I was especially annoyed during the Iraq campaign when our tough fight in the Sunni Triangle was contrasted to the "softly, softly" approach of the British in the south who had to face the Iranian-supported Sadrists and who (because they cut deals) seemed to be having more success than us (because of the loud explosions coming from our sectors).
But in both Afghanistan (in Helmand) and in southern Iraq, the British areas were not pacified and had to wait for those who followed them to actually defeat the enemies.
It pains me to say this because Britain has endured casualties at our side, and I value Britain as a capable military ally.
Although I don't know how long Britain will remain a viable military power, if the British hope to continue that tradition, they do need to examine their decisions not to use their excellent (if small) military properly in both Iraq and Afghanistan:
Self-serving myths are cultivated, putting all the blame on Tony Blair and the Americans for pitching British soldiers into unwinnable wars. Responsibility for the insufficient number of troops deployed or the lack of appropriate equipment is held to lie with the politicians, not the generals.
The result is that there is a lack of appreciation in Britain of the extent of the purely military failure. In Iraq in 2007, four years after British troops invaded, they were in the humiliating position of being largely confined to a camp outside Basra, while Shia militiamen ruled the city. The British contingent did little except defend itself and had become, in the graphic phrase of British soldiers, a "self-licking lollipop".
Failure after British troops were deployed in Helmand province in 2006 came even more quickly. Military intelligence wholly misjudged the danger of sending troops there. Assault troops devoted themselves to trying to destroy the Taliban and, by alienating the local population, acted as its recruiting sergeant. Little account was taken of local reaction to a foreign occupation that brought only death and destruction.
I have to say I question the characterization of the Helmand approach. Are we really to believe that the British were too soft in southern Iraq in how they dealt with Shia militias (although there was reason to be careful in the Shia south while we dealt with the Sunni Arab resistance) but too hard in Afghanistan, rather than consistently too soft? My recollection is that the British cut deals in Afghanistan, too, that went awry.
Counter-insurgency surely can't be won by military means alone. But sometimes people use that fact as an excuse to ignore the costly military side of counter-insurgency. Security provided by military means is certainly necessary for all the non-military means that go into defeating an insurgency. The British reputation for counter-insurgency success has allowed them to gloss over their recent record. It wouldn't hurt for them to really look at how they fought and what they achieved.
