed is the same as climate science in general: reasonable questions are being inflated into Chicken Little-levels of hysteria that justify drastic, expensive actions by reasonably enlightened despots to save us from ourselves.

I deny that is a sane response.

Holding in Crimea?

The Ukrainians say that there are 22,000 Russian troops there, including 10,500 troops that brought in from outside to reinforce the Sevastopol garrison.

If so, this means that about half the Russian troops sent in for the subliminal invasion are now gone.

If so, Crimea isn't much of a platform to threaten invasion of Ukraine from the south (unless reinforced). Note that there are probably still 10,000 militia there.

And why would the Russians do that if their military is so awesome? For some reason, the Russians needed more than 10,000 troops originally sent to Crimea elsewhere.

But this train of conclusions rests on the initial statement being true.

A Point of Common Interest

While we need to oppose Russia in Europe and the Middle East, there is no reason we can't cooperate in areas where we have common interests. Vietnam comes to mind:

Vietnam, for one, has fully embraced Russia in an effort to get allies to restrain China even as it continues on its own accord to pursue a diplomatic resolution of outstanding issues with China. Indeed, Vietnam’s partnerships with Moscow and Washington strengthen its leverage vis-à-vis Beijing, thereby enabling it to pursue both military and economic enhancement and diplomatic resolution of disputed issues. Thus, despite the allegedly deepening Sino-Russian friendship (at least against the US), in fact Russia has quietly but openly resisted Chinese encroachments in Southeast Asia and is forging a deeper military-political relationship with Vietnam.

I have no problem with Russia bolstering Vietnam to resist China. If we can settle down Putin in Europe, we can be big boys and defend our allies in Europe and help the enemies of our foes in Asia, at the very least, by working with Russia.

Heck, I'd still like to see Russia sell submarines to Taiwan--if Japan won't.

Penny Wise

After all the grief South Korea gives Japan over disputed islands, South Koreans would rather have China across the DMZ than North Korea if North Korea undergoes state collapse?

This is interesting--but not in a good way:

Collapse in North Korea makes South Korea and China nervous and, according to opinion surveys more South Koreans are agreeing with China taking over up there. That’s because since the 1990s South Korean reunification experts have been studying what happened in Germany (after the communist East Germany was absorbed by the democratic West Germany). That cost the West German taxpayers over two trillion dollars. Estimates of what it will cost South Koreans to absorb North Korea are now over five trillion dollars. Then there was the fact that Germany had a GDP four times that of South Korea, meaning that the average South Korean will have to pay ten times what the average West German paid to rebuild their lesser half. This could cost South Koreans up to ten percent of their GDP for a decade or more. Many South Koreans fear that rebuilding the north could wreck the South Korean economy. No one knows, and everyone is scared. But someone will have to pay, and the most likely candidate is the South Korean taxpayer. Unless, of course, China is allowed to take over. This is something China is not only willing to do but is kind of insisting on.

I can understand China not wanting American forces on their border if South Korea takes over North Korea. I won't defend that view that denies neighbors the right to be who they want to be without China exercising a veto. But I understand it.

I don't understand why South Korea thinks that China absorbing North Korea is better than South Korea moving in. Yes, it would cost South Korea. But they wouldn't bear all of the costs, I'm sure.

But isn't there a happy median between Chinese forces on the DMZ and American forces on the Yalu River? (And while we'd have no interest in moving north, the Chinese would have to see that NATO is moving east despite earlier pledges--although China will no doubt ignore the Russian provocation that prompted this new view of the threats to eastern NATO.) Couldn't we reduce the costs to South Korea by reducing what South Korea would be responsible for?

I say partition North Korea:

[We could] establish a pro-South Korean 'Middle Korea' regime from the DMZ up to a line north of the rail link between Pyongyang and Wonson. US combat forces would not enter this area and South Korea would not deploy combat aircraft or surface-to-surface missiles in this area. Ground units would be limited as well, with relatively few tanks allowed. Perhaps Japanese military police and engineer units could contribute, although Korean sensitivities would probably preclude this. But it would be nice to get Japan involved.

China would establish a regime from their border south to the rump Middle Korea. Let's call it Hungnam Korea to avoid seeming like the successor regime to the Pillsbury Nuke Boy's nutjob state. China would likewise not deploy combat aircraft or surface-to-surface missiles with limits on tanks and army units in place.

If we must, to get the UN's blessing (this is one icky place I'd like their blessing and since we have it already from the first Korean War, we could probably get something here as a continuation), we could create a small fourth Korea--Chongjin Korea--in the northeast corner adjacent to Russia.

I actually assume that we'd need the UN's blessing since this war was waged under UN authority and is merely in a ceasefire stage.

In theory, these would all be trust territories that would be prepared for eventual reunification in one Korea. But there'd be no deadlines.

The entire territory of former North Korea would be a partially demilitarized zone (PDMZ). Perhaps China would be allowed outposts along major lines of communication in the south to monitor and detect South Korean troop movements into and out of Middle Korea while South Korea would be allowed outposts to monitor and detect Chinese troops movements into Hungnam Korea.

I can understand South Korea being daunted by the cost of repairing the deeply damaged North Korea. But is it really worth it to bring China closer and risk getting pounded into submission by the far larger China?

On the bright side, Taiwan would perhaps appreciate their 100-mile-wide anti-tank ditch that complicates China's threats to Taiwan.

Mirror, Mirror, Inbound

Is a laser weapon system really are trump card against massed missile attacks at sea?

This sounds great!

The inherent characteristics of laser weapons, speed of light engagement, precision targeting, rapid shot generation and tunability, offer the opportunity for expanded engagement options against a range of threats. These features can enhance the ability of naval units to defeat large raids and to counter short time-of-flight threats such as rockets, mortars and artillery shells. Equally important, laser weapons could bend the cost-exchange curve between offensive and defensive systems that appears at present to favor the former over the latter.

Until you remember that lasers bounce off of mirrors.



If I was in the anti-access/aerial denial business and faced laser anti-missile defenses, I'd make all my anti-ship missiles nice shiny polished mirror-skinned weapons.

Obabycare?

Hey, if the state can require free birth control, can the state require pregnancy if society decides that lack of babies rather than unwanted babies is the bigger problem faced by society?

I wonder if there are any computer models about this? That would settle it, I imagine.

UPDATE: Thanks to Stones Cry Out for the link. I even got a "heh."

UPDATE: Oh good grief. This somewhat whimsical post (the "heh" at Stones Cry Out and my comment on that might have been a clue) prompted angry comments at Stones Cry Out. This is why I have resisted Twitter. The heart of the "post" is all of one sentence long and then veered off into a bank shot against global warming hysteria with a second sentence. So no, this was not a detailed analysis of comparing Obamacare birth control with requiring birth.

But I never would have made the strained comparison if the left hadn't raised Sandra Fluke to the level of saint in the epic war on women against the Republicans.

I wouldn't have made that comparison if the left didn't paint opponents of state-required birth control coverage in insurance policies as somehow being for keeping women barefoot, in the kitchen, and of course pregnant.

So, yeah, there is no direct comparison between the two notions. One is a state requirement on businesses to provide insurance that includes birth control and requires insurance companies to include coverage of birth control in their policies. The other is a state requirement on a woman to give birth (and logically on a man to help pay for that child).

So thanks commenters, for pointing out the obvious difference that I would never have noticed but for your ginormous brain power. And I'm the stupid one ...

But to deny a connection of state power to compel given the context of Sandra Fluke's fifteen minutes of fame in that glorious battle in the war on women is just wrong.

And this is another reason I don't enable comments.

I'm Not Sure Rationality is the Way to Judge This

I'm correct in assuming that the pro-Russian "demonstrators" in Ukraine's east are too transparent a pretext for Russia to rely on for an invasion, right?

I still have to ask if Russia is still looking for round two or if this is psychological pressure to solidify the initial gain of grabbing Crimea:

Several hundred pro-Russian demonstrators who have seized government buildings in the city of Donetsk, in eastern Ukraine, urged President Vladimir V. Putin on Monday to send troops to the region as a peacekeeping force, and they demanded a referendum on seceding from Ukraine and joining Russia.

I lean to the latter, but I just don't know.

It is disturbing that Russian troops in Crimea are still leaning forward--enough to have shot a Ukrainian major in Crimea who was packing his belongings to evacuate.

It's getting to the point that I do worry that a Chechen terrorist attack in Russia might be blamed on Ukrainians and start a chain of events that nobody really controls.

I think that Russia would risk a lot by testing their military in an operation aimed at securing eastern Ukraine that might not end as neatly as the Crimean subliminal invasion.

But when passions get hot, some damn fool thing in Donetsk--or Luhansk or Kharkov--could set off a string of incidents that end with Russians already inflamed by Putin's propaganda pushing Putin--even against his better judgment--to go to war against Ukraine.

We just don't know if our rational is their rational. Or if they can be rational by their own definitions.

UPDATE: The administration isn't being too shy about blaming Russia for the aggressive protesters:

Even as White House officials suggested Monday that Russia is behind an “escalation” of unrest in three cities in eastern Ukraine over the weekend, Secretary of State John Kerry announced he would meet within the next 10 days with officials from Russia, Ukraine, and the European Union in an effort to calm the deteriorating security and political environment in Ukrainian regions bordering Russia.

What is Putin up to?

Don't Forget the Security Deposit

Ukraine is sending in the lawyers.

Now we're getting somewhere:

Ukraine's ecology and natural resources minister estimated on Monday that Kiev had lost natural resources and related assets worth 127 billion hryvnias ($10.8 bln) when Russia annexed the Crimea region.

Ukraine has said it will file compensation claims with international courts over the annexation of Crimea, which Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk said could ultimately cost Kiev "hundreds of billions of dollars".

Andriy Mokhnyk's spokesman said the minister had told a news conference Ukraine intended to go to court to recover the money Ukraine would lose through its natural resources assets, which included businesses, 198 fields and 380 prospective ones.

That's what I had in mind, although I think Ukraine would be best to split their claims between outright compensation for natural resources and rent for Crimea to avoid giving up claim to the land.

And don't forget first and last months' rent plus a security deposit to deep clean the carpet when the Russians leave. Ugh.

Such a judgment would put Ukraine in a better position to write off their debts to Russia as payment in part for what Russia owes Ukraine, rather than risking Ukraine's credit rating by repudiating what are arguably "odious debts."

Heck, Ukraine could, in the spirit of moving on, accept natural gas as part of the rent payments for Crimea occupancy.

The Bones of a Single Ethnic Russian Protester?

I figured that the immediate crisis in Ukraine is over since the Russians missed the chance to achieve surprise in taking eastern Ukraine. But there is still a chance war could ignite.

Why Russia didn't seize eastern Ukraine while they took Crimea is a good question. I suspect the Russians lacked the troops to do so, despite Putin's boasting of how Crimea proved his military is simply awesome, now.

Russia certainly has the manpower gathered to march in now. But Ukrainians are now psychologically prepared to resist. And Ukraine's army will fight for the east:

Officially they are conducting military exercises. But with a reported 40,000 Russian troops gathered along the border just weeks after annexing Crimea, these soldiers are not willing to give up their part of the country without a fight. ...

"We are carrying out military exercises on our own soil and we don't feel any fear. Of course we understand that the integrity of our state depends on each of us, from soldiers up to officers and... we are ready in case of any aggression to defend our people."

[The Ukrainian major] won't say how many men are deployed in the region but confirms there are military exercises happening at several points along the border, a mostly invisible frontier which cuts through swathes of winter-hardened grassland and forest that were largely unguarded until now.

I just don't know how many Ukrainian troops are deployed to face the Russians in the east. Since our military judges Russia could seize their objectives in 3-5 days (saying nothing about Russia holding it, of course, or concluding the war with that success), there can't be many Ukrainian troops in the east.

Given the poor state of Ukraine's military and the need to protect the long northern border as well as Russia's new Crimea stronghold and to screen Transdniestria, I don't know how much Ukraine could safely deploy too close to Russia.

In many ways it would be better to screen the front to absorb the first Russian invasion without the army cracking under attack by being exposed to the initial attack. Deny the Russians a rapid battlefield victory and the Ukrainians can fight on. Then we'll see how awesome the Russian military really is.

And wouldn't a Russian invasion of the east just give Ukraine's army in the west the opportunity to seize Transdniestria as a bargaining chip? Last I heard, Russia's military presence in that region was pretty small--and not likely to be very good stuck at the butt end of nowhere (no offense) in the Russian empire.

But the Russians certainly are trying to maintain the threat of invading Ukraine by continuing to foment the illusion of unrest in an arc of territory that I thought was likely to be a target--the Kharkov-to-Donetz region:

Pro-Russian protesters seized official buildings in the eastern cities of Kharkiv, Luhansk and Donetsk on Sunday night, demanding that referendums be held on whether to join Russia like the one that preceded Moscow's takeover of Crimea.

I have no doubt that Russia's fingerprints are all over these seizures and declaration of an independent region.

What I don't know is whether Russia is really gearing up for stage 2 at the risk of triggering real NATO reactions or whether this is a threat to leverage acceptance of Russia's seizure of Crimea and reopening Ukrainian arms production lines to sell important systems to Russia.

I still judge the latter, but stuff happens and spins out of control, sometimes.