Monday, October 16, 2006

Come On, Four!

Via Instapundit, the Chinese are apparently considering regime change in North Korea.

And the Chinese are recalling three military incidents against Kim Jong-Il:

In 1996, the Sixth Field Army was planning to revolt but the scheme was betrayed by a new commander. One or two plotters got away but Kim Jong-il's personal guards arrested senior officers and the Sixth Field Army's political commissars.

On March 12, 1998, Kim suddenly announced a martial law "exercise" in Pyongyang and there was gunfire in the streets of the city. The Chinese later learned that two ministries were involved in a coup attempt, and that more than 20 ministerial-level officials were killed after it was crushed.

In October 1999, a company of the Third Field Army rebelled in dissatisfaction over grain distribution during the nation's prolonged famine, which may have killed a million people.

Like I said, the North Korean People's Army might yet remember that they are supposed to defend the people--not the psycho regime of Kim Jong-Il who seems determined to take the nation on a Viking funeral ride. And with the army downgraded in favor of spooks and nukes, the army might want to bump off the head thug for their own preservation.

And if China is seriously thinking regime change, things could get much better.

Really, even a North Korea under just a normal dictator would be an improvement over the current nut regime. If China can engineer such a coup, let's not make the perfect the enemy of the good--or even the better, which I suppose is a more accurate way to describe a pro-Chinese authoritarian regime that wants to reform the economy.

Our main problem consists of jihadis and jihadi states who might have nukes. If a coup gets North Korea out of the nuclear business, I'll be happy in Northeast Asia for a good decade or more. And our war against jihadis will have gotten much safer to wage.

Axis of Evil Update

The Axis of Evil has made news lately.

North Korea could be desperate to save their regime:

Could North Korean leader Kim Jong Il be using the provocation of a nuclear test simply as a bargaining chip to get the aid he needs to placate his people and stay in power? Pyongyang's recent nuclear test, labeled by the world as a provocation, could actually be a desperate cry for help.

Could be. So let's strangle them. Yes, I know that China has far more trade with North Korea than we or our allies have, but this might be enough to push them over the edge. And even if it isn't, shouldn't China bear the full cost of propping up that monster regime since they are the big obstacles to really strangling North Korea?

In Iran, Ahmadinejad refuses to abandon his nuclear ambitions:

"Mounting threats and pressures against Iran's peaceful nuclear activities won't cause even one iota of hesitation in the will of the Iranian nation to continue this path."


We should probably take him at his word. And so regime change is the only real answer to the problem. Military strikes alone are only a temporary measure that needs to have regime change follow within years.

Ex-Axis of Evil member Iraq has been put into the good guy column but bad guys continue to murder and terrorize:

The death toll in a surge of sectarian killings in Balad swelled to at least 91 on Monday, police and army officials said, while bombings in and near Baghdad killed as many as up to 10 people. Eleven more bodies were found dumped in the capital.


Sunnis still want power and Shias are increasingly capable of inflicting short-term and vicious justice on the former tormenters--regardless of individual guilt.

With Saddam still on trial despite his obvious and extensive guilt, and promising to win power, Shias wouldn't be so sour on official justice:

"The hour of liberation is at hand, God willing, but remember that your near-term goal is confined to freeing your country from the forces of occupation and their followers and not to be preoccupied in settling scores," Saddam writes in the Arabic-language letter, which is dated Sunday and signed by "Saddam Hussein al-Majid, President and commander-in-chief of the holy warrior armed forces."


Perhaps if Saddam would be finally executed, his very survival wouldn't cause Baathists to hope for victory and Shias to fear his return somehow. No justice, no peace, as the bumper sticker says.

And in Afghanistan, which would have been in the Axis of Evil speech had we failed to destroy their regime in 2001, we face problems with jihadis parked in Pakistan who use that territory as a sanctuary:

Speaking at the opening of a new intelligence-gathering centre on Monday, General James Jones notably expressed concern about the porous Afghan-Pakistan border cross which Taliban fighters enter and leave violence-wracked Afghanistan.


We've killed lots of the enemy and they've done relatively little to show for their deaths, but it does keep economic and political development from going forward fully.

Finally, Axis of El Vil and Axis of Evil wannabe Venezuela pines to run interference for their new mullah friends:

A Security Council seat could give Venezuela concrete opportunities to challenge U.S. foreign policy goals. Chavez has promised to stand by Iran in its efforts to avoid U.N. sanctions over its nuclear program, defending the Islamic country against allegations that it want to build an atomic bomb.


We haven't enough troubles and this loon is strutting about.

It is a long and varied war.

Thank You For Your Service, You Miserable Pukes

Is it too bloody much to ask people to honor the soldiers who fight to defend us? Yes, yes, everyone is "for the troops." Those who really are for the troops don't seem to need to repeat it before every statement they make, but never mind that.

It is far worse north of the border.

Canadian snipers who fought with us with distinction and skill in Afghanistan when we destroyed the Taliban regime and sent Osama into a cave condo development in Pakistan have been treated like dirt back home (via Strategypage email update):


Rob Furlong, Tim McMeekin and three other Canadian sharpshooters -- Graham Ragsdale, Arron Perry and Dennis Eason -- had spent nearly a week in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan's Shahikot Valley, reaching out and touching the enemy from distances even they had never trained for. But that shot was something special. Rob Furlong had just killed another human being from 2,430 m, the rough equivalent of standing at Toronto's CN Tower and hitting a target near Bloor Street. It was -- and still is -- the longest-ever recorded kill by a sniper in combat, surpassing the mark of 2,250 m set by U.S. Marine Gunnery Sgt. Carlos Hathcock during the Vietnam War.

It should have been a moment of pride for the Canadian army. Five of its most talented snipers -- men trained to kill without remorse, then turn around and kill again -- did exactly that. They destroyed al-Qaeda firing positions, saved American lives and tallied a body count unmatched by any Canadian soldier of their generation. U.S. commanders who served alongside the snipers nominated all five for the coveted Bronze Star medal. "Thank God the Canadians were there," is how one American soldier put it.

Yet days later, their heroics on the mountain would be overshadowed by suspicion, including stunning allegations that one sniper, in a subsequent mission, sliced himself a souvenir from the battlefield: the finger of a dead Taliban fighter. Military police launched a criminal investigation, but uncovered nothing but denials.


Can't we bring such fine soldiers here? Give them the recognition they deserve? I don't even care if they join our military. I don't care what party they vote for. Such troops deserve more than they have gotten in Canada:


Among the American troops who served with the snipers, the viewpoint is unanimous. "These are the type of people that I would want to put up on a pedestal and say: 'This is the very best that we have to offer,' " Justin Overbaugh says. "I am not big on apologies, but if they are owed an apology, I hope that they get one. I am quite certain that is all they want."

I'm sure there are lots of Westerners out there who would fight this war if we gave them the chance.

Canada has been a good friend and neighbor. They have a proud military tradition, fighting around the world with honor. An entire Canadian army fought in Western Europe in World War II. Today keeping a reinforce battalion in the fight strains them.

Canada welcomes our deserters with open arms but their own fighters are persecuted.

If Canada today can't recognize their very best, their recent resolve to fight with us is but a blip on a long downward slide toward irrelevancy and passivity in the face of deadly threats to the West.

I guess I'd best visit Canada while I still can. Nice country. Shame they don't seem to want to fight for it. Or even recognize those who will fight in their name.

Saturday, October 14, 2006

Another Fizzle Regarding North Korea

Thus far, it appears that the North Koreans tried to set off a nuke but the attempt fizzled--at best the nuclear part had only a small chain reaction and at worst the only thing that went off was the conventional explosion intended to trigger the chain reaction.

Following the nuclear test fizzle, the international community at the UN has attempted to test its resolve to defend the West--and indeed the world--from rogue nations. We have attempted to get a resolution to punish North Korea passed in the Security Council.

But the Russians and Chinese are continuing to object:


Despite winning key concessions, Russia and China raised new objections that could delay a vote Saturday on a U.N. Security Council resolution imposing punishing sanctions on North Korea for its claimed nuclear test.


Air sample tests taken by aircraft flying around the UN detected increased air temperatures consistent with hot air rather than actual effective reaction. Clearly another fizzle.

Had the UN test been successful, they would have become the fourth major body to demonstrate the possession of resolve, after the United States, Britain, and Australia.

In the absence of a successful UN test, Japan is anticipated to become the fourth resolve-possessing body in the world as it reacts to the signs of North Korean intent.

UPDATE: The UNSC has passed a resolution:

The resolution demands North Korea eliminate all its nuclear weapons but expressly rules out military action against the country — a demand by the Russians and Chinese. The Americans also eliminated a complete ban on the sale of conventional weapons; instead, the resolution limits the embargo to major hardware such as tanks, warships, combat aircraft and missiles.


Ooh... Aah... Wow... This is ACTION! UNACTION! Even now, clerks at the UNSC are addressing an envelope and putting the red-tinged paper visible through the address window that shows Pyongyang that this time we're serious.

UNserious, of course. The international community has just demanded that North Korea give up nuclear weapons, but ruled out military action and refused to ban even weapons North Korea can't afford to buy.

So really, nothing much has changed. We've always wanted them to renounce nuclear weapons and we've never been willing to attack or cut them off from even weapons they can't afford to buy.

What really amuses me is that this announcment is placed on the top of the Yahoo! News page as if it is important to spread the word rapidly. STOP THE PRESSES! The UN has ... well, done nothing, really. Sadly enough, it will be in the UN annual report as one of their "successes" of the year. Even more sadly, given the body's sorry record, it probably will rank right up there.

ANOTHER UPDATE: Wait one moment. We did get one big victory in this mush of words and it may outweigh the faux resolve of the international community:

The U.S.-drafted resolution allows nations to stop cargo going to and from North Korea to check for weapons of mass destruction or related supplies.

That means the Proliferation Security Initiative that we've formed to intercept WMD at sea. Since this is US-led and not UN-led, it could really be used to hamper North Korean trade. If we stop every damned ship going into or out of North Korea to check for WMD, we could really screw up their feeble economy while we screen for WMD.

All right, John Bolton.

Of course, it would have helped if we had banned air traffic coming out of North Korea. Nukes and nuclear-related material can be delivered by air, of course. But this was progress, after all. I won't whine too much about the vaunted international community given what I expected.

Not So Fast You Whipper Snapper

Raul Castro is indeed worried about Hugo Chavez trying to take the revolutionary torch from Cuba, as I noted here. Strategypage writes:


There are increasing indications that Fidel Castro is not going to return to power. His brother Raul has recently established close ties to nationalist elements in the Cuban Communist Party and in the Armed Forces. He has apparently played on suspicions that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' wants to inherit Fidel's mantle as the leader of radicalism in Latin America, and could take actions that would compromise Cuban security and independence.


And civil war inside Cuba is a possibility, according to Strategypage. So how popular is Hugo in Cuba anyway? Could some in Cuba be inspired by him to fight for a more aggressive Cuba? Will Cubans take to the sea to flee to Florida if violence breaks out on the island?

More broadly, will the death of Fidel trigger a Latin America crisis as Hugo grabs for the leadership role by provoking a crisis in the Caribbean Sea?

As much as I'd rather not deal with Cuba right now, when is the "right" time when it will be most convenient for us?

And this thinking is dangerously close to the thinking of South Koreans and Chinese who'd rather North Koreans suffer and die rather than pay a cost of seeing North Koreans free themselves.

If the Cubans can free themselves, we should not be realists in hoping for the stability of oppression because it is more convenient for us in the short run.

Friday, October 13, 2006

A Strange, Sick, and Cynical Alliance

Iran and Syria have allied to thwart the establishment of a democratic Iraqi government.

To achieve that end, Syria is the prime guilty party in sending Sunni jihadis into Iraq to slaughter Shias:

Between 50 and 70 foreign fighters sneak over the border into Iraq every month, Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, chief US military spokesman in Iraq, said last week. Most come from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Egypt, or Syria.


Not a lot enter Iraq but they are bloody minded.


And the Iranians get Sunnis slaughtered by arming Shia thugs and sending Iranians into Iraq to pose as Iraqi Shias:

Moqtada al-Sadr, a Shiite firebrand who heads the militia known as the Mahdi Army, recently told a top official of the Iraqi intelligence service that "an increasing number of Shia death squads, operating under the name of his Mahdi Army, are Iranian pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) staff officers and Hezbollah fighters, who are executing operational activities that he is not aware of, nor can he control,'' according to one U.S. source.


It is a strange, sick, and cynical alliance that pairs an Arab state with a Persian state that attempts to foment chaos and mass murder of both Sunni and Shia Arabs as shared national objectives.

Making Iranian Friends

Though as time drags on, I find myself with a bit of despair that we plan to do something about Iran, I keep my faint hopes on the determination of President Bush to end the mullah threat before he leaves office.

We are in the United Arab Emirates forging contacts with Iranians who live and work there:

The Iran Regional Presence Office in the U.S. consulate in Dubai is cultivating low-key ties with expatriate Iranians at a time when Tehran's disputed nuclear program has pushed the two nations' relationship to its lowest depth in years.

With Iran just 100 miles across the Persian Gulf, the United Arab Emirates maintains close ties with both Washington and Tehran, and Iranians and Americans, especially those with business interests, mingle freely in booming Dubai, one of its seven city-states.


I find it hard to believe that amidst the chit-chat about business or coming to America for college exhanges that we aren't looking for friends in case of a revolt inside Iran that we could support.

Am I hoping for too much?

Money and Guns

In Iraq, the Sunni Arabs are only 20% of the population at most and so against the 80% Shia Arabs and Sunni Kurds, don't stand a chance with the government armed and gaining experience. The Sunni Arabs will lose eventually--either by accepting their status in a democratic Iraq or by being expelled from Iraq or killed by a government tired of trying to persuade the Sunni Arabs to stop killing. This is complicated by the Shia thugs (supported by Iran) who kill Sunnis.

The disparity in numbers is one reason why I didn't think the Sunni Arabs could pull off an insurgency for long after we destroyed the Iraqi Baathist military. The rapid collapse of the Baathists and their failure to mount any type of last ditch defense of Baghdad or Tikrit indicated to me that the Baathists didn't have the heart to fight. Indeed, by February 2004, it looked like the Baathists were finally being snuffed out.

But the major mistake I made was not appreciating two factors that have allowed the Baathists to fight out of proportion to their strength: guns and money. Strategypage notes these two factors:

Saddam Hussein bought enormous quantities of Russian weapons and munitions, and left much of it scattered all over central Iraq. A lot of this stuff was looted after the 2003 invasion, and the terrorists, using more of Saddam's stolen oil money, bought a lot of it to support terrorist activities, and the attempt to restore Saddam, or some other Sunni Arab, to power.


I didn't suspect that arms were scattered around Iraq and I thought Saddam was short on money (the massive corruption of the Oil for Food deals was not apparent at the time).

Access to these two things allowed the Baathists to fight on longer than otherwise, arm the foreign jihadis, and gave time for Iran to start supporting Sadr's and others' Shia thugs and Syria to funnel foreign jihadis into Iraq. (That we've allowed both Iran and Syria to get away with this is a separate surprise to me, of course.)

Most Shias, some Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds reject both the Iran puppets, Sunni chauvanists ("nationalists" isn't terribly accurate) and Baathists.

We will grind down the enemy if we can hold the lid on sectarian violence. But this is harder than I thought it would be and taking a longer commitment of our troops than I anticipated.

Just have patience. And some confidence.

Thursday, October 12, 2006

Götterdämmerung

Ok, let's have a break from mad mullahs, the Pillsbury Nuke Boy, and communal murder in Iraq.

This is both amusing and disturbing (via Tim Blair):


AN 80-year-old German motorist has obediently followed his navigation system all the way into a huge pile of sand, abrubtly bringing his trip to an end.


The motorist ignored a motorway "closed for construction" sign and crashed his Mercedes into a pile of sand further down the road, police have said.

"The driver was following the orders from his navigation system and even though there was a sufficient number of warnings and barricades, he continued his journey into the construction site," a police spokeswoman said.

Just following orders?

Should al Qaeda ever manage to hack into OnStar, Germany could be destroyed in a holiday weekend.

Though I'm reasonably sure that the French and Italians are safe since I'm not sure those drivers are aware that traffic laws even exist.

No Longer Black Humour

I've not been impressed with the resolve of our European friends to stand up to the Iranian mullahs to stop them from getting nuclear weapons. And no, setting new deadlines to stop doesn't count as resolve. Not outside of the Euro Zone anyway.

They talk and I really think they just want to talk until Iran goes nuclear and then say, "Oops. We tried. Bad luck. No use trying anymore. So how about a trade deal, eh?" Sadly for the Europeans, the Iranians haven't gone nuclear yet and the Euros seem to be running out of ways to talk, stall, and buy the Iranians time to go nuclear.


Back in December 2004, I wrote about the European negotiating strategy:


Phase 3 negotiations will be to agree to parity in nuclear weapons between the EU and Iran.


And last month I wrote in a similar vein about the infinite Euro patience over Iranian refusal to observe their deadlines:


In ten years, if present trends continue, I'm sure the EU will be giving Iran a deadline to halt their nuclear arsenal at 100 missiles and insist that they are absolutely forbidden to destroy any more Israeli cities.


Ha ha, right? As if the Europeans would do something that spineless! What a laugh.

Well don't laugh. Listen to this British MP:


My despairing feeling is that, in the case of Iran, we should admit that it's checkmate, as they say in Persian. The Iranians are one day going to possess a nuclear bomb; there is almost certainly nothing we can do about it; all our blustering and threats are pointless. Indeed, if all else fails, there may even be a case for giving the Iranians the bomb — that's right: maybe it is time for the Americans to take control themselves of this unstoppable programme.

If I am right in thinking that an Iranian bomb is not only inevitable, but also corresponds to the wishes of the people of Iran, then perhaps we could turn this whole thing on its head. Perhaps it is time to end the sense of terror, and suspicion, and escalating menace. Perhaps the Americans could actually assist with the technology, as they assist the United Kingdom, in return for certain conditions: that the Iranian leadership stops raving about attacking Israel, for instance, and that progress is made towards democracy, and so on.

The Iranian public might feel grateful, and engaged, and not demonised.
He thinks we should give Iran the bomb on the assumption that possessing the bomb will make the Iranians more responsible! The Iranians are just like the British were when we shared nuclear technology with them!

Can you friggin' believe this??!

I'm sad to say that in five years, another MP will argue that if only we'd nuke those pesky Jews in Palestine, the Iranians will become more responsible.

We've been letting the Europeans negotiate the end of Iran's nuclear weapons program on the assumption that failure would lead the Europeans to support our more kinetic efforts to stop Iran from going nuclear if needed.

We have clearly over-estimated the European willingness to stop Iran and under-estimated the ability of the Europeans to surrender without shame.

It will fall to us--as all hard problems do eventually--to solve the mullah problem in Iran.

Wednesday, October 11, 2006

Point of Order

The more shrill opponents of the President claim that North Korea's nuclear test is a failure of President Bush and his failure alone.

So. If the test was truly a pure fizzle, is this failure--following on the failure of North Korea's long range missile test last summer--proof that the President's policy has choked off North Korean weapons development enough to lead to these failures?

Can we say that had we "engaged" the North Koreans (i.e., shoveled money at them), that North Korea would have likely had the resources to drop their missile in Hawaiian waters and detonate that nuke?

I'm just wondering. Because the critics were awfully quick to blame our current strategy of squeezing the Pillsbury Nuke Boy.

Discuss amongst yourselves.

Yes, Let's Talk "Hostile Attitude"

I've mentioned before that I am fully sick of North Korea and their psychopathic rantings. They give ranting a bad name. Which is bad, needless to say.

The North Koreans complain of our hostile attitude:


North Korea's No. 2 leader Kim Yong Nam threatened in an interview with a Japanese news agency that there also would be more nuclear tests if Washington continued what he called its "hostile attitude."


So let's explore the concept of projection as the North Koreans demand our "respect" for their nation in the wake of their attempted nuclear test.

They threaten us:


"If the U.S. keeps pestering us and increases pressure, we will regard it as a declaration of war and will take a series of physical corresponding measures," the statement, said without specifying what those measures could be.


And the beatings will continue until respect improves:


"The issue of future nuclear tests is linked to U.S. policy toward our country," Kim Yong Nam was quoted as saying when asked whether Pyongyang will conduct more
tests.


And their troops perhaps haven't heard of the likely failure of their first-ever test:


Along the razor-wired no-man's-land separating the divided Koreas, communist troops were more boldly trying to provoke their southern counterparts: spitting across the demarcation line, making throat-slashing hand gestures, flashing their middle finger and trying to talk to the troops, said U.S. Army Maj. Jose DeVarona of Fayetteville, N.C.


Nor does the Pillsbury Nuke Boy take kindly to people unhappy with his nuclear ambitions:


"The enemy schemes to destroy us through economic lockout ... but that is merely a foolish illusion," said an editorial published by the state-run Rodong Sinmun, according to Radio Press.

I'd say the North Koreans are the ones with the hostile attitude. If we were really hostile, South Korea would be an island and the Yalu would be China's southern shoreline.

I am sick of the North Koreans all over again. Thoroughly. I guess I don't mind if we talk to them. As long as we let them die. But let them talk to us with all six representatives around. No one-on-one. Don't reward them for their hostility and provocations.

And yes, I personally have a hostile attitude toward that gulag with a UN seat.

Tuesday, October 10, 2006

Opportunity in Crisis

Negotiations by a committee are difficult to manage because of the different goals of each participant. We need to take advantage of the attempted North Korean nuclear test to ratchet up the pressure on North Korea. The goal is to destroy them--not save them by giving them aid.

I think this post from several months ago on what the different countries talking to North Korea want describes the varying objectives pretty well. I'd add that we don't want North Korea to proliferate nukes to others who might use them on us. I don't know why I left it out at the time.

I think that we can still afford to be patient and put the screws to North Korea since we face the least immeditate threat from North Korea. We can run the risk of pushing too hard and North Korea lashing out more than others because of our relative distance from North Korea. They may be a mad dog but we are mostly beyond the length of their leash. And following their nuke test, we have some momentum to tighten the screws more than we could before, as I wrote nearly a year and a half ago when I urged the Pillsbury Nuke Boy to smoke 'em if he's got them:

So if North Korea has nukes, why not end the ability of some to pretend there is no problem? If North Korea lights one up, nobody can deny the need to confront North Korea. Do we really want this gulag with a UN seat to have nukes and survive for long? And the Pillsbury Nuke Boy will have one fewer nuke to wave around if push comes to shove. I'd certainly be happier if North Korea can't build nukes; but if they can, end the uncertainty.

With this cleared up, we can focus on containing North Korea. We can cut off all but a trickle of aid to keep them hoping for recovery rather than banking on war. We can welcome refugees. We can try to get information about the outside world into the north. We can build missile defenses around North Korea with the Japanese to guard against the worse. We can focus surveillance assets on the north. We can intercept any attempts to export nuclear materials or weapons. In short, we contain them and pull the plug so that they die. Regime collapse is our goal.

And we can prepare to strike North Korea's missile sites and leadership positions in a disarming strike should we detect signs of missile launch preparations. Remember, it is one thing to hide development in a deep cavern. But if you want a weapon, you have to bring it close to the surface where it can actually be launched. We can detect and strike these.

Remember, we've known North Korea is nuclear capable. This test tells us nothing new on this score. What we don't know even after the test is whether North Korea can weaponize their nuclear devices to theaten us. In time they will do it. Right now, and tomorrow, North Korea is not a direct nuclear threat to us.

The problem for us is the long run. If North Korea survives long enough to get nuclear weapons that can reach us, our options are far more limited. And if North Korea sells devices that can be hauled around on boats, trucks, trains, or planes even if not a launchable weapon, we could lose a city to a terror attack.

We must destroy North Korea in the short run while the threats to us are limited.

It may seem cynical to push for a North Korean collapse when the risk of a North Korean reaction is higher for our friends in the region; but remember that our friends in the region don't seem to lose sleep over the prospect of Los Angeles being a potential target in the long run.

Look to our interests. The worst thing isn't a nuclear capable North Korea but a nuclear-capable North Korea with a longer leash that lets them take a bite out of us.

Bribing North Korea just lets them live longer and the longer they live the more likely they are to get nukes that threaten us. Besides, we know they don't stay bought. They cheat. If not, why are we even discussing what to do about a nuclear North Korea?

And while I want to destroy the Kim regime, I don't think military action is appropriate or possible (and no, we are not "distracted" by Iraq. If you don't think our military is large enough to occupy 25 million Iraqis how can you think we could occupy 23 million North Koreans instead?).

Without South Korea in whole-hearted agreement, we simply can't invade North Korea.

Aerial attacks on our own could certainly cripple North Korea, but I'd hate to do it on our own and let our more vulnerable allies simultaneously complain and reap the fruits of our actions. They have more to fear in the short run so they should be full participants if military options are necessary. If things get bad enough, we have powerful military allies near North Korea who can shoulder the burden. South Korea's military and Japan's air force and navy are capable to smashing up North Korea. China's army--assuming North Korea's army remains near the DMZ facing South Korea--could push south quite a bit, too. And our naval and air power remains free to support a war against North Korea. Most importantly, we have time to wait and engineer a collapse of North Korea before we must consider a military attack in the short run.

Nor is encouraging proliferation by Japan, South Korea, and/or Taiwan anything more than a bit of revenge against China for failing to do something useful to stop North Korea. With mutually hostile states owning nukes that can reach neighbors in under five minutes, we'll recall our Cold War twenty minute notice of Soviet attack as positively geological in scale. It is simply not good to have six nuclear-armed neighbors bumping elbows with each other. It is not stable and somebody will lob some nukes.

I don't know how good the computer models are, but aren't pacifists constantly telling us that even a small number of nuclear blasts can destroy our climate? I may wonder about their models (they thought Saddam's oil fires in 1991 would cause a nuclear winter scenario) but I'd really rather not risk it. Plus the economic impact of the fast-growing Asia getting hammered. And not least, mega-deaths shouldn't be something we consider a good outcome.

Plus, Iran is a bigger threat than North Korea. I repeat my rule of thumb:


Better to stop the nutball from getting their first nuke than to take away the nuke from the nutball who already has one.


Iran with nukes will be far worse than North Korea with nukes. There are jihadis out their but darn few Kimunists willing and eager to kill us. Iran with nukes can lead jihadi nuts. Who on Earth will North Korea with nukes lead? Further, against Iran, by contrast to the allies we have lined up over North Korea, we maybe have Britain and Australia to help us on the margins. So allies can watch our backs in Northeast Asia while we face the more dangerous threat of Iran mostly on our own.

So let's squeeze North Korea harder with the added support of a nervous UN while we turn our attention back to Iran. Funny how Hugos and Nasrallahs and Kims keep popping up to make us forget that Iran is missing yet another deadline to stop their nuclear work.

But really, it's a lovely decade we're having, eh?

Clausewitz He Ain't

Via Instapundit, Thomas Barnett has this to say about the North Korea crisis and why China couldn't rein in their little loose cannon:


Beijing isn't ready, in large part, because we haven't prepared them well to emerge as a trusted great power ally. This administration keeps hedging its bets, sort of treating China like a military enemy, sort of treating it like a diplomatic ally, sometimes demonizing it and sometimes indulging it. Our "separate lanes" policy of trying to compartmentalize our relationship with China has been a disaster in my opinion, keeping us trapped in an immature strategic relationship with Beijing that makes it harder for us to deal with rogues like Iran and North Korea.

That's been the worst strategic failure of the Bush team: as they wade deeper into this Long War, they keep adding enemies without divesting themselves of old ones that should be left behind--in the Cold War. The upshot is that we're undergunned, not outgunned. We don't face bigger threats (on the contrary, they get smaller in aggregate each year), we just suffer from having too small a team on our side.

We tolerate Russia and India and China instead of embracing them as key allies, and we indulge the Japanese and Europeans, when neither has shown much inclination to grow up strategically any time soon (although I have my hopes for Abe as the next iteration in Tokyo). Bush and Co. define the new era all right. They just don't seem to recognize that a lot of players have changed sides in the meantime.


My learned response, after many years of college, can be summed up as "huh?"

I surely don't have as many credit hours as Barnett so perhaps I have a real "gap" in knowledge.

But this just seems to be another in a long line of thinking that assumes America is the only actor on the globe and the failure of another power to do something good (or their choice to do something bad) is because the nation in question is reacting to us in some way we failed to shape by our actions. No other state is a grown up and responsible for their actions. We are always at fault.

China has a neighboring ally, North Korea, who threatens our allies and could prompt a series of nuclear breakouts by non-nuclear countries? And Barnett lays the blame squarely on America because we didn't "prepare" China to be a great power ally! The Middle Kingdom of several thousand years experience needs us to teach them about geo-politics! As if China shouldn't be able to see the problem on their own--those poor wogs just can't think straight without us, it seems. And as if we haven't been relying on them the last few years to deal with their little spawn!

We have hedged our bets he says, failing to fully embrace China as an ally? Well here's a clue pill, we sometimes treat them like a potential military enemy and sometimes as a potential diplomatic ally because the friggin' Chinese seem of two minds about us! How can we settle on one approach when they can't decide whether they want to sell to us or destroy us? We aren't the only country involved here.

But for some, foreign policy is never a two-way street, it is all about getting the right big-brained and nuanced American policy to coax the proper response out of another country. What absolute rot.

And as for us just adding enemies and failing to get rid of Cold War enemies, Barnett is conveniently forgetting that China was in fact a late Cold War ally who we helped in order to balance the Soviet Union. That little unpleasantness in Tiananmen Square in 1989 might ring a bell. And threats to destroy Taiwan. And aiding every tinpot dictator from Venezuela to Sudan to Iran to North Korea. Oh, and the EP-3 incident. And we didn't embrace them! But oh no, rather than looking at how China has acted to forfeit our de facto alliance, we're at fault for not being a big buddy to Peking the last several years. Please.

If you want to discuss embracing a former enemy, I guess Bush looking into Putin's soul and embracing him as our friend for years even as the old KGB hand cracked down on freedom hasn't stopped Putin from playing old Cold War nostalgia games. Why didn't Russia emerge as a full partner?

And what is that failing to get new allies line about? How can Barnett fail to see that we have indeed brought Japan and India more fully into our alliance picture? Japan sent troops to Iraq; stated Taiwan is a strategic concern; and updated our alliance. And all this was done pre-Abe. Plus we've exercised with India's military, discuss arms sales, and penned a friggin' nuclear agreement with India! How can he talk of Japan not stepping up or of our just "tolerating" India?

What of new allies in Eastern Europe? What of Australia? Even Germany is recovering from its anti-Americanism that began pre-Iraq War as an electoral ploy of the Social Democrats. And don't dare say we've lost France when we've never had them to begin with. This adding enemies and losing friends talk is pure drivel.

I'm not really sure what he intends for Europe if he thinks we "indulge" them. I thought we were too cowboyish. Now I find we indulge them too much. Go figure. But even though I worry about the Europeans, we have convinced NATO to fight in Afghanistan. Quite the stretch for this alliance. But getting old allies to do something new doesn't count, I guess.

What a hash of an analysis. God help us if Barnett is considered our age's big strategic thinker with all his core and gap droning.

But on a number of occasions I freely admit I lack nuance, so what do I know?

Monday, October 09, 2006

I Wish This Attitude Was More Widespread

As Hugo Chavez runs around spreading cheap oil in America to score points against Bush while his own people become poorer, it is nice to see that not everyone leaps at the chance to take part in Hugo's theater. Some native Alaskan villages said no to Hugo:

[Despite poverty] a few villages are refusing free heating oil from Venezuela, on the patriotic principle that no foreigner has the right to call their president "the devil."

The heating oil is being offered by the petroleum company controlled by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, President Bush's nemesis. While scores of Alaska's Eskimo and Indian villages say they have no choice but to accept, others would rather suffer.

"As a citizen of this country, you can have your own opinion of our president and our country. But I don't want a foreigner coming in here and bashing us," said Justine Gunderson, administrator for the tribal council in the Aleut village of Nelson Lagoon. "Even thought we're in economically dire straits, it was the right choice to make."



Yep, the First Americans. Nobody would have blamed them for accepting the oil offered. But they told Hugo to shove it.

Good for them. I hope somebody in the White House notices this gesture of support.

Mulligan?

It may be worse for North Korea than I noted might be true in my first post on the test reports. Early reports said the blast might have fizzled a bit. Via Instapundit, this report says the test was likely a dud and concludes:

A plutonium device should produce a yield in the range of the 20 kilotons, like the one we dropped on Nagasaki. No one has ever dudded their first test of a simple fission device. North Korean nuclear scientists are now officially the worst ever.


This may explain why reports indicate a second test site has activity.

Given that some of Pakistan's tests nearly a decade ago were fizzles, we may have extra indications of the cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea.

If North Korea's test was a dud, and given that North Korea should have known that the nuke could be a dud, what does this tell us? Were the North Korean scientists convinced they had the problem licked? And so this tells us the scientists truly are the worst ever? Or could it tell us that North Korea has very limited raw materials for tests and so risked a single test rather than use up scarce nuclear material in an effort to hide failures amidst a number of tests?

Either explanation is good news.

After two high profile failures, perhaps the North Koreans should demonstrate something a little more reliable--like a new crossbow design with a cheap laser pointer duct taped on to help aiming.

Actually, with two failures, will the North Koreans risk another high profile failure with a second try at a nuke test?

And if this fails, could North Korea try another simpler method of inspiring fear? Like firing off some simple artillery and rocket rounds at Seoul?

Regardless, there should be no do-overs allowed. Treat this as if it was a successful test and put the screws to North Korea so the regime collapses and dies. If the test was a failure, consider that a bonus so we know that North Korea can't go all nuclear crazy in response. Because one day, if we don't stop them, they will succeed in going nuclear.

UPDATE: Growing evidence (tip to NRO) this fizzled big time--maybe just the conventional explosives meant to trigger the nuclear chain reaction actually went off. Treat this as a warning and act as if it worked. Squeeze North Korea until they collapse. One day they'll get it right if they survive long enough.

Sunday, October 08, 2006

The Moment of Clarity Arrives

The North Koreans appear to have lit a nuke off.

This clarifies things, at least.

So when does Iran blow one off, too? They do seem to chat a lot.

And now it is only time before Japan goes nuclear. And then South Korea and Taiwan.

Northeast Asia just got a lot uglier.

Unless we can end that monstrous regime in Pyongyang in the next six months, events will spin out and while we can probably live with the new situation--being rather distant--the countries of the region will sit on a powder keg.

Of the powers involved, I only really feel bad for Japan. They have worked with us. China, Russia, and South Korea, which refused to oppose North Korea, have earned every bit of discomfort they get out of this.

And I suspect that North Korea will not survive. There is no real reason for anyone to aid North Korea and every reason to deny them all aid and let them die.

UPDATE MINUTES LATER: Still waiting for confirmation. But if North Korea is a confirmed nuclear state (with no weaponized nukes yet, I assume), should we consider partitioning North Korea? China is already massing troops out of worry.

I personally have no problem with letting China have a buffer zone carved out of North Korea if it ends the repulsive North Korean regime.

But we must wait for confirmation, I guess. If North Korea did not set off a nuke while claiming to do so, how pathetic is that? So I can't imagine this not being confirmed.

ANOTHER UPDATE: Oh, and if the North Koreans did detonate a nuke, in the next several months we should disperse our Army brigade still in South Korea into company-sized packets since a concentrated brigade would be a logical target for any North Korean nuclear weapon.

And as we react, remember that Iran is a bigger threat due to Islamist terror. We've long assumed North Korea has a nuclear capability and this test--if we confirm it--simply confirms what we have long assumed. Work the problem. Don't panic. North Korea is the state in a desperate situtation. Not America. Not Japan. And not South Korea. Let North Korea die.

UPDATE JUST AFTER MIDNIGHT: The test may have slightly fizzled with less output than desired. Regardless, even if you were of the mind pre-test to give North Korea goodies, I would hope we would all agree that giving in to nuclear blackmail opens the gates to more nuclear blackmail. We need to squeeze those nutballs and watch them collapse. We should seriously consider blockading them. We'd need China to seal their border, of course. Oh, and I can't imagine anybody opposing missile defense now.

Checking out now. We'll see what it looks like in the morning. Effing bastards have ruined my morning coffee, that's for sure. But as I've said, at least the situation is clarified. Or should be.

Isolate that regime and let it die.

MORNING UPDATE: The Iranians thinks the test is our fault:

Not only did the United States not lift the sanctions it had imposed on North Korea, it even increased the diplomatic pressure. Such pressure finally led North Korea to conduct its nuclear test," Iranian state radio said in a commentary.

"North Korea's nuclear test was a reaction to America's threats and humiliation," it said.


Well that's a fascinating explanation. And one I'm sure we'll hear a lot here at home in the coming weeks.

But with the Iranians--Nobel Prize winners in feeling humiliated and threatened--say that low self esteem is reason to fire up a nuke, I'd keep an eye on Iran. Notwithstanding the official wisdom that says Iran is 5-10 years from having a nuke. In reality, however long it takes Iran to build their own, they are only about 20 hours from having a nuke FedExed to them from North Korea.

And now Iran knows their nuclear dollars will be well spent on a North Korean design.

Idiot; Useful; 1 ea.

Selig Harrison is possibly the most idiotic analyst of North Korean events I have ever read (noted here, here, here, and here). Well, other than the Pillsbury Nuke Boy himself. And International ANSWER. So, ok, he's third. But that's still pretty good. And since he gets printed in a leading news magazine, his influence outweighs his third place finish in the idiocy olympics.

Acting like the unofficial spokesman of that gulag with a UN seat, Mr. Harrison has written in defense of North Korea yet again. Wretchard notes Mr. Harrison's latest:

On Sept. 19, 2005, North Korea signed a widely heralded denuclearization agreement with the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea. Pyongyang pledged to "abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs." In return, Washington agreed that the United States and North Korea would "respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together and take steps to normalize their relations."

Four days later, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sweeping financial sanctions against North Korea designed to cut off the country's access to the international banking system, branding it a "criminal state" guilty of counterfeiting, money laundering and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction.


See? North Korea just wants to get along with us! Never mind the kidnapping, oppresssion, starvation, murder, terrorism, nuclear weapons, aiding Iran and whoever has money to buy WMD, threats to invade South Korea or just bombard it, missile firing over Japan, or actual criminal activities to support the regime.

The North Koreans didn't like the latter steps by us, however, and that just screwed things up for the former. Apparently, North Korea thinks it is "normal" to counterfeit our currency, launder money from drug dealing, and sell WMD technology to our enemies. Selig Harrison, too, apparently.

Selig Harrison just returned from his tenth visit to the psycho regime of Kim Jong-Il. Once again, it is time to answer the enduring mystery of why Kim Jong-Il lets Selig Harrison in so often to meet with North Korean officials. Quite the puzzle wrapped in an enigma, indeed.

The man is despicable and a one-man Joy Brigade bringing a nice smile to Kim's face every time he visits North Korea. But hey, Kim does buy Harrison dinner, so it isn't like he is prostituting himself or anything!

Newsweek should be ashamed to print his propaganda. I won't bother wondering why Mr. Harrison has no shame for his repeated defense of that murderous despotism in Pyongyang.

Saturday, October 07, 2006

A Controlled Experiment

A lot of people think that waging war on jihadism is a mistake. We should emulate the sophisticated Europeans, accept a certain number of terror attacks as normal, endure them, and focus on jihadis as a law enforcement problem.

The recently released NIE key judgments provides a lesson in this philosophy, actually:


The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings.


Interesting. Even with laws that make the Patriot Act and our so-called "domestic spying" programs look like an ACLU/CAIR wet dream of permissiveness, the Europeans are "an important venue for attacking Western interests."

Since the NIE was written in the spring, add in the failed airline attacks and German train attacks as terror coming from Europe.

The European law enforcement approach has stopped some attacks while failing to stop others. And the approach has absolutely failed to eliminate an important venue for attacking Western interests.

And there is no use saying that Iraq has enraged European Moslems. After all, 9/11 has strong European roots and planning was done in Europe long before the Iraq War--or even the Bush presidency. Besides, at some level, saying that Iraq has inspired jihad means you are arguing that it makes perfect sense to kill innocents because you oppose the war. Since a lot of people oppose the war, why aren't Michael Moore and Tim Robbins strapping on explosive belts and walking into pizza parlors? Or Belgians? Or the French? Somehow they restrict themselves to sneering. But not Moslem jihadis.

But by all means, note how the NIE describes how the law enforcement approach has failed in Europe. Shall we really try this worldwide?

Who Counts?

Another note on numbers of troops in Iraq.

First of all, let me note that Saddam managed to keep his Kurds and Shias suppressed for many years without any American troops at all. He just had Iraqis. And most of them were fairly ill trained. And while sometimes he needed to really kill a lot of Shias or Kurds really quickly to force them into submission, mostly it was just occupation and police work.

So how many troops and security personnel do we have for 25 million Iraqis? I'll round and mostly go from memory:

We have about 140,000 troops in Iraq.

The Coalition adds 20,000.

Count 10,000 private security.

Then add in 275,000 Iraqi army and police.

Toss in 70,000 Kurdish Peshmerga militia in the Kurdish areas.

We could even add in 15,000 official Shia militia people though they are a mixed bag. But they do fight (and murder and terrorize, unfortunately) Sunnis.

This is 510,000 troops, or a little above the 2% of the population ratio that is commonly said to be the minimum for a successful counter-insurgency.

But wait, there's more!

As the latest Pentagon report on Iraq notes, there are 145,000 Facility Protection Service personnel. I've mentioned them before and how they are strangely not counted.

This last group brings us up to 655,000 security personnel.

If we want to be really ambitious, let's count the 30,000 Sunni tribal forces that Anbar tribal chiefs promised to fight foreign jihadis in the west.

And of course, we hardly need the intense ratios for the peaceful southern Shia areas. We could also just ignore the Kurdish areas and Peshmerga and say we have 585,000 personnel for 22 million people in the non-Kurd areas.

And since we can be thinner on the ground in Shia areas, the effective ratio for the Sunni and mixed regions around Baghdad can go way up.

It is more complicated than just counting troops and population and doing some quick division.

Now, granted, the quality of all of these forces vary considerably. And we can't even just talk American versus Iraqi. While valuable, our support personnel are just not out there fighting like Iraqi army units or national police. And the FPS are really just security guards. But they protect facilities that need guarding that would otherwise need to be protected by better trained Iraqi police or army units--or even American units.

But the bottom line is we have a total of 685,000 troops fighting the various enemies inside Iraq. And we are seriously arguing about whether 20,000 more American troops will be decisive? When military power is a necessary but not decisive portion of the counter-insurgency effort?

So I don't know why the discussion over winning in Iraq (we are winning) is about numbers. And even when talking about sufficient numbers to win in Iraq, I have no idea why the discussion is only about American troops and whether 20,000 more Americans will be decisive. This is just tunnel vision.

Step back, look broadly, and have some patience.

Friday, October 06, 2006

Jihad. Apply Directly to the Infidel

Jihad. Apply Directly to the Infidel.

Jihad. Apply Directly to the Infidel.

Jihad. Apply Directly to the Infidel.

Jihad. Apply Directly to the Infidel.

Jihad. Apply Directly to the Infidel.


Yeah, it's annoying. But constant repetition sure seems to work.

Don't buy it, people. Just kill them.

Ahem

A number of the Left like to say who can blame Iran and North Korea for wanting nuclear weapons when they have to fear they could be on the receiving end of a George W. Bush invasion.

Well, the Chinese report that North Korea started their current round in 1994.

And the Iranians seem to have started in 1988.

Sadly for the conventional Left wisdom that the current administration is at fault for their desire for nuclear weapons, these time line beginnings do not include the current administration.

There is one nuclear development that does include the current administration. That would be Libya, which gave up its nuclear program after Saddam was pulled from his hole.

I still want to know why Libya gave up their nukes rather than accelerate their programs. Because if the conventional Left wisdom is correct, Libya should have naturally wanted nukes to prevent themselves from being on the receiving end of a George W. Bush invasion.

Perhaps the desire of nuts to get nukes isn't our fault, eh?

Pre-Game Pep Rally

The Pillsbury Nuke Boy is meeting with his troops:

North Korean state television aired still shots of the bouffant-haired leader waving to an assembled crowd of about 500 olive-suited officers in dress caps. Kim later posed for a group photo with his commanders in front of Pyongyang's sprawling mausoleum for his father and national founder, Kim Il Sung.

The meeting was the reclusive leader's first reported appearance in three weeks and the first since Tuesday, when his government shocked the world by announcing plans to test a nuclear device on its way to building an arsenal of atomic weapons.

It was unclear when the rally took place, or how many attended, but it could show that Kim is trying to polish his credentials with the country's cherished military at a time when international pressure is mounting on Pyongyang.


With Kim Jong-Il relying on spooks and nukes for regime survival rather than his army, but the army increasingly too weak to threaten South Korea but strong enough to destroy the Kim regime, is this a pre-game pep rally?

If so, North Korea might actually be ready to light a nuke up real soon.

They Can't Help Themselves. It is Their Nature

Austin Bay reports that the Chinese can't stop North Korea from testing a nuclear device. Or rather, they choose not to do that:


WHILE the rest of the world looks to Beijing to stop North Korea from exploding a nuclear bomb, a leading Chinese analyst says it is too late — China cannot act without doing worse harm to its own interests.

Fascinating. When the harm to China's interests of North Korea setting off a nuclear device includes Japan going nuclear and rearming in earnest; with possible cascading atomic proliferation as South Korea and Taiwan decide not to be the last on the block without nukes, how on Earth could China conclude that stopping North Korea would be worse?

Is a little economic dislocation really worse if North Korea collapses either outright or as the result of losing a desperate war against South Korea?

Do the Chinese seriously believe having a loose cannon pointed at Japan and America is so desirable that they'll risk a nuclear-armed Japan and Taiwan to keep that so-called asset?

I guess that says a lot about how China views us. "Strategic partner," indeed.

It kind of reminds me of the fable of the Scorpion and the Frog. You know, a scorpion wants a frog to give him a lift across a stream and the frog protests the scorpion will kill him. The scorpion says not to worry, if I sting you, I die too, since I can't swim. So the frog takes the scorpion on his back and heads across the stream:


Halfway across the river, the frog suddenly felt a sharp sting in his back and, out of the corner of his eye, saw the scorpion remove his stinger from the frog's back. A deadening numbness began to creep into his limbs.

"You fool!" croaked the frog, "Now we shall both die! Why on earth did you do that?"

The scorpion shrugged, and did a little jig on the drownings frog's back.

"I could not help myself. It is my nature."

Then they both sank into the muddy waters of the swiftly flowing river.


China can't help herself. It is their nature, apparently.

Thursday, October 05, 2006

Taiwan Can Fail Only Once

Due to internal Taiwanese bickering over actually defending themselves against Chinese attack, the F-16 sale to Taiwan has fallen through.

It is absolutely amazing how free people can fail to see threats to their very existence and refuse to take the necessary steps to preserve their freedom, prosperity, and even lives.

Not that we in America can boast too much about a bare majority willing to fight the current war, but at least we are--as of this posting date--still doing it. And if we fail, we can recover at least, given time.

If Taiwan fails, they will become just another province under the heel of Peking, and the Taiwanese can kiss their recent prosperity and freedom goodbye.

I will say, if the worst happens, it will be a fascinating topic for graduate students for years to come about how people used democracy to prevent the effective defense of their nation.

Damn shame. They seem like such nice people.

Jobs or Hijabs?

The French police union claims (tip to NRO) they are facing a low-level intifada in their suburbs:

Radical Muslims in France's housing estates are waging an undeclared "intifada" against the police, with violent clashes injuring an average of 14 officers each day.

Eleven months ago, I wondered if the car-burning riots represented outrage over lack of opportunity or Islamist fervor. I generally sided with the former but wondered whether Islamism would take the lead and focus the aggrieved in the name of Islamism:

My fear is that the jihadis in France will increasingly lead the alien and alienated Moslems of France. Remember our own Revolution. When colonists first confronted British soldiers with arms in April 1775 at Lexington and Concord, and then lay siege to the British in Boston, we did not seek political separation. Our forebears only wanted their rights as Englishmen recognized. It was not until July 1776, more than a year later, that we made independence from the British our official goal.

This is not jihad and it never has been, says Strategypage. But this says nothing of the future. Will it become jihad? A cry for rights can become a cry for separation in remarkably short time. Will we look back at the events at Clichy-sous-Bois as the first clash leading to a declaration of independence by France's Moslems?


So what do the rioters want? Jobs or hijabs?

UPDATE: Welcome Instapundit readers.

Wednesday, October 04, 2006

Is There a Long Run for Iran?

Secretary Rice is out gathering an anti-Iranian coalition:

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is in the Middle East this week seeking to build a network of support for what she calls "emerging moderate forces" (i.e. Iraq, the Palestinian Fatah Party, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt) against "extremist" ones that are opposed to US interests.

The No. 1 extremist Ms. Rice intends to to counter, say analysts, is Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This trip comes at a time when an oil-flush, potentially nuclear Iran has growing clout in the region, particularly among armed Shiite groups in Lebanon and Iraq.


So is this development saying we are going to accept a nuclear Iran under the mullahs and are trying to contain Iran for the long run in the hope we can outlast their regime?

Or are we trying to judge sentiments for direct action against Iran in the near future to prevent Iran under the mullahs from going nuclear? And no, I don't know whether we might be planning to overthrow the mullahs so that at least a sane Iran might go nuclear; or whether we will disarm the mullahs of nuclear ambitions while we can even if the mullahs survive the attack. Or it could be regime change combined with a disarming military campaign, of course.

I keep assuming we are playing our cards close to our chest. It is always possible that the apparent decision to do nothing and hope for the best is actually our hand.

We Kill What We See

Hutchison links to this post about a translated Iraqi document written prior to our invasion calling for Iraqi commancers to bury equipment and devices:

Re: Concealment of Equipment and Devices

1. During our observation of enemy air attack techniques in bombing and destroying deployed equipment and devices belonging to sectors not currently in operation at this time, in which the principle of deployment by our troops, we noticed that the troops deployed, fortified and established control to protect against any land attack.

2. The use of shelters that provide complete concealment and would completely hide the weapons, equipment and devices underground (as applied at the beginning of Gulf War I) has been authorized. As applied at the beginning of Gulf War I, this will make them hard-to-find targets for the enemy’s air force, especially weapons and devices not currently in operation at this time which may be brought into operation in the future. In the event that there is insufficient roofing material, begin with the most important priorities.

Act accordingly.

Signature
General Ibrahim `Abd-al-Sattar Muhammad
Army Chief of Staff

This is being read by some as alluding to hiding WMD. I don't think so.

The memo is clearly written in reaction to lessons from Desert Storm. In that war, the Iraqis deployed their ground troops to resist a ground attack and suffered from our air attacks more as a result. If we could see it we could hit it and what we hit we killed.

This memo, to me, is simply telling commanders to expect air attacks rather than ground attacks and to hide underground any equipment they don't need in order to preserve them for later when they can be hauled out and used. This "later" could be during a ground invasion or after the war is over, depending on the equipment. The Iraqi Baathists sorely missed weapons destroyed in Desert Storm in the decade after that defeat and hoped to avoid losing what was left in 2003--assuming they'd still be there ruling Iraq, obviously.

Indeed, during Desert Storm, the Iraqis suffered from the synergy between our air and ground power both during the air campaign and during the ground war. After enduring more than six weeks of air attack, during the ground campaign when our heavy armor plowed into Iraqi units, engaging them at great distance and beyond Iraqi visual detection range, Iraqi vehicle crews abandoned their vehicles to take shelter from what they thought was yet another destructive aerial attack. This is the right thing to do under air attack. But under ground attack, it helps the defenders a lot if the the defenders actually man their weapons, shoot back, and maneuver. The Iraqis did not do this and so our ground troops had many turkey shoots against unmanned armored vehicles.

Anyway, while I suspect some WMD are buried in the deserts of Iraq somewhere, this memo is not a smoking gun on WMD. It is just a warning to avoid smoking hulks at the hands of our aircraft.

More US Troops in Iraq?

I don't think we need more US troops in Iraq.

This First Lieutentant who served in Iraq believes we do, based on his experience in Iraq:

Two things are to blame for our predicament, one a corollary of the other. The first reason is that we did not have enough troops in Samarra. The skill and courage of 150 American soldiers prevented chaos, but was never enough to fully secure a city of 120,000 people or maintain the rule of law. The soldiers in the city were preoccupied with defending themselves and conducting night raids, and were therefore largely unable to regularly patrol during the day--thus giving insurgents reign to move freely and intimidate the local population. A visitor in Samarra on an average day would be hard-pressed to point out a single American humvee traversing local neighborhoods. The same is true for Baghdad.

Our four-vehicle civil-affairs patrol was often the only American presence deep inside the city and we were frequently greeted by locals with the question, "Where have you been?" Americans can't of course be omnipresent; but we should at least be there when it matters. When Americans are there, either the insurgents are not or they are on the losing side of a firefight.

Second, because of a lack of troops, American military leaders are forced to make a choice between mission objectives and self-preservation. Many of our leaders are opting to guard supply routes and coagulate on sprawling military bases, rather than consistently moving into dangerous areas and fighting the insurgency. In our case, we had 500 soldiers stationed outside Samarra who made infrequent trips into the city center. There is little reason why most of these troops were not stationed inside Samarra, canvassing every neighborhood with platoon-sized patrol bases and suffocating insurgent operations.


First of all, I expect he could have used more troops for his mission. Any good commander could find uses for more troops. Second, I do not doubt that he sincerely believes we need more troops. Third, I believe his call for more troops is so we will win in Iraq. And finally, he could be right. I don't think so, but I am far away and relying on what I read. I could be wrong.

But I think the lieutenant's description of the situation undercuts his call for more troops. He said we only had 150 inside Samarra. Plus Iraqis of unknown number. I don't know why they apparently don't count, but I'll ignore that. More to the point, he also says we had 500 troops outside Samarra who rarely went in the city.

Why do we need extra troops sent to Iraq if we could more than quadruple our troop strength (based on this example) just by using what we have differently? Why should we add 500 new troops to Iraq so they can go inside the cities and still keep 500 existing troops under-used outside those same cities?

Clearly, if we have a problem it isn't troop strength. It is rather how we use them. This is a matter of strategy and not numbers.

We've decided that our strategy to win is to push Iraqis forward and so we pull back a bit to keep the Iraqis from slacking off and relying on us. I think that this is the proper solution to winning.

But if we need more troops to fight in Iraq, we should look inside Iraq before we ship more over.

Tuesday, October 03, 2006

But It Looks Good On Paper

The latest letter concerning the enemy's internal debate (Atiyah's Letter to Zarqawi ) about the Iraq War has an interesting passage (tip to Powerline):

The most important thing is that you continue in your jihad in Iraq, and that you be patient and forbearing, even in weakness, and even with fewer operations; even if each day had half of the number of current daily operations, that is not a problem, or even less than that. So, do not be hasty.


While critics over here focus on numbers of attacks, the enemy sees the focus on piling up attack statistics as actually counter-productive. They view higher attack levels as potentially risking the survival of their network. Apparently, even the "cause celebre" of the jihad isn't luring enough recruits to Iraq to make the enemy confident.

I wrote a while back that the focus on the number of attacks could distract our enemies if they believe it is a metric of winning:

I've repeatedly argued that enemy body counts are not the way to measure our success in the war in Iraq. The New York Times reports that enemy attacks continue to rise in Iraq even after lulls. But this focus on attacks is as misleading as a focus on enemy body counts would be. Both can be used to argue for victories even as both statistics are meaningless metrics for success. Indeed, I specifically warned against assuming that escalating violence means we are losing. Any war escalates if it goes on long enough. Winning and losing is independent of that factor as each side throws more resources into the fight.


Body counts and numbers of attacks are metrics of battle intensity--not whether we are winning. The metrics of winning that I wrote about in December 2005 continue to roll our way.

And do remember, we see our flaws--real and perceived--while our enemy's failures take place in the dark and are mostly unseen by us.

Mushroom Clouded Judgment

If the North Koreans truly believe we are always on the verge of nuking them, announcing they will test a nuclear weapon is just foolish:

"The U.S. extreme threat of a nuclear war and sanctions and pressure compel the DPRK to conduct a nuclear test, an essential process for bolstering nuclear deterrent, as a self-defense measure in response," said a statement by the North's Foreign Ministry and carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. DPRK stands for Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.


Wouldn't we take the opportunity to strike before they test a nuke if we really are determined to nuke them? (And we have been planning it for fifty years according to Pyongyang.)

So really, North Korea's threat to test makes little sense. It would just put some spine into those who don't want to confront Pyongyang:

"A North Korean nuclear test ... would create a qualitatively different situation on the Korean peninsula," Rice said. "I think that you would see that a number of states in the region would need to reassess where they are now with North Korea."

I agree. Like I said last year, North Korea should smoke 'em if they've got them:

So if North Korea has nukes, why not end the ability of some to pretend there is no problem? If North Korea lights one up, nobody can deny the need to confront North Korea. Do we really want this gulag with a UN seat to have nukes and survive for long? And the Pillsbury Nuke Boy will have one fewer nuke to wave around if push comes to shove. I'd certainly be happier if North Korea can't build nukes; but if they can, end the uncertainty.

With this cleared up, we can focus on containing North Korea. We can cut off all but a trickle of aid to keep them hoping for recovery rather than banking on war. We can welcome refugees. We can try to get information about the outside world into the north. We can build missile defenses around North Korea with the Japanese to guard against the worse. We can focus surveillance assets on the north. We can intercept any attempts to export nuclear materials or weapons. In short, we contain them and pull the plug so that they die. Regime collapse is our goal.

And we can prepare to strike North Korea's missile sites and leadership positions in a disarming strike should we detect signs of missile launch preparations. Remember, it is one thing to hide development in a deep cavern. But if you want a weapon, you have to bring it close to the surface where it can actually be launched. We can detect and strike these.


It would be a clarifying moment for the South Koreans, Chinese, and Russians who just don't want to be bothered with dealing with North Korea.

UPDATE: James Robbins agrees that North Korea should test if they can.

Mission Accomplished

October 3 1993 was the day our Rangers and Delta Force blew away attackers by the hundreds--anywhere from 500 to over 2,000 enemy were killed in the fight--and pulled out of Mogadishu's Islamist inferno with the enemy leaders they were sent to capture still in their hands.

We (and our enemies, too) speak of it as a defeat, but in any other war it would have been a point of pride and consdiered a victory of brave soldiers against overwhelming odds. A Thermopolye or Alamo but where the good guys survive and win.

In the hazy world of peacekeeping, losing a score of soldiers in one battle was too high a loss to be considered a victory.

Ridley Scott's 2001 movie Black Hawk Down provided our people with a look at that bravery.

I hope we will always remember the type of men who charge into infernos to fight in our name and protect us from vicious killers. They did a Hell of a job that day in Mogadishu and deserve to be known as American soldiers who remembered duty, honor, and country to carry out a difficult mission and decimate an enemy that dared try to stop them.

It isn't our soldiers' fault that we don't really realize just what they accomplished that day.

Hooah.

Monday, October 02, 2006

The Joys of a Law Enforcement Approach to War

Remember the September 2001 Anthrax attacks?

Well, it could have been anybody since the spores were not weaponized and so not in fact indicative of American professionals at work:

What was initially described as a near-military-grade biological weapon was ultimately found to have had a more ordinary pedigree, containing no additives and no signs of special processing to make the anthrax bacteria more deadly, law enforcement officials confirmed. In addition, the strain of anthrax used in the attacks has turned out to be more common than was initially believed, the officials said.


So it may have been another act of war on us by freelancing haters.

I think we have a better chance of killing the enemy that did this simply in the course of killing jihadis than we have of "solving" the so-called crime.

Five years and this is just coming out in the press? Amazing. If we hadn't gone to war with the Taliban in 2001, I'm sure we'd be reading about new evidence that might conclusively tie bin Laden to the 9/11 attacks.

The Iran Insurgency

Via Instapundit, are insurgencies growing inside Iran?

Iran has blamed Great Britain for supporting the elements of the Iranian insurgency, but has not yet been able to present any solid proof of those claims, as opposed to the solid physical evidence against Iran in providing material support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, Palestinian factions in the West Bank and Gaza, and the sectarian Shia violence in Iraq, in the form of captured Iranian weaponry. It would be logical, of course, for Western powers to support the various low-level insurgencies in Iran. Attacks in Iran's oil and gas producing regions can pose a threat to the stability of the central government. Hopefully Iranians can accomplish regime change without need for direct military intervention by Western armies, saving many lives on both sides.

I have to say I might believe the Iranians on this. Indeed, I've wondered if the British are involved in preparing the ground work for a Western-supported revolution in Iran (and where are those missing AK-47s?). If so, Prime Minister Blair's comments recently that he would step down in a year might indicate the outer time limits of action.

Subcontracting this work to the British would certainly keep the New York Times from publishing the details from American leakers.

We shall see. After the November elections.

We're at War With Someone

I watched United 93 today.

I wanted to watch it at home. I am still too angry to watch something like that with others, let alone watch it in public.

Knowing what would happen just increased the sense of helplessness I felt more than five years ago as I watched events unfold on a small black and white TV in my office and as I surfed the web looking for more news. The anger I felt then was brought home, too. The anger at our enemies has never disappeared these five years, though it is hardly a constant. I usually don't even really feel it. It only exists as a determination to win.

At one point in the movie, some official--I don't remember if he was an airline executive or an FAA official--is portrayed as saying, "We're at war with someone."

Five years later, I think that pretty much all Americans feel we are at war with someone.

But depending on who the "we" is, the answer to that question varies. For some, that "someone" "we" are at war with is the President. For others, it is the prospect of gay marriage. For others, it is carbon dioxide. Others think it is abortion. Or teaching Intelligent Design. Some of us wage war against flag burning, tobacco, or fatty food.

Some even think the object of their war is to determine who gets to appoint goddamn committee chairs in the friggin' Congress.

I simply don't understand how any of these things can be more than secondary objectives when we face murderers who would kill us all if they could. I have one issue and one issue only at the national level: who will fight and win this war? Who believes we deserve to win this war? I wish I could have the luxury of voting based on marginal tax rates. I wish terrorism was a law enforcement issue. Good God, I wish we were debating shark attack coverage.

But we have to face reality. We are in the world we are in and wishing for the return of our vacation from history won't make it so. We have to fight for that normality.

If we all can't at least agree that we have enemies who must be killed and defeated every day and then pursued and destroyed without mercy, our enemies will continue to kill us in inventive ways. Oh, we might get lucky and have the victims stretched out in small numbers with only the occasional 9/11-scale attack to disturb our morning coffee and get us all weepy in our grief for a month or so, but as this drags on for years and decades without really smashing our enemies--whether we are speaking of specific groups, countries, or ideologies that spawn our enemies--eventually we will lose a city. And if we do, the civil liberties that some falsely argued have been seriously eroded these past five years will truly be erased in large swathes to prevent another fireball.

We need to focus, people. We're at war with someone. Remember?

Sunday, October 01, 2006

So What If Mecca is the City to Get Nuked?

While I'm not speaking in reference to any particular article or blog post, I think there is a common thread of wondering what we'd do if we were nuked. What if we know who did it? What if we think we know? What if we don't know who did it?

I personally think we must respond with nukes to maintain deterrence. I wouldn't slaughter civilians in a revenge attack but I would use nukes in response. Would any state with nukes be deterred in the future if we won't respond with nukes? That's a rhetorical question, by the way, since deterrence requires believing the other side will respond in kind.

But what if Mecca is nuked? What if we wake up one morning to find CNN reporting that Mecca has been slagged and that for the average Moslem, getting the right compass bearing to pray is rather pointless. What do we do if that happens?

Moslems will be itching for revenge, I think it is safe to assume given past violent reactions to cartoons and what-not. Would Pakistan use its "Islamic bomb" to retaliate?

And who could have done it? We worry that loose Russian nukes could fall into the hands of jihadis, but what if irate Christians upset over Beslan got it? Or angry Hindus? Or angry Jews? Or Catholics worried the Pope is at risk for pointing out the violent tendencies of Moslems these days?

Or maybe some grad students make their own bomb right here in America or abroad in some Third World hell hole and ship it to Saudi Arabia?

Does anybody think the Islamic world will pause to consider who did it before lashing out?

And if the Moslem world isn't as likely to be measured as we might be, what do we do anticipating a highly violent response to something we did not do?

Will we be forced to strike hard after Mecca is destroyed just to preempt a lethal Islamic response?

I'm reasonably sure what we need to to do if we are nuked. I have no idea what we should do if they are nuked.

Ugly Duckling

What the heck is this?

I know Israel has long converted old tanks into armored personnel carriers. During the Hizbollah War I noted that the Israelis were using some old T-54/55s as APCs. This picture looks like an old M-48 (I think I see a curved front) given a new life as ... something.

I do give credit to whoever wrote the caption for the photo for not just calling it a "tank." Usually, the press calls anything big and green a "tank." But what is it?

It doesn't look like an APC. It is too tall, really, to be an APC; and with firing slots all around the structure it looks more defensive.

It has a small superstructure, so how many infantry could it really hold? Could there really be room to have a rifleman at each port or is it for a couple guys to move around and have multiple firing slots?

But it doesn't have antennas sprouting out so it probably isn't some type of command vehicle. Usually, comman vehicles will have lots of room and this vehicle doesn't have it. There appears to be some type of antenna on the rear but it might be behind the vehicle.

There appears to be a bulldozer behind it so it part of an engineer unit? Or is it just passing by and so has nothing to do with the engineer vehicle?

Perhaps it is really just a mobile bunker. Is that why it is so high up? For providing some protected observation capabilities? Is it designed to park with engineers to provide some protected position to defend engineers?

But why isn't there an apparent machine gun mounted on it? Or is it just removed for some reason?

Whatever it is, it is designed to do something under the protection of heavy armor.

It is always interesting to see how old front line vehicles get a new lease on life as some special purpose vehicle.

A Dim Star in the Firmament

President Jimmy Carter is a disgrace and embarassment to America, as far as I'm concerned.

Victor Hanson writes of this man:

In his dotage, Carter is proving once again that he is as malicious and mean-spirited a public figure as he is historically ignorant. And for all his sanctimonious Christian veneer, and fly-fishing, ‘aw shucks blue-jeans image, he can’t hide an essentially ungracious and unkind soul.


Still, our Navy has made sure that nobody can ever say that Jimmy Carter does not defend our nation.

I'm reasonably sure the Navy named a submarine after President Carter to avoid the shame of having to name an aircraft carrier after him.

Troop Strength

Once more on the topic of what is enough troop strength to win in Iraq.

While there are renewed calls for more American troops in Iraq, I still do not think it is necessary to ramp up our troop strength. Sure, the recent fairly minor adjustments can help, but the focus of moving responsibilities to trained Iraqi forces is the key.

This conference is interesting, in particular the statement's discussion of what is enough to win a counter-insurgency campaign:


One example of this dilemma is troop strength. What is the proper ratio of security forces (military and police) to a given population? An often cited rule of thumb is approximately 20 soldiers per 1000 residents. A recent study by the Army’s Combat Studies Institute in Fort Leavenworth attempted to derive the “right” ratio based on historical analysis. Although the numbers varied significantly across cases, the average turned out to be 13.26 soldiers per 1000 inhabitants or 91.82 residents per soldier. But, the study’s own Forward warns that these results “cannot be used to guarantee victory by simply putting a certain number of soldiers ‘on the ground’ relative to the indigenous population. The percentages and numbers in the study are merely historical averages, with all the dangers inherent in any average figure.”


As is noted, this is not a rule where if you get 13.26 (or 20 as was commonly asserted as the minimum) troops per 1000 residents, you win. The point of the conference is that counter-insurgency is mostly political. The government needs to run a successful country with economic opportunity and political inclusion to keep people pro-government and pull neutrals or anti-government folks in the government's direction. These are things any government must do even in peacetime and so the security forces' job is to provide a shield to do these things. The military aspect is a minority of the problem but an absolutely essential shield to let government work.

In a country of 25 million, we'd need 350,000 to have 14% ratio. We have 140,000 US, 20,000 coalition, 10,000 private security, 300,000 Iraqi police and army, and 150,000 facility protection forces (this is all from memory so don't cite me for precise numbers). That is 620,000 troops--24.8 per 1,000 people. This doesn't count the 70,000 Kurdish Pesh Merga that keep the northern Kurdish areas safe. And if you break it down by region, we can skimp on the southern Shia area and pump up the numbers in the central Sunni and mixed area. I fail to see how we have insufficient troops to win. Unless you hold the bizarre notion that only American and British forces count. If you argue this tell me how many American and British soldiers did Saddam have to hold Iraq against a hostile Shia and Kurd population before we destroyed his regime?

On the security level, it is important to get the locals fighting. Indeed, the statement provides that "a key objective is to assist the host nation in developing its own capabilities[.]" More of our troops could interfere with this goal as I've argued from early in the insurgency (back in the Fall of 2003). If we fight for our friends, they'll let us fight for them. And eventually blame us for the violence as they watch from the sidelines. Indeed, we still get some of that attitude even as we stand up Iraqi forces to fight instead of us. How much worse would it be if we had 200,000 troops in Iraq?

We have started a process of creating an Iraqi military to fight the insurgency and not a miniature version of our military:


Working with the host nations in these states, we are not creating, nor have we attempted to create, a “mirror image” of our own military. Instead, we are helping to build forces that can counter their respective insurgencies and which can be sustained by the host nation.


Troop strength is important, but arguing about our levels ignores that we have made progress in the far more important political and economic areas even as some claim we have too few troops. How have we made progress in these areas if we have too few troops? The study of past ratios and campaigns should tell us that winning is not a matter of reaching some magic number of troops density. (Indeed, one study by the Army before the war argued that 100,000 US troops would be needed.) This is simply not the key ingredient to winning when the non-military aspects are 80% or more of the solution. I don't care how many hawks and doves argue we need more American troops to win. We don't.

And we've made military progress, too. The enemy is restricted to fewer areas even if numbers of attacks increase. This is where the ample enemy money comes in. They still are using the Oil for Food money to carry on an insurgency out of proportion to their support and strength. And despite their money, the enemy is atomized, unable to operate in company strength and rarely, it seems, in even platoon strength. This is something the rookie Iraqi forces can take on successfully.

So have patience. We are winning. And stop focusing on troop strength since that is hardly the key; and even in military terms alone, we've done the job well.

We will win this. If we don't falter in spirit.