Friday, February 24, 2012

In the Heart of Darkness

While there are no details of what we are doing in Uganda, we say we are making progress:

The United States said on Thursday it was making progress with its African allies in its push against Uganda's notorious Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), but gave no clear end date for the shadowy U.S. military operation unfolding in central Africa. ...

Karl Wycoff, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for Africa, said the intervention was showing some positive results, noting that LRA attacks were sharply down and defections were rising.

We're hunting a monster. And we can get some credit from countries who can help us in East Africa in pursuit of our objectives.

Spin, Baby, Spin

So the president came into office saying he wanted higher energy prices to push us to a new, Green, post-petroleum future. As the proverb says, be careful what you wish for.

We have oil prices going on a steady march up that people are starting to really feel in their wallets.

President Obama faces reelection this year. He says the steadily rising oil prices aren't his fault.

Which leads me to ask the president why he is unhappy that he is getting what he said he wanted--and what we needed? Shouldn't this be a case of "promises made and promises kept?"

Of course, embracing the rise of oil prices as just what he intended would require the president to decide whether he has to tell us we are too stupid to appreciate his brilliance or that his high energy price objective was stupid.

UPDATE: Thanks to Stones Cry Out for the link.

Thursday, February 23, 2012

Get a Sense of It, And Then Look Away

He is so screwed:

Princess Mary of Denmark caught the eye of Pentti Arajarvi — married to Finnish president Tarja Halonen — when they sat next to each other at a state banquet.

Mr Arajarvi was blatantly staring at her breasts, only looking away when she suddenly turned towards him.

Seinfeld has advice for this situation:



Although in the real world it gets in The Sun rather than being like looking at the sun.

Several centuries ago, a Danish squadron would be laying waste to the port facilities of Helsinki by now.

Oh, the first link has the video.

The Long March at Sea

Really? Taiwan is just getting around to this?

The Taipei-based United Daily News said the navy, which ordered the US-built Harpoon missiles in 2008, recently test-fired the weapons in the United States, in preparation for installing them on its two Dutch-built submarines.

Next year, the two non-ancient subs that Taiwan has will have them operational.

I was happy to note the purchase back in 2005. It is a "force multiplier" and gives America options in the early hours of a war when we might not be ready to openly help Taiwan:

If the Chinese try to invade Taiwan and at least one Taiwanese sub makes it to sea, then if Harpoons start smashing into Chinese ships, we can openly marvel at the storage capacity of the Dutch-built boat. I mean, some people might speculate that American subs are launching them, too, but that would be idle speculation best left for historians to examine decades after the Taiwanese fend off the invasion attempt.

And next year, the Taiwanese will finally deploy the missiles. Hey, no sense of urgency, eh?

No Enemy Should Sleep Soundly

The question of supporting the anti-Assad rebels is in the air as Assad escalates his efforts to kill his way to peace and quiet that will end those persistent voices calling for his departure:

Syrian tanks pushed into a rebel stronghold in the battered city of Homs on Thursday and U.N. investigators accused President Bashar al-Assad's government of crimes against humanity.

I'd rather have the Turks go in to Syria in force to have a chance at ending this problem sooner rather than later. But if the question is simply whether we support the insurgents, the answer is "heck yes."

Does anybody remember that through the Iraq War Assad funneled jihadis into Iraq for al Qaeda where they blew up Iraqi civilians and American and allied troops in suicide bomber attacks? And otherwise supported insurgents fighting us in Anbar and the Sunni Triangle?

We owe Assad payback. Even if the anti-Assad forces don't win we should support the anti-Assad forces. Our enemies should know they don't have a free shot at us, and fear that even if we don't hit them immediately, we'll bide our time and strike when we can.

UPDATE: Some arms are getting in:

Foreign powers are turning a blind eye to weapons purchases by Syrian exiles who are already smuggling light arms, communications equipment and night vision goggles to rebels inside Syria, a Syrian opposition source said on Friday.

If it is a good thing that Assad falls (and I think it is), I worry that too many people in Washington labor under the delusion that insurgents always win and so Assad is doomed. After all, the people in power now are the same people who said we couldn't beat the insurgents and terrorists in Iraq. Indeed, they said that fighting the terrorists and insurgents in Iraq just created more insurgents and terrorists so was actually counter-productive. But I'm not sure that these people have digested the implications of the fact that we did in fact defeat the insurgents and terrorists in Iraq.

Assad has survived so far, remember. He is weakening and the resistance is strengthening. But Assad hasn't faced even the shock we faced of the dual uprising in Iraq in spring 2004--just as we were knocking down the Baathist resistance--where al Qaeda and the Sunni Arabs plus the Sadrists in the Shia community rose up to fight us and the new Iraqi government. Half of the Iraqi security forces collapsed in the first shock of that uprising, and it took a year to beat back the twin offensives. And then it took three more years and our surge offensive to finally beat them down.

Nothing is inevitable. Our choices influence what happens. And not making a choice is a choice.

Just Who Was Reset Anyway?

Remember how we tossed Poland (and the Czech Republic) under the bus in order to "reset" our relations with Russia? This was supposed to pay dividends by convincing Russia to work with us on common interests.

Well, we have a diplomatic success to savor!

Russia is warning Israel not to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure:

Russia warned Israel on Wednesday that attacking Iran would be a disastrous and played down the failure of a U.N. nuclear agency mission to Tehran, saying there is still a chance for new talks over the Iranian atomic program.

Which seems really similar to America's position on the issue!

The Obama administration, increasingly concerned about the lack of any assurance from Israel that it would consult Washington before launching strikes on Iran's nuclear sites, has scrambled in recent weeks to convince Israeli leaders to give sanctions and diplomacy more time to work, U.S. officials say.

Well, we couldn't get a convergence of approach by getting Russia to move toward our position, so we move closer to Russia's position. Still convergence, right? What's the dif'?

The nuance! It's blinding!

We Need a Treaty of Westfailia

Member states of the United Nations are supposed to be the only really recognized actors in the world. But technology is enabling sub- and trans-national entities to act as sovereign states with their own foreign policies. The online Anonymous collective is groping its way forward to being an actor on the world stage.

This fits in with the broader development of private warfare which is the subject of the first volume of collected essays from The Dignified Rant, with a retrospective commentary, that I have published and offer for sale on Amazon in Kindle format. The Dignified Rant on Private Warfare is available for 99 cents. This and future titles will be available through the tab at the top of the blog called "Buy the Dignified Rant."

Anonymous has emerged as a cyber-state that wages war for its own goals:

It's been denounced by NATO, targeted by the FBI, and subjected to dozens of frenzied editorials. Targets as varied as Bank of America, Sony, the Justice Department, and the government of Egypt have felt its wrath. Its trademark symbols have appeared everywhere from the streets of Cairo to Occupy Wall Street to the Polish parliament. For a group that sprang organically from an Internet forum normally devoted to anime cartoons and cat videos, the amorphous hacker/prankster collective known as "Anonymous" has become a surprisingly potent actor in global politics. But to understand the forces that make the group tick, let's look back to a time before SOPA and the Arab Spring and consider the strange story of one "Agent Pubeit."

So far, missions are coalitions of the anonymous willing:

In operations, as in communications, Anonymous follows a simple model: Anyone can propose anything. The measure of success is simply whether other Anons join in. Want to hack Muammar al-Qaddafi's websites? Take down MasterCard? Wipe out a child-porn haven? Put out the word and start doing it. The result has been a dazzling series of "ops" against everyone from the government of Sweden to right-wing billionaires David and Charles Koch to the strategic consulting firm Stratfor.

Heck, I got an email or two from the Anonymous collective tweaking Stratfor with messages purporting to be from the company but obviously not from the company. But the company didn't have my credit card information so it was more interesting (to me) than annoying or dangerous (again, to me).

The group has grown from talking to pranks to acts that try to affect the physical world from the cyber-world. Right now, the group is oriented by a common view of the world (at least in some respects) but lacks leadership that focuses the group. Will that last?

Will someone assert control and will others follow? Will a traditional state subvert the group for its own purposes? Could Anonymous fragment as members continue to slide away from the prank and talk side of the spectrum of action more toward direct actions against the physical world? Is the membership just unsuited to following orders or becoming a real actor in foreign affairs rather than a factor that impacts foreign affairs like extreme weather that can hit a place and then dissipate?

And as governments react to being attacked by going after the Anonymous members, what do we do? Some are kids? But are they pranksters, criminals, spies, or unlawful combatants? What does one country do when another country decides that the first country's Anonymous hacker who stole secret documents are spies and snatch them while they are on spring break in the Bahamas? Or just kill them with a poison-tipped umbrella?

But don't count on the Westphalian international community's professional guild--the United Nations--to productively address this issue. They're just unhappy that their is a demand for a service that nation-states don't provide. Security isn't security if the wrong people provide it, apparently:

A United Nations expert panel today warned of an alarming resurgence of the use of mercenaries in armed conflict, and called for regulating private military and security companies, whose activities raise numerous human rights challenges.

“Mercenaries pose a threat not only to security, but also to human rights and potentially to the right of peoples to self-determination,” said Faiza Patel, who currently heads the Working Group on the use of mercenaries. “It is crucial that States cooperate to eliminate this phenomenon.” ...

In addition to mercenaries, the “ever-expanding” activities of private military and security companies continue to raise a number of challenges, Ms. Patel said.

“Providing security to its people is a fundamental responsibility of the State and outsourcing security to private military and security companies creates risks for human rights, hence the need to regulate their activities.”

She noted that these companies continue to undertake a growing range of activities in an increasing number of countries from drug-eradication programmes in Colombia to post-conflict reconstruction.

“And it is not just governments who take advantage of their services, but also NGOs [non-governmental organizations], private companies and the United Nations,” she added.

I don't know, but I think a majority of UN member states pose threats to security, human rights, and the right of peoples to self-determination. UN troops, too, have been involved in some pretty ugly human rights violation cases, after all. Mercenaries are a tool that can do good or be abused, as any tool that can coerce people can be abused regardless of who wields it.

But the UN admits that it isn't providing enough UN-level collective security to meet demand. And it admits that member states aren't providing it. Heck, even the UN uses private military service companies. So in the end, the UN just wants to regulate it:

For the Working Group, “the potential impact of the widespread activities of private military and security companies on human rights means that they cannot be allowed to continue to operate without adequate regulation and mechanisms to ensure accountability.”

I'm sure they mean UN regulation. This report simply sounds like a threat to ban private military companies as the stick to get them to accept UN regulation and oversight. But if the UN can't provide collective security at the nation level because countries disagree about who should be the target of collective security action, who thinks the UN could enforce mercenary regulations without member nations doing the job? And how would authorization to enforce UN rules be any easier than collective security decisions when some member states will defend "their" mercenary companies from UN action?

Well, they've done a bang up job with what they are responsible for already. I'm sure this new UN job will work out just swell.

Mercenaries are simply responding to demand. If they are to be regulated, it would be better handled at the national level where a nation can enforce the rules and the nations can be held accountable by others for failing to control their own mercenary companies. Privatized military power is a fact of life.

Anonymous is a forming post-Westphalian entity that represents one type of a class of private warfare actors who increasingly challenge the nation-state that formally has a monopoly on military power. We need to come to grips with this trend to develop new rules of the road--a Treaty of Westfailia, so to speak.

Private warfare is the subject of the first volume of collected essays from The Dignified Rant, with a retrospective commentary, that I want to put together and offer for sale. The Dignified Rant on Private Warfare is available for the low, low price of 99 cents. Wow! And if you print it out on absorbent paper, it can function as a kind of ShamWow!, so it's really a two-fer.

I have a long list of topics that I want to mine The Dignified Rant for future volumes. If you have suggestions, email me at bjdunn-at-umich.edu. You probably have ideas that I haven't thought of.

Wednesday, February 22, 2012

Shaky Science

We've detected signs of a recent earthquake on Mars. Apparently, that means that there could be liquid water underground.

I'd quote the article but I don't know how I'd possibly be able to follow fair use guidelines by only excerpting a small portion of the article.

On a more serious note, I blame global warming.

Blowback in Action

Iraq says violence is down as al Qaeda leaves Iraq for more fertile killing grounds in Syria:

The departure of al-Qaida-affiliated fighters from Iraq to join the rebellion against Syrian President Bashar Assad in Syria has had one benefit, Iraqi officials say: Violence has dropped in this country, in some areas by as much as half in just a few months.

This doesn't mean the resistance to Assad is an opportunity for jihadis to seize control of Syria:

The U.S. is concerned that al Qaeda is operating in Syria. It's true that Iraqi Sunni Arabs have been entering Syria to join the fighting, and some of these men probably belonged to terrorist groups in Iraq. But it's also true that Syria has suffered several incidents of terror attacks over the last five years. These were believed to be carried out by one of the many Islamic terror groups that Syria has given sanctuary to over the decades. ... But keep in mind that al Qaeda trashed its reputation in Iraq during the last decade, because of so many attacks on civilians. Al Qaeda may be temporarily welcomed by the Syrian rebels, but as soon as the Assads are gone, any popularity for Islamic terrorists will dissipate. Many of these thugs still work for the Assads, and have been sheltered by the Assads for decades.

As an aside, Sunni Arab Iraqis are taking the opportunity for some payback.

Justifying a hands-off approach to Assad just because al Qaeda is fighting him makes as much sense as refusing to take sides against Hitler because Stalin fought Hitler. That has been Assad's line all along, recall.

But if you insist on "multi-lateral" military alliances as a superior alternative to unilateral operations, never forget that "multi" leaves room for unsavory characters.

No Prophet Motive

Austin Bay writes that the struggle against the drug gangs in Mexico faces the challenge of surviving an election. Fighting the drug gangs and strengthening rule of law are the two major efforts in that struggle:

Calderon's goal is laudable but so difficult. It will take years to achieve. However, time is something he doesn't have. 2012 is an election year in Mexico, and Calderon cannot succeed himself. He needs a follow-on reform president with guts and vision.

The cartels may not want to replace the political order like a terrorist or political insurgent movements, but they do seek to subvert it. No, Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel commanders don't have a rigid ideological orthodoxy, but they do have an idea of what constitutes politically favorable conditions for their operations: a weak government with corrupt cops, bought judges and a defanged military focused on parades. Add frightened reporters, since the bribed cops won't protect them, and you've got a drug lord Reconquista of Mexico, a return to the worst dinosaurio days of the Institutional Revolutionary Party.

He also notes that while the drug gangs use the tools of terrorism (military-grade weapons and beheadings) to complement their use of bribery, blackmail, and death threats, the drug gangs are not like terrorists in that the gangs have a profit motive rather than a prophet motive. This looks like war but it is different.

Mexico is making progress. but this year's election isn't the only threat to defeating the drug gangs. My fear is that the use by Mexico of the relatively uncorrupted military in the struggle (to bypass corrupted--by bribery, blackmail, and death threats--local police and judges) will result in the military becoming a corrupted institution. If the Mexican drug lords can buy time, they'll be able to buy troops, too.

Oh, and this is a lesson to countries that tolerate thugs on their own soil, with the justification that it is a problem for others only. Years ago, Mexicans refused to address the drug gangs because it was "an American problem" and not a Mexican problem. The problem was drug demand from America and why should Mexico suffer casualties to go after drug gangs in Mexico? Besides, lots of dollars flowed south into Mexico. Too bad for Americans. But ignoring the drug gangs led them to be a threat to the Mexican government. Now it is a Mexican problem.

And for Americans, don't think that this is just a Mexican problem. Violence spills over into America and over time, Mexican drug lords will spill over to battle for control of the distribution network inside America and undermine our border agents, cops, and judges to look the other way. The gangs have a profit margin and vertical integration from producer to retail sale is one method of increasing profits. Plus, it may be safer for drug gangs to live in America if the fight in Mexico gets too hot.

We have an interest in Mexico's victory in this "war."

Inconvenient Truths

Recently, merchant ships have begun to put armed detachments on ships travelling within range of Somali pirates. Many are private contractors and so many people are up in arms about the possibility that trigger happy mercenaries will shoot up an innocent boat approaching their ship on the high seas.

Well, that happened. Inconveniently, the shooters were Italian marines:

The shooting deaths of two Indian fishermen mistaken for pirates sparked diplomatic wrangling Wednesday over the arrests of two Italian marines, and some maritime experts are questioning the use of armed guards on merchant ships.

India may try the marines for murder. You'd think the Indians would be a little more understanding considering they had a major "oops" moment in the fight against piracy. Perhaps I missed the news of the trial in Thailand over that incident.

Critics of defending against pirates cite this incident as proving that armed guards are counter-productive (from the initial article):

Maritime organizations are questioning whether the very presence of armed security could actually increase violence on the high seas.

Please. Armed security guards simply increase the levels of violence visibility when an accident happens. The violence is already at a pretty high level.

You can prefer the invisible collateral damage of inaction in the face of pirate attacks, but don't pretend that fighting back is the cause of collateral damage just because that's the only time you hear about it.

Perhaps the Italian marines really screwed up. I don't know. But considering that India allows armed guards on merchant ships and India fights back even at the risk of making mistakes, you'd think they'd have a little more understanding.

Until someone goes ashore in Somalia and kills lots of pirates, we'll be living with this problem.

Actually, this would be quite the opportunity for China to carry out. They'd demonstrate the willingness to act to protect the general good, gain experience with long distance military deployments, gain ground near their oil import sources, make the "Indian Ocean" seem a little less "Indian" in doing what India hasn't done, and demonstrate that the American-led anti-piracy patrol just hasn't been enough.

We've Long Been Against Impressment

The Great Game comes to the Taiwan Strait. We have intervened in the Taiwan-China dispute as Taiwan and the mainland continue their dispute:

"I want to say that I'm sorry to tell you that Jeremy Lin is an American, a blue-blooded born American," Faleomavaega said, drawing hearty laughter from Ma, and then added "who happens to be of Taiwanese ancestry, and we're proud to have him."

That's about it right there. The U.S. representative from Congress (representing American Samoa) put it well.

You can be impressed by our people--but don't impress them.

Now if only Ireland and Hungary would stop bickering over me ...

Tuesday, February 21, 2012

This Will Work Out Swell

The Iran debate continues. Let's see:

We're warning Israel not to strike Iran to prevent Iran from going nuclear any time soon.

We're worried that Iran will strike back at us--perhaps even at home with terrorism--if Israel strikes Iran.

We're so worried about Iran's reaction that we are publicly saying we won't attack Iran any time soon because it is a bad idea.

Increasingly the administration seems to be taking the position that we can deter Iran if they get nukes rather than run the risk of a wider war by striking Iran's nuclear program.

So notwithstanding our confidence that we can deter a nuclear Iran in the future, right now we don't think we can deter a non-nuclear Iran from striking at our forces or allies in the Persian Gulf region if someone else attacks Iran.

That's so nuanced, I think I pulled a muscle trying to follow it.

Everything You Always Wanted to Know About State

Foreign policy unilateralism at its worst:


I'm sure Secretary of State Clinton is wondering, "What am I doing here?" (language and subject warning)

I think they're yelling, "Hey, we're going to make diplomacy!"

Sorry. I couldn't resist. Probably should have. Hey, I'm sick with my judgment impaired by medications.

The Iran Precedent

I'd forgotten, but Victor Hanson reminds us that Iran was the first country to attempt a preemptive strike against an enemy's nuclear program:

In 1980, Iran sent planes into Iraq to attack the Osirak facility, for fear that Saddam might develop a bomb during the Iraq-Iran War. That mostly failed mission damaged but did not destroy the facility, which was demolished a year later by the Israeli air force. For all the present Iranian talk of sovereignty, it was Iran that established the precedent that unhinged enemies cannot be allowed to have nuclear weapons.

I've probably mentioned this before (ah, a quick check shows I did mention Iran's effort at least once), but forgot about it. Not that we need an Iranian precedent to strike. But cries of outrage if Israel strikes Iran should explain why Iran could be on the giving end of preemption without global rending of garments and gnashing of teeth but not on the receiving end.

Decode? No. Address? Yes

Secretary of Defense Panetta's recent remarks that Israel could attack Iran soon to disrupt Iran's nuclear programs are causing some debate about why he did that (tip to Instapundit):

Officials and strategists the world over are trying to parse Washington Post columnist David Ignatius’s bombshell revelation that Defense Secretary Leon Panetta believes Israel will attack Iran in the coming months and is pleading with the Israelis to put off any strike. Had Panetta, who’s developed a reputation for being gaffe-prone during his short time as defense secretary, possibly been a bit too candid in the presence of a fellow old Washington hand? Or was Panetta crazy like a fox, using an influential columnist to make the threat of an Israeli strike to strengthen the U.S.’s ability to rally its partners into putting tougher sanctions on Iran?

That's an interesting idea that Panetta is trying to rally our partners to implement sanctions to preclude the need for war. It is plausible.

But for one thing. Another article from four days ago notes that Europe and Congress have been dragging America along on the tougher sanctions route:

In recent months, the toughest moves to deter Iran from pursuing its presumed nuclear ambitions have come from a bipartisan group in Congress and European allies, especially Britain and France. The White House at first resisted these steps before embracing them as inevitable.

If Panetta is trying to rally our partners for tougher sanctions, why has our administration been following along (and not "leading from behind" by any stretch of the imagination)?

The theory that Panetta is trying to drag someone along works if you change it slightly and assume that the leak was for the purpose of doing what Washington leaks usually try to do--influence policy here in America and not abroad. If you assume that Panetta is actually trying to rally the Oval Office to implement tougher sanctions, Panetta's leak makes much more sense. Consider the same article's assessment of our Obama sanctions policy:

The administration has imposed dozens of sanctions on Iran since 2009, but it has carefully calibrated their effect. Officials fear that too powerful a blow to the world's third-largest oil exporter could cause an oil price increase, damaging the global economic recovery, undermining international support for the sanctions campaign and creating political trouble in an election year.

Careful calibration is stupid when the stakes are nuclear. Careful calibration is just another way of saying gradual escalation of military means to send signals. All either does is give the target the opportunity to adjust to gradual problems rather than a big problem all at once.

So the decoding isn't that much of an issue. The address for who the coded message is more important. And I suspect that the recipient is President Obama and not distant partners in Europe. Face it, the Europeans have to be scared. For years they could drag their feet on the assumption that cowboy George W. Bush would do the job right if all else failed. Now the Europeans have to face the prospect that the only likely military option will be carried out by Israel, which lacks the ability to do a really thorough job.

Heck, the Europeans have to worry that Iran will lash out first as the crisis drags on:

"Our strategy now is that if we feel our enemies want to endanger Iran's national interests, and want to decide to do that, we will act without waiting for their actions," Mohammad Hejazi told Fars news agency.

Which is why I'm not a fan of putting our carriers in the Persian Gulf.

Have a nice day.

Monday, February 20, 2012

Is the Oil Market Working?

This post notes that there seems to be a disconnect between the supply and demand of oil, as prices continue to rise while retail deliveries dive. The purpose of the post is political rather than foreign policy, but it raises the question of why the apparent disconnect?

Granted, global demand is what counts and our deliveries aren't the only component of demand. But surely our demand is a major part of the global total.

What if there is no disconnect? What if the dive in retail deliveries here simply doesn't consider the demand of non-retail deliveries? What if nations and companies are buying oil for petroleum reserves in anticipation that America and/or Israel will strike Iran's nuclear facilities this year and lead to a short-term crisis of oil production and transport through the Strait of Hormuz? What if this isn't captured by the statistics (or is being hidden in the short run for obvious reasons)?

Of course, I wondered about just this same thing 6 years ago.

I always keep in mind that connecting dots is a risky game when you have no idea if you are seeing actual dots let alone connections.

I'm Just Careful

Via Meadia reminds us that we don't have a purely bilateral relationship with China. Others with real power are involved:

In China, those who think of the relationship out of context often push for a more aggressive Chinese foreign policy than the facts justify or China’s real interests warrant. In the United States, it leads people to divide into two camps: the declinists, who think the U.S. must try to appease a rising China, and the containers, who think we must work to contain China before it’s too late.

I can go with that. I think it is premature to speak of China taking over the top spot when they still have less than half of our gross GDP (and even calculating by PPP gives us a good edge) and their per capita GDP is woefully low (about 10% of ours). So I oppose the declinist camp.

But while I think we need to focus on the China threat, I neither over-state the threat nor think we should "contain" China. Our containment of the Soviet Union was an ideological containment that sought to prevent the USSR from using hard power until the economic weaknesses of communism could undermine Moscow. China is not economically a communist power--they're more state capitalism now--so while China will face economic setbacks on occasion, we can't wait for that factor to undermine their government. Nor is China an ideological threat to spread pro-China communism since the only thing that survives of communism is party control of the government.

So "containment" doesn't even make sense in terms of China. We have to view the potential problem from a regional point of view.

China faces lots of military power besides America.

Indeed, when Asian powers increase their power, I think that actually increases our influence. (Well, as long as nobody uses their increased power to smash their neighbors to become supreme in the region.) Consider that when all the Asian powers lacked power projection capabilities, we were actually the only country that could theoretically threaten an Asian country. With wealthier Asian states investing in capable militaries, they each theoretically pose threats to each other. And a power outside of Asia is, all things being equal, safer to trust for help.

But in a purely bilateral comparison, China has the advantage of being close to the theaters of operation while we are far. That matters more in the short run than our overall power superiority which will take time to mobilize and focus.

That distance does make us more trusted than China, as I said, but our ability to support stability requires friends, enemies, and potential enemies to have confidence that we will use our power to help our friends. This, I think, is what people who propose "containing" China really mean. They need a new word with less history. Maybe we can turn around China's term that they use to hammer us and say we oppose "hegemony" in Asia by any one power to defend the peace and prosperity that has marked post-World War II Asia.

China is neither doomed nor destined for greatness. We can say the same for America, although our fundamentals are stronger than China's. I don't fear the future. China should be the one to worry even as purported deep thinkers here panic about China and dream of replicating China's reasonably enlightened policies they believe fuel China's rise.

And I don't assume we will fight China any more than I assume China won't risk their growing economy to pick a fight with us. But I could be wrong. And accidents happen.

Yet sheer prudence requires us to prepare our military with an eye on China to deter Peking; reassure the many Chinese neighbors who worry about China's rising power; and if worse comes to worst, be capable of defeating China's military. That isn't containment, that's just being careful.

Of course, just what capabilities we would need to defeat China's military is a good question all its own without delving into questions of destiny and futility. But I'm careful like that.

Attica! Attica!

Greeks are rioting and protesting over their money problems:

Several thousand Greeks demonstrated on Sunday against punishing austerity measures to reduce the country's debt, on the eve of make-or-break talks in Brussels on a 130-billion-euro ($171 billion) bailout to avert bankruptcy.

The Dignified Rant has obtained film of one confrontation with police (language warning):



Sorry. I always think of this scene when the Athens region is mentioned.

The Greeks surely feel like they deserve a kiss, under the circumstances.

Thinking Outside the Box

People keep saying Israel can't attack Iran's nuclear facilities. This article says our military has calculated that Israel would need 100 aircraft minimum. The article focuses on the lack of aerial refueling as the reason Israel can't attack Iran given the range and routes.

Whether or not Israel is likely to succeed with the tools they have available isn't the most relevant question for me. The question is do the Israelis think that the certainty of Iran getting nukes is a risk that even a low odds attempt should attempt to stop--or delay?

I think Israel has attack options, although coping with the refueling issue with aircraft flying from Turkish bases is obviously no longer an option given the anti-Israel turn of Turkish foreign policy. But who knows, since Turkey is also turning against Iran after a brief flirtation.

But what other options might Israel take to address the refueling problem? We're huge, so if we have a problem we think "buy more tankers." Basing out of Turkey was one option I thought of. But what else could Israel do?

Perhaps, like we did at Desert One in our failed rescue operation where we attempted to refuel our helicopters inside Iran on the ground, Israel does something similar. Could some of Israel's planes land at remote airfields or stretches of highway in eastern Jordan, western Iraq, or northern Saudi Arabia to refuel? This would save Israel's aerial tankers for other planes flying straight from Israel.

Perhaps, like we planned for the Doolittle Raid, the Israelis will plan this like a one-way mission where most Israeli planes recover in nearby countries after hitting Iran, with only those within the capacity of Israel's aerial refueling capacity return to Israel at once. Would Georgia be a likely site (where Iran tried to kill Israelis recently)? Armenia to thumb their nose at Turkey? Even Jordan or Kuwait? Or even land at a remote airfield or road on the way back in the Desert One option to be refueled after the mission? Note that our assumption failed and we lost all our planes in the Doolittle Raid

How many Israeli warplanes could land at any one site without being an "incident?" If only small numbers land at some places (like Jordan or Kuwait) could Georgia, as an example, handle most as long as they aren't the only site?

And how many planes could be left out of a strike by relying on other assets for a portion of the missions? Could cruise missiles or ballistic missiles with conventional warheads suffice for some of the unhardened targets? Would commandos be able to replace some sorties? Those options would reduce the refueling burden a bit.

Or what if the Israelis go a completely different route? What if the Israelis fit out their long-range civilian aircraft as GPS-bomb toting bomb trucks? How many of these would Israel need to replace all but the long-range fighters that would escort the bomb trucks? If Israel just had to refuel in the air the escorting fighters, that pretty much eliminates the refueling problem, no?

Or maybe Israel accepts that a strike on Iran would be a one-way mission. What if the Israelis haul out a bunch of their 200+ A-4s, F-4s, and Kfir C-7s from reserves and outfit them with GPS bombs? Would the Israelis get pilots to go on one-way suicide missions or simply land the planes after the strike at neutral sites so the pilots survive and who cares if the locals confiscate the planes in retaliation for unauthorized landings? Or could the Israelis turn these reserve planes into drones guided from the ground so only the ancient air frames are at risk? Or a mix, with a small number of piloted planes controlling 3 or 4 drone strike planes each? Israel could only do this once, but if all you hope to do is buy time since you can't hope to solve the problem, why not?

Israel has had a lot of time to think of ways to overcome their aerial refueling limitations. Buying more refueling tankers is only the most obvious option. And if Israel has concluded that any chance to slow down Iran's nuclear progress is worth taking given the alternative 100% chance that Iran will get nukes, Israel has a lot of incentive to be more creative than your average columnist insisting Israel "can't" attack Iran.