Russia appears to have the capability to move into eastern Ukraine. Whether they have the capability to fight for and hold eastern Ukraine is another question altogether.
Rationally, I think Putin should pocket his easy victory in Crimea that gives him a tremendous propaganda victory that makes it appear his military is awesome, as well as gaining control of an important military base to allow him to project power into the Mediterranean Sea.
As Putin continues to stoke tension with Ukraine by engineering uprisings in Ukraine's east, he could be preparing for round two with an operation justified by a similar effort in Crimea.
Or he could just be trying to influence negotiations with the West over Ukraine's internal governance to loosen Kiev's control of the regions, trying to influence Ukrainian elections coming up, or trying to get the West and Ukraine to accept Russia's conquest of Crimea.
Indeed, the special forces work in eastern Ukraine could be a compromise by Putin between cashing in his Crimea chips or letting the bet ride to gain eastern Ukraine. Perhaps nationalistic elements want to keep going, and unable to simply rein them in, Putin has said, "show me what you can do" and then he'll decide, putting the burden on them to keep expanding Russia.
Putin might be putting the aggressive nationalists within his government in the position of making good on their claims, and if they can't whip up a faux uprising as they did in Crimea, Putin can safely end the crisis.
Yet if they can do that, Putin could have no choice but to continue the war even if he doesn't want to right now.
Regardless of Putin's intentions, nationalistic forces could push Putin to invade even if he does not want to risk a war over eastern Ukraine. Those forces aren't just a passive force to be harnessed in direct support of whatever Putin chooses to do. They are a force that can move in its own direction:
From the moment that Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea cast a new, bitter chill over relations with the West, a sinister jingoistic vibe has pervaded this unsettled capital — stirred up by state-controlled television and Mr. Putin himself.
“Some Western politicians are already threatening us not just with sanctions but also the prospect of increasingly serious problems on the domestic front,” the president said in his speech announcing plans to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation. “I would like to know what they have in mind exactly: action by a fifth column, this disparate bunch of ‘national traitors,’ or are they hoping to put us in a worsening social and economic situation so as to provoke public discontent?” ...
There is also now a website with a name that translates as “traitor.net” that includes photos and quotations of public figures who have spoken out in some way against Russia’s policy toward Ukraine. The bottom of the site has a button inviting viewers to “suggest a traitor.”
At Mr. Putin’s direction, a committee led by his chief of staff is developing a new “state policy in culture.” Widely expected to be enacted into law, the proposed cultural policy emphasizes that “Russia is not Europe” and urges “a rejection of the principles of multiculturalism and tolerance” in favor of emphasizing Russia’s “unique state-government civilization,” according to Russian news accounts that quoted a presidential adviser on culture, Vladimir Tolstoy. ...
Some of the language on Russian television in recent days has been far more charged than anything heard during Soviet times. One of the country’s most prominent television hosts, Dmitry K. Kiselyov, declared during an evening newscast last month that Russia remains “the only country in the world capable of turning the U.S.A. into radioactive ash.”
A force like this could easily conclude that Putin himself deserves to be on a traitors' list if he fails to "return" Ukraine to Russian control and leaves millions of Russians "stranded" and at risk in a foreign land.
So while I think that rationality requires Putin to hold off on invading Ukraine (again), I can't be sure if he defines rational the same way I do. And that assessment of rationality is complicated by the forces of nationalism that Putin is whipping up but which could carry him along on a wave of xenophobia that he does not control and only hopes to survive.
While intentions can change overnight, Russia's military capabilities to begin a war in Ukraine remain intact.
Don't forget that as tensions are stoked by Moscow, Ukraine under pressure might decide that they have no choice but to use their smaller military power to strike first at Russia in the belief that they are making a preemptive strike.
Armed with publicly released satellite photos, might the Ukrainians in the belief that the Russians are coming use air and missile forces to hit Russian airfields and combat units arrayed near their border or in newly annexed Crimea?
The Ukrainians are counter-attacking against the "uprisings" in the east:
Ukrainian security forces launched an operation on Sunday to clear pro-Russian separatists from a police headquarters in the eastern city of Slaviansk, with Kiev reporting dead on both sides as it combats what it calls an act of aggression by Moscow.
Ukraine faces a rash of rebellions in the east which it says are inspired and directed by the Kremlin. But action to dislodge the armed militants risks tipping the stand-off into a new, dangerous phase as Moscow has warned it will protect the region's Russian-speakers if they come under attack.
Once shooting starts, attitudes change. Forces on both sides of the border could react in ways that escalate this beyond the control of anybody--even Putin.
And this is a reminder that it is unfair to blame the West for failing to bring Russia into the West after the Soviet Union fell. I hoped Russians would take the opportunity of defeating Communism to join the West (although I never supported their membership in NATO, not wanting NATO's eastern front to reach the Pacific Ocean facing China). But Russians feel apart from the West in many ways. And that's the way a lot of them like it.
