In Somalia, fighting back against the jihadis is not just creating more jihadis:
Al Shabaab gangs still control most of the interior in central Somalia. Government troops, local militias and AU (African Union) peacekeepers are going after the towns and major villages one at a time. Local militia take control once al Shabaab is driven from a place. Peacekeepers remain available to assist militias that are again attacked by the Islamic terrorists. That does not happen often because most al Shabaab men are demoralized and tend to just desert after a major defeat.
While I'm fine with killing jihadis if they aren't vulnerable to loss of morale, many jihadis are not of that caliber.
And in Afghanistan, more subtle defeats take place if you look at the decreasing effectiveness of Taliban IED attacks:
As a result, the same number of bombs were used this year as last (1,200-1,400 a month), but more of them were detected (by civilians as well as Afghan and foreign troops) and destroyed or disabled. In some cases the tribesmen hired to make and place the bombs scammed the Taliban by building a shoddy bomb and placing it with the intention of never setting it off. Taliban commanders tended to look the other way at this, as it kept civilian deaths down and morale up among the few tribesmen who still supported the Taliban. This kept the Taliban brass content, although still concerned about how ineffective their forces had become.
Low level Afghans rip off the Taliban without fear of being on the wrong side of the war; field commanders figure the price of effective bombs (dead civilians) makes it better to just go along; and top commanders are content to see the numbers coming in showing the war is being waged even though they have to wonder why the bombs aren't very effective. That's a result of being defeated and not really caring about the bigger picture.
We can beat these guys. But we do have to fight them to make that happen.
