The Saudi nightmare has been that the United States would choose to reach an understanding with Iran as a way to create a stable order in the region and guarantee the flow of oil. We have discussed this possibility in the past, pointing out that the American interest in protecting Saudi Arabia is not absolute and that the United States might choose to deal with the Iranians, neither regime being particularly attractive to the United States and history never being a guide to what Washington might do next.
The Saudis were obviously delighted with the U.S. rhetorical response to the alleged assassination plot. It not only assuaged the Saudis’ feeling of isolation but also seemed to close the door on side deals. At the same time, the United States likely was concerned with the possibility of Saudi Arabia trying to arrange its own deal with Iran before Washington made a move. With this action, the United States joined itself at the hip with the Saudis in an anti-Iranian coalition.
We reassure Saudi Arabia that we won't cut a deal with Iran. And we reduce the chance that Saudi Arabia will cut a deal with Iran as we leave Iraq. Plus, as Stratfor points out, we show Pakistan that we can stay and defend our interests in the region. Further, it may help persuade the Iraqis that we can be trusted to resist Iran, as Stratfor writes in another article. (As an aside, I'm kind of surprised to read that Stratfor thinks we need to maintain 20,000 troops in Iraq for some time to come--in the same ball park as my hope for 25,000, including three combat brigades).
I find it interesting that we have to do this. After a decade of American ground forces in combat in the region, the prospect of America reducing our presence to pre-9/11 scales--when our deployments showed our determination to defend our interests--is making allied countries worried about our determination to defend our interests. Locals got used to our heavy presence, despite their public complaints to the contrary, it seems. But this general worry fits in with my worries over Afghanistan. There, I've held that I don't think we need the surge troops to win but I'm worried that the image of too-fast withdrawal gives the image of retreat to locals. That worry is more general, it seems, in the whole Central Command area.
Of course, this makes it more likely that our public condemnation of Iran is more theater than an indication that we will actually do something about Iran.
