Clearly, the problem is that America isn't offering the Pillsbury Nuke Boy enough money. That's what a panel of experts has concluded:
The United States should use incentives to entice North Korea to scrap its nuclear programs, including a "buyout" pegging aid to the amount of plutonium Pyongyang surrenders, a panel of experts said.
No matter that we tried to bribe the North Koreans into reasonableness ten years ago and it led to our current situation. Because, hey, these people on the panel are experts:
Formed in late 2002 after the crisis erupted, the task force is made up of prominent American experts on Korea, including former military officers and diplomats. It is chaired by Selig Harrison, director of the Asian program at the Washington-based Center for International Policy.
See, right off the bat the experts are confused. The crisis didn't erupt in 2002. We caught them violating existing agreements in 2002! There really is a subtle difference and this really should influence how you read the North Koreans. If the North Koreans wanted money from us, why did they hide their violations of the 1994 Agreed Framework until we confronted them in 2002? You'd think that an attempt at monetary blackmail would require some sort of note indicating they are working on nukes and have a price to halt development.
But no, the North Koreans worked in secret. Why? Here's a clue for the experts. BECAUSE THEY WANT FRIGGIN' NUKES. Once you say it out loud it really is quite clear. Try it.
But then the story provides explanations for this seeming inability to comprehend an evil foe:
The task force -- which includes critics of Bush's North Korea policy -- challenges other U.S. principles in a crisis that erupted in October 2002 when Washington said North Korea admitted having a secret uranium enrichment program.
The task force--hold your hats--has critics of the Bush administration's policy on it. Who'd have thought that? The task force also challenges other U.S. principles. I think one of the principles it is challenging is that we should prevent threats to our people from developing.
But the task force does embrace the principle of valuing hope over experience. If I was content to pretend we were succeeding with North Korea for a little while until they burst our bubble again, I might go with the principles of the task force experts. Then shoveling money into Pyongyang would be worth the lulling, soothing effect of believing the threat from North Korea was solved.
I'd rather squeeze those psychopathic monsters until they implode.
