In China, those who think of the relationship out of context often push for a more aggressive Chinese foreign policy than the facts justify or China’s real interests warrant. In the United States, it leads people to divide into two camps: the declinists, who think the U.S. must try to appease a rising China, and the containers, who think we must work to contain China before it’s too late.
I can go with that. I think it is premature to speak of China taking over the top spot when they still have less than half of our gross GDP (and even calculating by PPP gives us a good edge) and their per capita GDP is woefully low (about 10% of ours). So I oppose the declinist camp.
But while I think we need to focus on the China threat, I neither over-state the threat nor think we should "contain" China. Our containment of the Soviet Union was an ideological containment that sought to prevent the USSR from using hard power until the economic weaknesses of communism could undermine Moscow. China is not economically a communist power--they're more state capitalism now--so while China will face economic setbacks on occasion, we can't wait for that factor to undermine their government. Nor is China an ideological threat to spread pro-China communism since the only thing that survives of communism is party control of the government.
So "containment" doesn't even make sense in terms of China. We have to view the potential problem from a regional point of view.
China faces lots of military power besides America.
Indeed, when Asian powers increase their power, I think that actually increases our influence. (Well, as long as nobody uses their increased power to smash their neighbors to become supreme in the region.) Consider that when all the Asian powers lacked power projection capabilities, we were actually the only country that could theoretically threaten an Asian country. With wealthier Asian states investing in capable militaries, they each theoretically pose threats to each other. And a power outside of Asia is, all things being equal, safer to trust for help.
But in a purely bilateral comparison, China has the advantage of being close to the theaters of operation while we are far. That matters more in the short run than our overall power superiority which will take time to mobilize and focus.
That distance does make us more trusted than China, as I said, but our ability to support stability requires friends, enemies, and potential enemies to have confidence that we will use our power to help our friends. This, I think, is what people who propose "containing" China really mean. They need a new word with less history. Maybe we can turn around China's term that they use to hammer us and say we oppose "hegemony" in Asia by any one power to defend the peace and prosperity that has marked post-World War II Asia.
China is neither doomed nor destined for greatness. We can say the same for America, although our fundamentals are stronger than China's. I don't fear the future. China should be the one to worry even as purported deep thinkers here panic about China and dream of replicating China's reasonably enlightened policies they believe fuel China's rise.
And I don't assume we will fight China any more than I assume China won't risk their growing economy to pick a fight with us. But I could be wrong. And accidents happen.
Yet sheer prudence requires us to prepare our military with an eye on China to deter Peking; reassure the many Chinese neighbors who worry about China's rising power; and if worse comes to worst, be capable of defeating China's military. That isn't containment, that's just being careful.
Of course, just what capabilities we would need to defeat China's military is a good question all its own without delving into questions of destiny and futility. But I'm careful like that.
