Sometimes Soldiers Just Die

You'll recall the Wanat ambush from July 2008. A platoon-sized element of Army paratroopers with a small Afghan army contingent attached was hit by a 200-strong Taliban force intent on overrunning the unit. We held off despite the odds and defeated the enemy.

After some initial indications that some would be punished for the battle, a new review by General Campbell has argued something novel in this day and age when anything abnormal that happens has to have a cause and a punishment--there was a battle, the enemy killed a number of our troops, but we held off the mass assault and killed a lot more of the enemy (Oh, and thank you so much, Army, for disabling the copy function in the document):

Battle is the supreme test of any unit. The U.S. officers, NCO's, Soldiers, and Marines at Wanat on 13 July 2008 met this test and passed it with flying colors. By their valor and their skill, they successfully defended their positions and defeated a determined, skillful, and adaptable enemy who masses and attacks at times, ways, and places of his own choosing. That U.S. casualties occurred at Wanat is true. However, they did not occur as a result of deficient decision, planning, and actions of the chain of command -- running from [REDACTED] to MG Schloesser. The U.S. casualties occurred because the enemy decided to attack the COP at Wanat and battle resulted. It is critical that we not mechanically equate U.S. casualties with professional error or misconduct. In war, battle is the mechanism by which we defeat the enemy. In battle, casualties are inevitable. Regrettably, they are often the price of victory. When U.S. casualties occur, as at Wanat, we must examine the facts and circumstances to determine whether our Officers, NCO's, and Soldiers have performed properly. When, as at Wanat, they have done so, we should learn any lessons that the battle teaches and more forward. This judicious, reasoned review process, without anger or partiality, is the true meaning of accountability. This is what I have endeavored to accomplish in fulfillment of your tasker.

My initial worries that we'd screwed up were quickly replaced with confidence that our troops performed well in a difficult and even desperate situation. Our troops won that battle against a numerically superior enemy, but suffered losses to achieve the victory. This review confirms my impression.

Sometimes it just isn't a crime when good soldiers die.

Wanat Ambush

The battle at Wanat did not unfold as I assumed. Instead of the enemy assaulting the outpost with the defenders absorbing the first blast that allowed enemy inside the perimeter until repelled, eight of our deaths took place in a patrol outside the base:

When the attack occurred, the U.S. and Afghan soldiers were scouting for a location in the remote area to set up a coalition observation point. The Taliban never breached the main coalition base near the village of Wanat in Kunar province, which borders Pakistan.

So a squad was ambushed rather than the base itself being stormed.

Which makes the decision to abandon the fort all the more stunning.

UPDATE: I'm confused. This article says that the fighting at the main outpost was very intense:

The base was occupied by 45 US soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division and 25 Afghan soldiers. It was only two days old when it came under fierce bombardment on Sunday morning. Taleban fighters successfully breached the outer defences and were prevented from overrunning the base only after fierce hand-to-hand fighting.

Yet 8 of our 9 deaths took place away from the outpost at a site for an observation post. I'd have expected that an assault that breaches the outer defenses to get inside that line would have caused more casualties. And the enemy had every reason to assault the position:

Western military sources told The Times that the Wanat Combat Outpost was poorly sited and overlooked on three sides by buildings in the village, which Taleban fighters from a force estimated to be around 200 strong were able to use as firing points.

But given that the article says the outpost was poorly placed, it is more understandable that the post was abandoned.

Still, we should move back to the village in another outpost better positioned to repel the enemy--and with more troops assigned to it.

I Gotta Go Kill These Guys First

The details of the battle in Wanat are so confusing that it may not even have been at Wanat but in Want in another province altogether:

There has been much recent hysteria about an incident on July 13 when nine American soldiers were killed in an insurgent assault on a combat outpost in Want, in Nuristan (mistakenly reported as taking place in Wanat in neighboring Kunar Province).

One thing that was not confusing to me, however, was that our troops must have put up one hell of a fight in very desperate conditions. A lot of well-earned medals for heroism will come out of this fight, I figured.

The enemy pressed the attack with exceptional vigor. I didn't know the half of it:

Outnumbered but not outgunned, a platoon-plus element of soldiers with 2nd Platoon, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team accompanied by Afghan soldiers engaged in a fistfight of a firefight.

I can't do justice to all that the article describes without just copying the entire piece. The enemy clearly wanted a massacre of an entire American unit and persisted in their attack instead of running. So read the conclusion and then read the details:

"It was some of the bravest stuff I’ve ever seen in my life, and I will never see it again because those guys," Stafford said, then paused. "Normal humans wouldn’t do that. You’re not supposed to do that — getting up and firing back when everything around you is popping and whizzing and trees, branches coming down and sandbags exploding and RPGs coming in over your head … It was a fistfight then, and those guys held ’ em off."

Stafford offered a guess as to why his fellow soldiers fought so hard.

"Just hardcoreness I guess," he said. "Just guys kicking ass, basically. Just making sure that we look scary enough that you don’t want to come in and try to get us."

Far more of the enemy are dead rather than scared, but point taken. It has been years since our jihadi enemies derided us as 15,000-foot warriors and invited us to close quarter combat.

Lesser troops would have folded and been slaughtered or led off to be tortured and killed on video. The paratroopers of 173rd Airborne Brigade held a hasty position against high odds and denied our enemies a victory that they very clearly desperately wanted.

Silver Star Day

I mentioned there'd be a lot of medals issued over the Wanat Battle:

Don't be surprised if some major medals are awarded from this action. It sounds like it was probably touch-and-go for a while.

Our troops fought and stood their ground despite being outnumbered and taken by surprise. The medals have come out:

On July 13, 2008, about 45 Americans and 24 Afghan soldiers battled up to 200 enemy fighters determined to overrun the newly established Vehicle Patrol Base Kahler and Observation Post Top Side, nestled in the village of Wanat in the Waygul Valley of Konar province.

When the fighting stopped, nine paratroopers were dead and 27 were wounded.

For their actions on that day, 11 soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy, received Silver Stars, the third highest award for valor. An additional 17 received Bronze Star Medals with V device and 25 received Army Commendation Medals with V device.

The enemy wanted a media massacre event to break our home morale, I'd guess.

Half the enemy was likely killed or wounded in the 4-hour battle (as Strategypage reported). And we held the media event.

Looking for a Headline

When 14 Taliban attackers hit a NATO base containing thousands of personnel, the effort is clearly not to capture the base:

A group of would-be suicide bombers tried to storm a major NATO base in eastern Afghanistan early Saturday but were repelled before they could enter, officials said.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack — their second assault on the NATO base and an adjoining airport outside Jalalabad city in six months.

Indeed, the assault didn't even get near the base:

The militants attacked the Afghan army checkpoint outside the Jalalabad base shortly after dawn, sparking a gunbattle that lasted at least two hours and involved NATO helicopters firing from overhead, said Sgt. Abdullah Hamdard, a national army commander at the site.

A spokesman for the Nangarhar provincial government, Ahmad Zia Abdulzai, confirmed the attack and said eight assailants were killed — including two who were wearing explosives vests.

We suffered no KIA in the successful defense of the base outpost.

The enemy is just trying to keep their name in the news. It isn't as if the enemy can't mass forces to try and overrun one of our positions. They tried that at Wanat in 2008 (as the official report details). But sending in a large force against a small outpost is tough enough without wasting Taliban lives on an assault on a major base. And the Taliban got their headline:

Militants mounted attacks in Jalalabad and Kunar in the east and in Kunduz in the north, after an attack in the capital Kabul on Friday, apparently demonstrating their continuing strength despite NATO-led forces stating that they have made gains.

The attacks will send a message to NATO leaders meeting in Lisbon next week that the Taliban remain a formidable enemy. European NATO leaders are under particular pressure because popular support for the drawn-out war is sagging.

This should not be cause for hand wringing. The enemy fights--that's why it is a war. Heck, sometimes they will have successes. But when the enemy presents themselves to be killed, that's supposed to shake our morale? God help us if that is the case.

The key is to keep moving forward in seizing and holding enemy dominated areas and snuffing out support for the enemy in those areas. This all takes time, and during that time the enemy will try to defeat us (as at Wanat) or just try to defeat our home front with a media operation (as at the Jalalabad base).

Jackpot

The enemy in Afghanistan got their headlines touting their so-called progress.

The enemy succeeded in killing nine of our soldiers in a mass assault on a base in Afghanistan:

An insurgent raid that penetrated an American outpost in eastern Afghanistan, killing nine soldiers, has deepened doubts about the U.S. military's effort to contain Islamic militants and keep locals on its side.

I didn't comment initially because I wanted to read more. I was only sure that the press would paint this as a major defeat and a sign of our imminent defeat in Afghanistan--yet again. I wasn't ready to panic at the first report.

One thing that has amazed me about both Iraq and Afghanistan is the almost total absence of enemy attacks that overrun our outposts or patrols. As bad as this attack was, it did not overrun the post:

Moving in darkness before dawn Sunday, some 200 fighters surrounded the newly built base in a remote area near the Pakistan border without being spotted by the troops inside, said Gen. Mohammad Qasim Jangalbagh, the provincial police chief.

He said people in the adjacent village of Wanat aided the assault. About 20 local families left their homes in anticipation of the raid, while other tribesmen stayed behind "and helped the insurgents during the fight," Jangalbagh said. ...

The militants showered the small base — which had been established just three days earlier — with machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortar shells, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to release the information.

Some of the militants breached the wall and got inside, killing nine American soldiers and wounding 15 others, he said.

Other American soldiers managed to drive out the attackers and called in air support. Attack helicopters swooped over the battlefield, and in hours of fighting dozens of insurgents were killed and about 40 were wounded, the NATO official said.

The official described the militant raid as "serious," but also said it was a rarity for insurgents to get inside a base.

Strategypage also comments on the battle:

A newly established American-Afghan base near the Pakistani border in northeastern Kunar province, was attacked by the Taliban, and the battle left over a hundred dead, and many more wounded, in several hours of fighting. About a third of the dead were U.S. and Afghan troops. A large Taliban force attacked from nearby buildings, including a mosque. U.S. and NATO warplanes responded quickly with smart bombs and missiles. Spectacular, but futile, attacks like this are mainly playing to the Western media.

So we know this was a new base on the frontier. It was not yet tuned in to the local region. And it probably wasn't fully set to detect enemies. The enemy was able to hit this forming outpost, possibly by crossing the border with heavy weapons, at least in part.

A couple hundred enemy troops attacked what I assume was a company-sized US-Afghan outpost (100+ troops).

Local residents from sympathy or fear assisted the jihadi attackers.

The enemy penetrated the perimeter but the Coalition defenders rallies and ejected the attackers.

Our air power than savaged the enemy, which could not stay close enough to our troops to keep our air power at bay.

The enemy lost twice as many men as our side did, but the price they paid got the result they wanted--pants-wetting reporting from our press that depicted an attack that failed as a great victory.

I still want to know how the enemy approached the base in such strength and managed to penetrate the perimeter. That could have been very bad. But our troops held the line, and in the end won the victory. Don't be surprised if some major medals are awarded from this action. It sounds like it was probably touch-and-go for a while.

With more outposts established on the border, the problem of Pakistan sanctuaries will risk further such battles as the enemy crosses into Afghanistan to hit us. We can't invade Pakistan and Pakistan won't control their border areas.

But there is a third option to guard against such attacks.

UPDATE: The outpost garrison seems smaller than I assumed (though there could have been other services present in small numbers to bring it up to 100) and we really didn't have full defenses up or situational awareness established, according to this report:

Sunday's assault occurred just three days after 45 US soldiers, likely from the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and 25 Afghan troops established a new combat outpost in the town of Wanat. The troops had little time to learn the lay of the land, establish local contacts, and build an intelligence network. The fortifications were not fully completed, according to initial reports.

And 200 enemy is at the lower end of the estimate. Another week of settling in and this wouldn't have happened. But the enemy was able to pounce quickly. If those weapons and a lot of the attackers came in from Pakistan to exploit the early stages of the outpost, the importance of operating inside Pakistan as i linked above is more important than ever.

As Far From Cyber-War As It Gets

Salute Ryan Pitts, newest Medal of Honor recipient:

Alone and losing blood, Pitts radioed Myer to inform him that everyone at the OP was dead or gone. Myer told Pitts, he had no one to send as reinforcement for the OP. At this point, the insurgents were in such close proximity to Pitts, Soldiers at the command post and those listening on the same channel at FOB Blessing could hear enemy voices through the radio. Despite this, Pitts remained determined to bring the fight to the enemy before they overwhelmed the OP.

It was obvious at the time that the troops at Wanat fought an epic battle.

Never forget that all the high-tech weapons and Internet reach-back capabilities that people dream will make war a push-button exercise are just so much expensive junk if not wielded by determined soldiers who fight, kill, and die at the pointy end of the stick against bloodthirsty enemies within hand grenade range.

Feeling Fine

One gripe I had during the Iraq campaign as it raged was the repeated press reports that our troop morale was poor. Surveys or complaints would be used by reporters to argue morale was bad.

Given troop performance and lack of signs of morale breakdown, I could only conclude that the reporters were simply reporting the gripes of soldiers, which is not in fact directly related to morale. As the war dragged on, I worried that the reports might be right, but the signs of ill discipline never showed up.

Strategypage gives as good evidence as you'll see that morale was never a real issue. You see, award inflation never kicked in during the current wars:

During the last seven years of combat, only five Medals of Honor (MoH), the highest American award for bravery in combat, have been awarded. A lot more MoHs were awarded in past wars. During World War I, there were 124. During World War II- 440, while Korea had 131 and Vietnam, 244.

If our troop morale had been bad, you'd have seen a lot more Medals of Honor. Yes, medal standards are also more rigorous, but how many of the Silver Stars awarded for the Wanat Battle would have been Medals of Honor if our troops were worn out and sick of fighting.

Remember, a major purpose of medals is to bolster morale and not just recognize excellence and bravery. I'm not actually arguing against medal inflation when needed.

The point is, we haven't needed to award our highest medal more frequently. This is a sign of a military with good morale.

Roarke's Drift

The report on the battle at Wanat has been published (and is available through this article). The article (tip to Long War Journal) reports on the 48-man US paratrooper unit and their Afghan cohort that fought at a hasty patrol base and a small observation post apart from the main patrol base:

On July 9, in the early morning darkness, the U.S. troops and 24 Afghan paratroops established the vehicle patrol base.

Each day, locals warned the U.S. troops of an impending attack.

"There was intelligence an attack would occur," the report found, "but this was to be expected for the Waygal District."

Troops expected a "probing attack" of around 20 militants. Instead, at around 4:20 a.m., the force of 200 enemy launched a complex, well-organized attack that first targeted the troops’ heavy weapons.

The narrative describes a pitched battle in which troops fought militants firing from a mosque, an adjacent bazaar, up in trees and within 15 meters of U.S. positions.

Four of the nine soldiers at an observation post were killed within the first 20 minutes of fighting. Claymore mines and hand grenades were used liberally. Close-air support was called in, and nearly 100 artillery rounds were fired from Camp Blessing. An hour and 35 minutes into the fight, the first medical evacuation helicopters arrived; an hour and 48 minutes into the fight, the first reinforcements arrived.

In the interim, troops had mounted four brave runs at reinforcing the observation post. It was during the first of those attempts that Jonathan Brostrom was killed with two of his men.

It was obvious to me that some amazing bravery was displayed that day worthy of a movie. But for the determination of our troops to hold and fight, there would have been a massacre that day.

And note the repeated attempts to reach the small isolated outpost even though the entire unit was in danger of being overrun and destroyed. Our impulse to leave no man behind runs that deep.

We must not betray such men. I hope our Left remembers that they've called this the uniquely "good" war.

The Border Still Matters

One thing I worry about in carrying out our COIN strategy in Afghanistan is that it appears to be based on abandoning attempts to control the border with Pakistan:

U.S. commanders had been planning since late last year to abandon the small combat outpost in mountainous eastern Afghanistan where eight U.S. soldiers died Saturday in a fierce insurgent assault.

The pullout, part of a strategy of withdrawing from sparsely populated areas where the United States lacks the troops to expel Taliban forces and to support the local Afghan government, has been repeatedly delayed by a shortage of cargo helicopters, Afghan politics and military bureaucracy, U.S. military officials said.

The attack began in the early morning hours. Taliban-linked militiamen struck from the high ground using rifles, grenades and rockets against the outpost, a cluster of stone buildings set in a small Hindu Kush valley that has been manned by 140 U.S. and Afghan forces. By the end of a day-long siege, eight Americans and two Afghan security officers were dead, marking the highest toll for U.S. forces in over a year.

We'll abandon isolated outposts vulnerable to attack as this latest attack demonstrated (and remember last year's Wanat battle) to pull back into Afghan population centers.

I worry that we'll believe we can afford to let the enemy come across the border with no practical ill effects. We got away with this in Iraq but that was based on factors unique to Iraq early in the war that do not apply to Afghanistan, namely that the enemy in Iraq had ample money and weapons inside Iraq (courtesy of the Baathists) and only needed to import the suicide bombers from outside Iraq. It was just too difficult to seal a border against infiltration by individuals when those troops could be put into large urban areas to protect the people. Eventually it made sense to expend the effort to control Iraq's borders rather than focus resources in the interior, but not before 2007.

In Afghanistan, the enemy brings in weapons and men for large attacks from Pakistan--whether recruited there or just trained there. If we abandon the border, won't we just invite those large groups of Taliban to penetrate further into Afghanistan to attack our outposts in Afghan cities and towns? Afghanistan is much more rural so our troops will have to spread out quite a bit to protect all those small villages unlike Iraq with large urban areas to focus on.

Wouldn't it be better to put a network of interlocked US/Coalition/Afghan outposts along the crucial border areas that make sure no outpost is beyond help from nearby forces? That way we keep the threat in the interior to smaller levels where Afghan forces with Western advisors and a more limited number of US and NATO units can provide security to population centers (See here).

We recognize that our battle spans both sides of the Afghan-Palistan border (AfPak), but let's not pretend that the border isn't important. If we abandon the border, the enemy will follow us to wherever we stand. And the enemy may be able to make those border areas inside Afghanistan their sanctuary rather than Pakistan, just as Pakistan seems poised to wrest control of border areas from their own jihadis.

But perhaps my worries are all expected by our military. Perhaps nobody sees the chance that we could reasonably seal the border, so any troops away from the people are ultimately a waste of resources. I hope they are right, because I think the border still matters.

I hope that the terrain near the population centers will make it easier to kill off any large groups that attack us there. Because I have no doubt that the enemy will come to the cities.

Don't Get Cocky

In 1991, after training to beat the Red Army, we smashed the largely Soviet-equipped Iraqi military. After more than two decades of smashing Saddam's troops, irregular Iraqis, jihadis, and Taliban gunmen, are we ready for another peer in conventional combat?

An American officer doesn't think we are ready for the big league:

Most of today’s senior generals – division commanders up to four-stars — got their first taste of battle in 1991’s Desert Storm. Brigade-and-below commanders typically deployed first to Bosnia or fought in Iraq or Afghanistan soon after 9/11. All of these military operations were hailed as unequivocal tactical successes. But all military success is not alike.

The level of difficulty and set of challenges the Army has faced since 1980 isn’t comparable to those faced by uniformed leaders during World War II, Korea, and even the initial stages of Vietnam. Our senior leaders have spent virtually their entire careers in environments where they were able to schedule “war” as if it were a training event. They had the luxury of establishing deployment schedules, often times years in advance. Next-to-deploy units had predictable flight schedules, shipping timetables, and arrived in the combat theater to mature infrastructure. Troops frequently had on-base shopping malls (post exchanges), restaurants, coffee shops, and all-you-can-eat military dining facilities (typically featuring weekly lobster and steak nights).

Throughout Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, leaders at Regional Command and below have been able to conduct tactical engagements throughout their deployment window against Iraqi and Afghan insurgents with unprecedented certainty. Before the first boot hit the ground, leaders often knew exactly when their units would return. American troops were able to conduct tactical missions at a time, place, scope, and speed as they saw fit. If any conditions didn’t favor employment, U.S. leaders could choose to alter the fight timelines or cancel the mission altogether. The only time the enemy took the tactical initiative it was at something like platoon-level or below, and action of that nature was rare. Since the Vietnam War, no American combat leader above the position of company commander has faced a situation where his unit was at risk of defeat by an unexpected enemy attack.

Ever.

In fact, never since Vietnam has any enemy formation had any chance of inflicting a tactical defeat on U.S. forces. Not in Grenada, Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, the conventional phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, nor any phase of counterinsurgency operations since 9/11.

He has a point. Although I think that even in Grenada there were some tight periods when our enemies could have hurt us. There were some close calls in Afghanistan, even though the author is generally right that in the counter-insurgency fights we rarely faced enemies in larger than platoon strength (50 enemy). After losing in battle--in both Afghanistan and Iraq--they tended to rely on IEDs and indirect fire to attack us. So the fact that we won these engagements doesn't mean we didn't face a threat of loss (Wanat, anyone?).

At one level, we are correcting the fact that our Army became "unbalanced" in more than a decade of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations. Units just did not practice at conventional warfare. Which was the right thing to do, I'll add. Losing a counter-insurgency war we are waging to keep troops ready for a hypothetical conventional war made no sense.

That is changing. And while our foes the last decade have been second-rate, just having troops used to being shot at is a tremendous advantage for the future.

But it is true that we can't assume that battlefield victory is our birthright. I've said this enough in the past. And recent talk of speeding up the Army to be strategically mobile says to me that too many people assume that victory is the constant in the equation of war and we just have to lighten up the Army to deploy it overseas faster to collect that assumed victory.

And I recently read an Air Force Magazine article arguing that (this time for sure!), killing power against ground power now lies in the hands of the Air Force rather than the Army. Really, the Army just needs to be a screen that holds the enemy in place with enough forward air controllers to call in the smart bombs.

This attitude will lead to a defeat if unchecked.

And I've addressed the failure to rush to the sound of the guns in Benghazi as if military operations can only take place at our pace--and preferably after a lovely PowerPoint presentation on what we will do.

Mind you, this officer caused a stir a couple years ago with an article essentially accusing the military of lying about progress in Afghanistan. I disagreed, noting that we weren't creating an Afghan military capable of taking on our troops--we have been building an Afghan security force capable of defeating the Taliban.

But on this issue, I think the author is spot on:

If America wants a championship-caliber Army, we must subject them to much tougher training – both physical and emotional – and place our leaders under considerably more stress, exposing them to a much broader set of potential combat environments than has been the case for the past couple decades. Further, we must hold commanders responsible for how they perform under these stressful conditions, rewarding prudent risk-taking (even if the outcome of any given engagement might result in mission failure) and avoid rewarding performance that seeks the avoidance of risk.

Our troops are good. But they are not invincible. And I don't want them assuming no battlefield foe can stop them. I want our training to get back to brutally tough field exercises in conventional operations against our OPFOR (opposing forces) at the National Training Center (NTC). That training was so good that conventional Iraqi forces in battle were nothing compared to the OPFOR in training, according to our troops who experienced both.

The old saying is true: sweat during peace to avoid bleeding during war. Make our troops sweat, physically, intellectually, and emotionally.

Deadly Bait

Our new strategy for Afghanistan will expose our troops placed near the border to potentially large enemy forces that stage from the relative safety of Pakistan.

It seems that our uptick in UAV strikes inside Pakistan over the last month is indeed a new strategy to preempt Taliban forces and disrupt them so they can't come across the border in force:

"In order to stop unifying Taliban groups from launching massive attacks against NATO and in particular newly arriving U.S. troops in Afghanistan, such attacks have become indispensable on Americans' part," he said.

Keeping Pakistani territory from being a sanctuary and jumping off point to attack US forces is more important than ever with our forces moving into small outposts near the border:

President Barack Obama is hoping to boost the flagging war effort in Afghanistan by sending 17,000 reinforcements. Most of them will be deployed to small, remote bases such as Seray, a walled compound of trenches and fortified buildings near the Pakistan border. Many of these new outposts will be in eastern and southern Afghanistan, the most violent parts of the country.

But will the troops in these tiny redoubts be able to carry out the often conflicting missions of fighting insurgents and building relationships with local villagers, or will these soldiers and Marines merely be easy targets?

You'll recall the Wanat battle that could have been a tragedy had we lost. The Taliban are no doubt eager to gain a propaganda victory by over-running an outpost and killing every American there. The vast majority of the time these outposts will be killing ground for the enemy. Just like Vietnam firebases, these outposts will be hard targets that will draw in the enemy where they will lose heavily. But the enemy just needs to be lucky (or we just need to be sloppy) once, and they have a massacre that will be played up by the media.

With the news that we are heading to the frontier, it seems that my broad guess on our future approach is correct.

And although the article mentions one renowned analyst's opinion that we need to focus more on the cities as we did in Iraq, I disagree. The Afghan insurgency is far more reliant on weapons and manpower coming in from Pakistan's tribal areas. In Iraq, controlling the borders wasn't initially as important since money and arms were readily available inside Iraq. And trying to keep out the 2 or 3 jihadis who came in per day to serve as suicide bombers was way too tough. We'd have wasted resources and scarce American manpower on the border of Iraq while the main battle raged in the cities.

The cities are certainly important and we must fight there, too. We (including NATO and allied forces) should support Afghan forces in the cities to root out Taliban shadow governments, but American troops can do the most good isolating the battlefield as much as possible out near the border with Pakistan. I suspect that Afghan sensitivity to civilian casualties attributed to our forces means we should be a supporting force in urban areas where Afghan forces are the primary on-the-ground muscle. I'd rather not have a surge of forces into Afghanistan where we can't easily supply them, but that is a done deal.

But I don't think that drone strikes alone can keep the Taliban broken up and off balance enough to protect our border region outposts. We need Pakistan to control or at least contest the region.

And if Pakistan can't exercise some level of control or influence, we may need an unconventional campaign to extend our eyes and ears--and firepower--into the Pakistan tribal regions in a post-Westphalian campaign.

If we don't prevent the Pakistan border areas from being a safe staging area for the Taliban, we will lose a company-size outpost at some point. We never suffered such a loss in Iraq, but the enemy there did not have the sanctuary that the Taliban and al Qaeda enjoy inside Pakistan. In Afghanistan, the enemy is not nearly as atomized as the Iraqi terrorists and insurgents were.

And after we lose a hundred or so men in one battle, the anti-war Left will turn on the good war in earnest. Get ready to hear, "Hey, ho, B-H-O, American troops have got to go!" The chants just write themselves.

We are Not Losing in Afghanistan

I get tired of reading the comments of our Panicky American community every few months that we are losing in Afghansitan. They've been shrieking this prediction for nearly seven years now, beginning in the first week of Operation Enduring Freedom.

So it is nice to read this in the paper:

The Afghan insurgency has no broad popular base and doesn't mirror an obvious religious or ethnic fault line. It is also far more linked with Pakistani support than the Iraqi insurgency or militias were with Iran. Afghanistan needs a better president, judiciary and police force -- and a Pakistani government that is not playing footsie with the Taliban.

In Afghanistan, the situation can differ radically in provinces just a half-hour helicopter ride away. There has been much recent hysteria about an incident on July 13 when nine American soldiers were killed in an insurgent assault on a combat outpost in Want, in Nuristan (mistakenly reported as taking place in Wanat in neighboring Kunar Province). This was the deadliest attack on American soldiers since 16 troops were killed in Kunar in 2005. It was a tragic event, but does not demonstrate that the American effort in Afghanistan is on the brink of disaster, as some commentators have risibly argued.

Afghanistan does not need a surge, the author states. I agree. I can be persuaded that a brigade or three can accomplish some particular mission, but Afghanistan and Pakistan have too many people to attempt an Iraq-style pacification campaign.

Further, even if appropriate to mirror Iraq, we simply can't supply that many troops in Afghanistan. I'd be wary of risking more than ten percent of our active brigades in that potential Stalingrad pocket.

Besides, other than keeping the country from becoming a training area for al Qaeda, our interests in Afghanistan are more humanitarian than strategic these days. I simply don't aspire to very much out there.

Now, what we do need to do is address Pakistan where the enemy masses, rests, trains, and strikes from. The Pakistanis seem worried that we might invade to knock out the Taliban and al Qaeda:

Over the last week, the Pakistani press has been filled with commentaries warning that American attacks without Pakistan’s permission would further inflame anti-American sentiment, drive more people into the camp of the militants and fatally undermine the already fragile civilian government. Privately, one senior government official said American strikes would produce “chaos.”

But the English-language newspapers have also stressed that the Pakistani government has failed to deal with the Islamic militants, and they have made repeated pleas in recent days for the government and the military to take on the militants before Washington does the job, uninvited.

I, too, would like the Pakistanis to act. And I think it is in their long-term interest to defeat jihadis who would just as readily plant bombs in Pakistani cities as in Afghanistan. But Pakistan does not seem to have the will to act.

So we will act. But not an invasion. Even three more brigades would be swallowed in the vastness of Pakistan's tribal areas. Talk of invading Pakistan is stupid.

But we will act. With a new style of campaign if my hunch is correct, using the concept of the Anbar Awakening within Pakistan's frontier are itself:

Pakistan's refusal to take responsibility for their frontier areas while refusing to let us violate their so-called sovereignty isn't going to last much longer in the face of bin Laden rebuilding his terrorist organization there. ...

It is about more than bin Laden. But without routinely violating the border to attack targets inside Pakistan and without accepting perpetual defense as we do in Iraq in the face of Syrian and Iranian aggression, we may have an opportunity to use a post-Westphalian Lexington Rule to fight al Qaeda in Pakistan.

If we can't get Islamabad to control the frontier area, it is time to bypass Islamabad and deal directly with the tribes who don't recognize the control of Islamabad in the first place. We cannot allow the fictions of sovereignty to keep us from defending ourselves from fanatics who straddle the gray boundary that lies between reality and international law.

Using limited military assets such as special forces and drones to back civilian armed assets such as the CIA or contract personnel (with either former or seconded special forces from Western countries, or perhaps even hiring security companies to provide the personnel) or even Arab special forces that would live and work inside the frontier areas, we may be able to turn the frontier tribes against the jihadis who target us.

Several more brigades would make sure that success in a Pushtun Awakening does not lead to jihadis fleeing freely to Afghanistan. With our increased presence on the Afghan-Pakistan border, the jihadis will be killed if they head west into our blocking positions, hammered by our air power, artillery, and damned fine soldiers and Marines.

We won't be foolish enough to invade Pakistan to get at bin Laden and the Taliban. But we will undertake a campaign in Pakistan. The only question is when we go. I'd prefer a winter campaign that makes enemy movement difficult since if we force them to move from their winter encampments they will die even without fighting. But it will be a year before we get three more brigades in place, I'd think.

So perhaps in fall 2009, we begin the Lexington Campaign.

We aren't losing in Afghanistan--we're about to attempt to win in Pakistan.

UPDATE: Related thoughts by Ralph Peters.

Standard Operating Procedures

I have expressed confusion over the battle at Wanat, Afghanistan, where we lost 9 soldiers. Where were the troops killed? Why was the base so poorly situated? Why abandon the base and give the enemy a victory?

Well, as it turns out the press got the story wrong and our military actually just did what it was supposed to do. From Strategypage:

American troops in Afghanistan are not happy with how a July 13th battle with the Taliban was reported. In that action, some 200 Taliban attacked a U.S. “base” and killed or wounded more than half the 50 or so U.S. and Afghan troops found there. Actual U.S. casualties were nine dead and fifteen wounded (including walking wounded).

U.S. troops were irked that, once again, the mass media got lazy and didn’t bother to report the action accurately. For one thing, there was no “base”. What the Taliban attacked was a temporary parking area for vehicles used to conduct patrols of the area. These are set up regularly, and have been used for years. These are secure areas, but basically a parking lot surrounded by barbed wire and several sandbagged observation posts. This one was set a few days before the attack, and was due to be taken down soon, as the patrol activity moved to another area.

The "base" was no base at all. Which is why we "abandoned" it. We "abandon" "bases" all the time, I imagine, as we move around.

Perhaps reporters thought it was a base because, like the Romans, we dig in whenever we stop moving. Other armies break out the cigarettes and rations when they stop, so when an enemy attacks, the troops get overrun and killed. We prepared and so saved the unit. The press does not understand what we do and so thought our temporary preparations amounted to a "base."

Which makes holding that position all the more impressive.

So really, our military peformed as professionals as they were trained; and our professional press corps doesn't understand what it is reporting on.

Standard operating procedures, all around.

Weekend Data Dump

Buh bye: "The pier built by the U.S. military to bring aid to Gaza has been removed due to weather to protect it, and the U.S. is considering not reinstalling it unless the aid begins flowing out into the population again, U.S. officials said Friday."

Maybe Russia needs a buffer zone inside Ukraine to protect Russians from their own air force: "The powerful glide-bombs that Russia has used to such great effect to pound Ukrainian cities into rubble have also been falling on its own territory, an internal Russian document has revealed."

Crap: "A U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter and a KC-46 Pegasus tanker were involved in an aerial refueling incident off the coast of the Netherlands on June 27, service officials told Air & Space Forces Magazine." But it's hard to do and that's why we practice.

Good: "Initial construction is beginning on a new fleet of warships for the Royal Canadian Navy, with the vessels expected to be operational by 2035, service and government officials said." The last ships will arrive in 2050. Fingers crossed.

Are Russia's nuclear red lines serious? "As the famed military and nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie explained, countries usually do not usually bluff when they make threats." But nuclear bluster for conventional threats are orders of magnitude greater. The Russians have a history of empty nuclear bluffs. 

Huh: "Multiple U.S. military bases in Europe are under a heightened state of alert for a terrorist attack against U.S. military personnel or facilities, multiple media outlets reported Sunday." Odd. Terrorists usually like to slaughter civilians. Just who is the terrorist threat?

I'm against using our SSBNs to visibly send messages. Their message should be "We have lots of nuclear warheads and you don't know where we are." 

Unless has nukes, this is not that credible: "Iran has threatened an 'obliterating war' if Israel launches a full-scale attack in Lebanon[.]" Iran doesn't already have nukes, right?

Is there much to celebrate on NATO's 75th anniversary? Seriously? When NATO formed, the Red Army sat on the Elbe River in the middle of Germany. Western Europe was exhausted. Now, Russia is bleeding out in the Donbas and NATO is rearming with new members committed to stopping Russia. Celebrate!

Does Ecuador need a Western (non-military) "intervention" to help it--by strengthening intelligence institutions, reforming the judicial system, addressing money laundering, and enhancing prison infrastructure--restore institutions to battle organized crime?

Cuban commies gotta commie: "Images captured from space show the growth of Cuba’s electronic eavesdropping stations that are believed to be linked to China, including new construction at a previously unreported site about 70 miles from the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, according to a new report."

Hell no, Putin won't go: "Donald Trump has said repeatedly he could settle the war between Russia and Ukraine in one day if he’s elected president again. Russia’s United Nations ambassador says he can’t." The key is Trump says he'll end the war--not lose it. If Russia won't end it, Ukraine has to win it.

But not the murderers and rapists Russia sent to kill: "Ukraine is expanding the draft to cope with acute battlefield shortages more than two years into fighting against Russia’s full-scale invasion. And its recruiting efforts have turned, for the first time, to the country’s prison population."

White hull line in the sea: "The Coast Guard is slated to continue solidifying its Pacific footprint with new funds from Congress as the service plays an increasingly prominent role in Washington’s regional strategy."

Still playing defense: "U.S. Central Command reported U.S. forces in the Red Sea in a “self-defense engagement” destroyed three Houthi unmanned surface vehicles Sunday." America's Red Sea production of Resolve Theater will end in tragedy for the Navy if only the Houthi are trying to win.

Kick out the jams: "In Ukraine, Russia took the lead in developing electronic jamming technology and Ukraine, the United States and its NATO allies are hustling to catch up." 

I sure hope Nigerians aren't Islamophobic: "In northeast Borno States female Boko Haram suicide bombers, set off their explosives at a wedding and then a funeral, leaving 32 dead and 42 wounded." This is more rare now. Sadly tribal violence is making up for the decline in Islamist violence.

Macron is free to destroy his own career, but: "Is France heading to a civil war? Yes — if one is to believe the far-left activists, who keep saying that 'they will not allow the far right to rule,' even if they win the coming general election democratically." Their Left will destroy notre liberté to save it. Via Instapundit.

Who blinked? "China and the Philippines held a crucial meeting Tuesday to try to ease escalating tensions following their worst confrontation in the disputed South China Sea that sparked fears of a wider conflict that could involve Manila’s ally the United States."

Oh? "A new report from the Center for New American Security calls for push for a low-cost drones that would provide an autonomous, lethal shield against an amphibious invasion of Taiwan[.]" Stop looking for cheap silver bullets. Never trust the Center for No American Security. But sure, they coined a scary name.

One could do some damage. But ultimately the Kilo sub would lead a short but exciting life: "Russian submarines twice conducted unprecedented missions in the Irish Sea after Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, it has emerged." 

Is this instead of terrestrial war or in addition to that? "A new RAND report emphasizes China’s rising risk tolerance and growing strategic maneuvers in space, an aggressive push forged to challenge US dominance in the domain." That's the difference between avoiding war and winning war. Via Instapundit.

Interesting: "China’s leaders view the US as a dominant but declining power"; and America sees China as peaking and beginning a decline. I guess the risk of war due to a Thucydides Trap power transition is now zero. I've doubted the relevance of that trap for America and China.

Is Canada stepping up to defend the Arctic and Europe?

Escalation: "Taiwan said the Chinese coast guard boarded a Taiwanese fishing boat Tuesday before steering it to a port in mainland China, and demanded that Beijing release the vessel." Taiwan blinked.

NATO established a quick reaction force, the Allied Response Force, in Italy: "'The ARF can deliver forces, fires and effects within 10 days to either strengthen deterrence or provide strategic dilemma to adversaries,' SHAPE said." Let's hope its bite is worse than its bark.

Good: "Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria have activated a naval task force dedicated to countering mine warfare in the Black Sea."

Reflections on the battle at Wanat by soldiers involved: "On Monday, two paratroopers who fought in the July 13, 2008, battle shared their recollections as part of discussions designed to keep the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s history fresh for current 'sky soldiers.'"

Outlasting Russia: " NATO allies have agreed to fund military aid for Ukraine with 40 billion euros ($43.05 billion) next year, a Western European diplomat told Reuters on Wednesday, one week before the alliance's leaders are set to meet in Washington."

Hmmm: "Ukrainian officials said Monday that they thwarted an attempted coup, arresting individuals who had conspired to allegedly stage a riot in Kyiv." If Russia backed this, Russian confidence in their ability to sacrifice unlimited Russian troops to achieve victory might not be as solid as they portray.

Keeping Ukraine in the fight: "the U.S. will soon announce an additional $2.3 billion in security assistance for Ukraine, to include anti-tank weapons, interceptors and munitions for Patriot and other air defense systems."

And now for something completely different:
Nobody has done this, so please grant me clemency for what I hope is more clever than political.

Sigh: "All told, June was a hectic month for the sea service, which has not seen this much sustained combat since World War II." It seems like only the Houthi and their Iranian sponsors are trying to win.

Putin is NATO's best recruiter: "NATO continues to support Ukraine because that was what NATO was established in 1949 to do. The threat then was the aggressive Soviet Union, which never attacked. [Now Russia is] led by men who wanted to rebuild the Soviet empire and decided in 2021 to start with Ukraine."

The counter-battery duel in Ukraine. 

All your sea are belong to us: "China sailed its aircraft carrier CNS Shandong (17) into the South China Sea, as close as 230 miles from the Philippine main island of Luzon. Meanwhile, PLAN ships have been operating around Japan over the past few days, according to Japan Joint Staff Office releases."

Across the Atlantic, and through Norway and Sweden: "You’re going to have 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, a storied brigade, a storied division, fighting underneath the NATO banner underneath a Finnish land component." That was in the Steadfast Defender 2024 exercise.

Rim of the Pacific exercises wrap up with a SINKEX: "This year it will be an unusually substantial target: the former USS Tarawa, a full-size amphibious assault vessel." Huh. Are we worried our big ships are vulnerable (they are) or are we thinking about how to sink big PLAN ships?

Via Instapundit, the Marianas Islands: "There is a largely unknown U.S. territory that Chinese citizens can enter legally without a visa. China expert Cleo Paskal argues it’s an 'open backdoor into the United States' that the Chinese communist regime can exploit." My belief that we can't be that stupid is tested.

Did not expect that: "The frontline of the Russo-Ukrainian war now extends into Africa and the Middle East, where Ukrainian special forces have been hunting Russian forces to erode Moscow’s economic resources and influence." Should have.

Raping and slaughtering over a thousand Israelis will do that to Israeli opinion: "When it comes to the Palestinians, the survey found, almost everyone is a right-winger now." Well, not everyone. 

Turkey is a mediator? "Turkey has now intervened diplomatically - bringing Ethiopian and Somali delegates together for talks in its capital, Ankara." You'll recall the Ethiopia-Puntland port agreement. You may also recall Turkey's imperial ambitions in the region. Turkey's impartiality is suspect.

No! Way! "China is [replacing Russian influence by] building car plants and power stations in Ukbekistan and Kazakhstan, brokering surveillance software deals, and expanding its direct railway line into Kazakhstan, to further strengthen trade links." Is Putin having fun yet with his "partner" with no limits?

An additional American military aid package for Ukraine to provide additional air defense systems plus various ammunition and other equipment. So far no additional armored fighting vehicles are being provided. Is this because Ukrainian offensive operations aren't anticipated until 2025?

Sure, the claims are right: "With a single decision, Macron exposed himself as everything his political opponents have claimed he is—arrogant, aloof, and grossly naïve about what ordinary French want." But maybe Macron wants to fail upward to his dream job by showing he will fight the "right," no matter what.

European citizens may actually want their own countries to endure--reflecting their own countries' values. Shocking, no?

I think we're still at the first of the chance, coincidence, enemy action count: "An explosion at a defense weapons plant in Arkansas injured at least two people Wednesday and left another missing, the facility’s operators said." Tip to Instapundit.

Trying--and failing--to build a first-rate army.

It's China's best weapon: "Indians are mystified at the inability of India, the most populous nation in the world with over a billion people, as well as a current GDP of $3.7 trillion, to have adequate weapons for its military."

An admiral defends carriers. I think he does not distinguish enough between power projection and sea control. The idea that mobility makes carriers defensible is laughable. Carriers were found and sunk in World War II with Mark I eyeball surveillance. Carriers aren't the apex predator.

En garde: "Philippine forces will defend themselves with 'the same level of force' if they come under assault again from China’s coast guard in the disputed South China Sea, where Chinese personnel armed with machetes and spears injured Filipino navy personnel and damaged two of their boats [in June.]

Yeah: "Ukraine is addressing its manpower challenges and is forming several new brigades, but delayed and insufficient Western weapons deliveries will likely prevent Ukraine from equipping all these new brigades." And Ukraine needs more ammo, too.

There should be consequences: "Russia and China are working together to produce a version of Iran’s Shahed drone that could be used on the battlefields of Ukraine, European intelligence sources have said." Free fire zone in Russia, sanctions on China's economy, and treat mullah-run Iran like the enemy it is.

The Marine Commandant, discussing operating inside China's A2/AD envelope, counts on joint forces: "'You don’t want to fight alone' as the Marine had to do at Guadalcanal, Smith said." I respectfully contest that description. The Navy skedaddled sometimes, as I recounted in this LWP, but it was a joint fight.

Switching to European gauge railways would be self defense, too: "If its European aspirations hinge on [Ukraine's] ability to connect itself with its neighbors to the west, then the railway gauge difference will be a significant obstacle to this future." Are you paying attention Baltic States, with your Russian gauge?

Oh, hogwash. "American diversity is a national security asset[.]" Diversity is not inherently something that strengthens or weakens us. If it tribalizes us, it weakens America. If it provides perspective within an American melting pot, it strengthens us.

Huh: "A union that represents Michigan corrections officers asked Gov. Gretchen Whitmer Wednesday to deploy the National Guard to help understaffed prisons."

The Deep Mosque arranges for a new figurehead.

Good: "The CIA continues to aid Ukraine and HUR, the Ukrainian military intelligence agency by providing them with information the CIA has obtained on Russian operations as well as real-time video of Russian military operations in Ukraine." And what I assumed.

The Tories were crushed in Britain's snap election. As much as they deserved a thrashing, I wouldn't want to inflict Labour on my worst enemy. Lord, it's just the fever talking about reversing Brexit, right?

Is Russia developing an IFV based on the T-72? The idea makes sense to me.

A Europeanized NATO? "It is time for Europeans to approach defence much more strategically, invest in defence in the long term, and actively prepare to accept more responsibilities for the defence of Europe." All part of the EU plan. With less America it isn't NATO. That's bad for Europe, too. Why promote this?

We have a border open to jihadis, anti-Semites running amok, and citizen dissent suppressed. Screw DHS: "[Divisive rhetoric] leads to extreme political views, some of which gain footing among military and veteran communities, and increases the chance [of domestic violent extremism by such people]." 

Good: "Germany has delivered a third Patriot air-defence system to Ukraine, authorities said on Friday." 

Japan and South Korea sanction North Korea for supplying Russia's war machine. 

Against alert defenders, Ukraine's now-not-suicide USVs would still be suicide missions.

They will hold a net wall beneath them: "Russia plans to build a network of barrage balloons inspired by the First and Second World Wars to thwart Ukraine’s daring drone attacks[.]" I assume Ukraine will escort strike drones with incendiary suicide drones designed to ram a balloon to clear a corridor.

In isolation, this is BS: "Hamas is more than just a military, it is an ideology – and you cannot defeat a hateful ideology on the military front alone." We destroyed Nazism by crushing their military and prosecuting leaders. Only ineffective use of force recruits jihadis. That said, I have a next-day plan.

Adapting to counter-measures that disable precision munitions. I suppose self-maneuvering rockets and shells with cameras that go after programmed targets wouldn't need more than precision-ish aiming based on ISR that finds what is in a particular area. It's a measure-countermeasure race.

Welp, we're getting out of another country before an anniversary of 9/11: "The U.S. will remove all its forces and equipment from a small base in Niger this weekend and fewer than 500 remaining troops will leave a critical drone base in the West African country in August[.]"

If we help Israel crush Hamas they'd cower: "The State Department’s top intelligence official [warned the Gaza war] is bolstering recruitment among terrorist organizations and providing 'inspiration for lone actors' furious over the United States’ staunch support for Israel." Getting away with 10/7 inspires jihadis. 

Iraqi unemployment is high because of immigrant labor. Yet the economy expands. And Iran is losing influence in Iraq: "Few Iraqis want to emulate Iran and this now includes Iraqi members of pro-Iran militias." Iran's troubles grow at home both economically and politically.

Red alert: "NATO is depending more on locally developed weapons and munitions rather than obtaining them from the United States. The war in Ukraine has encouraged this trend because European nations now realize that they have a very real threat next door with Russia." Germany builds cruiser-size "frigates."

Putin's regime continues to "shield" Russians from what it considers "misinformation" and "disinformation": "Russian federal censor Rozkomnadzor announced on July 4 that it recently blocked Russians from accessing 25 mobile virtual private network (VPN) services." 

I will repeat that Gazans would stop dying and suffering if Hamas stopped using the people as human shields and simply surrendered. I refuse to care more about Gazans than Hamas does.

Tip to Instapundit: "Starting from 2022, Russia has been moving everything west, stripping the Far East naked. So, the Russian-Chinese border is getting effectively demilitarised, for the first time in >50 years[.]" When his war against Ukraine ends, will China let Putin remilitarize Russia's side of the border?

Big foot: "The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) said on Saturday that China's largest coastguard vessel has anchored in Manila's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea, and is meant to intimidate its smaller Asian neighbour."

I'm kind of a big deal, you know: "The message to NATO from President Vladimir Putin was simple and stark: Don't go too far in providing military support for Ukraine, or you'll risk a conflict with Russia that could quickly turn nuclear." Will any of Russia's nukes explode?