Last summer, I used this space to speculate that the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, if it sensed that it was losing power in Damascus, might contemplate retreating to the Alawite heartland in the coastal areas and mountains of northwestern Syria. Today, that option is very much alive, and according to several independent sources it is being discussed freely within the Alawite community.
That is not to say that Assad and his acolytes intend to surrender control of Syria if they can avoid it. The regime from the outset appeared to be working on two fronts simultaneously: paving the way for a prospective communal fallback plan by securing the northern and southern hinges of the Alawite area, at Kfar Kalakh and Jisr al-Shoughour, while also endeavoring to re-impose its writ nationwide.
I don't think that the northwest is enough of an enclave to retain power. Sure, Alawites could retain power. But retreating to the core Alawite area doesn't mean that Assad and his cronies will be the Alawites in power. No, to retain his band of followers in power, Assad needs the capital region to continue calling his realm "Syria" and to keep the UN seat. Assad also needs the border regions adjacent to Lebanon and Israel. The former border for money by controlling access to Lebanon (and indirectly for security by isolating a hostile Sunni Arab population in Lebanon from their Syrian brethren). Assad needs the latter border for legitimacy.
Remember what Assad claimed about his legitimacy a year ago before the Arab Spring came to Syria:
Syria, which has gradually shed its socialist past in favor of the free market in recent years, was insulated from the upheaval because he understood his people's needs and has united them in common cause against Israel.
Assad needs Israel as an enemy (one he rarely fights and when he does in only a limited fight that avoids total defeat) to keep his people and armed forces--even the Alawite core of Syria's people and armed forces--loyal to Assad and his oligarchy. To do this Assad needs Lebanon as a tool to threaten Israel and he needs a direct front opposite the Golan Heights that he has to promise to eventually regain from Israel.
So Homs will get ugly not just because Assad needs a corridor from his northwest power base to Damascus to try to win in the entire country. Homs will get ugly because Assad needs a corridor to Damascus and points southwest to keep even a rump Alawite Syria mostly centered on the northwest secure. This would mean ethnic cleansing of the entire region from Homs through Damascus and down to the Israeli border of Sunni Arabs who are the main opposition right now. Assad supporters outside the core area might then flee to the core Alawite area.
Assad said opposition to Israel was the pillar of his regime. This will remain true whether his regime is all of Syria or just an Alawite heartland.
