Saturday, November 24, 2012

Preparing to Fight the Last Israeli War?

I wonder what lesson Hezbollah is learning from the recently concluded Gaza Punitive Raid? And I wonder what Israel wants Hezbollah to learn?

Despite mobilizing 40,000 reservists for a ground war in Gaza, Israel limited itself to air and naval bombardment, agreeing to a ceasefire with Hamas.

Does Hezbollah in southern Lebanon believe this would be the template for Israel if Hezbollah starts lobbing rockets at Israeli civilians?

If so, Hezbollah will no doubt feel less restraint in starting a war despite the loss of their patron Syria while Assad is engaged in losing a revolt.

But Israel cannot wage an air-only fight with Hezbollah. Why? Because Israel's Iron Dome ammunition was insufficient to carry on the fight with Hamas much longer, let alone sufficient to handle Hezbollah's far larger rocket arsenal:

One factor Israel may have considered in agreeing to the recent cease fire with Hamas was a possible shortage of Tamir missiles (used by the Iron Dome system to shoot down rockets). The problem was that Israel was not sure how many long (over 20 kilometers) range rockets (that could reach larger urban areas) Hamas had left. ... Thus it is possible Israel was facing the possibility of running out of Tamir missiles before Hamas ran out of long range rockets. That would mean dozens, or more, dead Israelis. At that point, Israel would have to send in ground troops to shut down Hamas rocket launches. That would also mean more dead Israelis. So, to be on the safe side….

Hamas decided it was not worth the risk to repeat the effective Israeli ground invasion of the 2008-2009 Gaza Winter War.

Hezbollah, after surviving the 2006 war that featured reliance on air power and very ineffective Israeli ground operations, may think that Israel would be even less willing to engage in ground operations with Hezbollah than with Hamas.

So the risk of war may be greater, now.

On the other hand, Israel got a good rehearsal for a ground war against Hezbollah by mobilizing 40,000 reservists.

And if Hezbollah believes they won't face a multi-division thrust into Lebanon to destroy their base of power, the shock to Hezbollah will be greater.

Further, Egypt is on the line to keep Hamas quiet, at the risk of annoying America that has given Morsi some slack to acquire autocratic powers because Morsi reined in Hamas. One can argue that Morsi sicked Hamas in the first place, but in the end he has openly declared he is holding the leash now, with all the responsibilities that come with owning a rabid dog that bites.

So Israel may be setting the stage for a deep Israeli ground war that goes all the way to Baalbek:

I assume that any war will be a multi-division push north of the Litani that will take advantage of the fact that Hezbollah, after 2006, wrongly believes it can go toe-to-toe with Israeli troops and so will fight as light infantry rather than as insurgents. For a while, Israel will be able to really pound Hizbollah ground forces as the Israelis take over rocket-launch sites and armories with troops.

Further, I'd guess the Israelis will push rapidly into the Bekaa Valley as far as Baalbek to tear up Hezbollah's rear area to slow down rearmament after the war is over. Air strikes would take place north of that, if necessary, I'd guess.

Air mobile and paratrooper assaults would be part of such an offensive.

And if Israel is thinking of the late spring to face off against Iran over their nuclear program, neutralizing Hamas and Hezbollah before that confrontation would be a good idea. Remember, Israel doesn't need to crush Hamas and Hezbollah--who are mere symptoms of the real problem--if they plan to inflict a defeat on Iran, which has armed Hamas and Hezbollah.

Rather than preparing to fight the last Israeli War, Israel may be preparing to fight the next two wars.

But maybe that's just how I think.