Tuesday, October 18, 2011

Don't Ignore Them--Sink Them

This article worries about swarms of Iranian armed boats smashing up our high tech big ships in the Gulf:

In September 2010, Fadavi (NOTE: the commander of Revolutionary Guard naval forces) laid out his vision for his navy’s mission. According to Himes, Fadavi “contrasted the limited number of U.S. Navy ships with the hundreds at his disposal and emphasized speed and challenges inherent in tracking such vessels via radar as the key elements that allow his vessels to reach their intended target and employ either missiles or torpedoes in large numbers.” Himes quotes Fadavi as saying that large ships don’t have a place in the IRGCN because “choosing large vessels means that you play in the enemy’s court and under his rules.”

Please. Iran doesn't have large vessels because they can't afford them. If they cold afford them, they'd buy them. You don't see Iran sending little boats to the Mediterranean or threaten to send Zodiacs to our coast, do you?

Could all those little boats be a threat? Sure. But we won't battle them with our large vessels. Unless the Iranians pull off a Gulf-wide Pearl Harbor, we'll pull back our big ships out of range and use our own small craft, armed helicopters, armed drones, aircraft, and even large vessels firing missiles at long range, to smash up all those little boats. We did it before during the Iran-Iraq War when we needed a defense in the northern Persian Gulf:

Middle East Force developed a plan that provided for constant patrolling to prevent attacks. Bernsen sent an outline of his concept of operations to General George Crist, USMC, Commander in Chief, Central Command, on August 6, 1987: "In my view, to be successful in the northern Gulf we must establish intensive patrol operations to prevent the Iranians from laying mines." (2) Rather than using regular naval vessels, he concluded, the area could be better patrolled by a mixture of helicopters and small boats, augmented by SEALs and marines. They could range over a wide area and were better equipped to deal with unconventional threats. These assets would also be far less expensive than additional warships.

Because of political sensitivities, neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia would grant U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) basing rights for combatants who might engage in offensive operations against Iran. Thus American forces required an operating base, ideally in the center of the patrol area, positioned astride the sealane and close to Farsi Island. Attention quickly focused on two oil platform construction barges, Hercules and Wimbrown VII, located at a shipyard in Bahrain and owned by Brown and Root. The company had extensive business dealings with the Kuwait Oil Company and agreed to lease the barges. Both were strong, compartmentalized, and surrounded by a floodable tank which would protect against a mine strike. They had large support facilities and helicopter flight decks. Hercules was immediately available. At 400 by 140 feet, it was one of the largest oil barges in the world. Wimbrown VII, 250 by 70 feet, required extensive repairs to be made habitable.

To guard the 100-mile stretch, each barge would be deployed to cover a 50-mile section, with their helicopters and patrol boats operating in a 25-mile radius. While patrol boats maintained a 24-hour presence, preventing penetration by small craft, helicopters would provide a quick reaction force as well as night surveillance. Each barge would have a mixture of patrol craft, including Vietnam-era riverine patrol boats (PBRs), Navy SEALs, and a Marine platoon. Should the Iranians directly challenge the barges, positions would be reinforced with metal plating and sandbags while the marines manned various weapons: 50 caliber machine-guns, MK-19 grenade launchers, a TOW missile, 81mm mortars, and Stinger missiles. With the addition of an explosive ordnance team and a Marine Corps radio reconnaissance linguistic and communication detachment, Hercules and Wimbrown VII would carry complements of 177 and 132, respectively.

Barges would be moved randomly every few days among the Saudi islands and oil platforms and have a layered defense. Helicopters would interdict any target out to 50 nautical miles while MK-III patrol boats covered the mid-distances and smaller Seafoxes and PBRs safeguarded for the first five miles. If all else failed, the Marine security force would man the decks with machine guns, rifles, and side arms.

They might hurt us. But if we play our cards right and keep calm, we'll simply shatter them. Again.