I've written a lot about the excessive expectations of "porcupine" weapons advocates who wrongly assume they are silver bullet weapons. I was almost ready to dismiss one author early in his essay. But he made good points for such weapons, including the non-trendy naval mines and physical obstacles. So I stuck with it to the end where he provided the context for justifying the asymmetrical capabilities the porcupine advocates rely on.
A call for "porcupine" capabilities for Taiwan. But read to the end:
There are two key caveats with respect to porcupine defenses. The first is that they are emphatically meant to complement existing and emerging capabilities, rather than to supplant them. These defenses can disrupt, delay, and degrade the PLA if it attempts to take Taiwan; they will not defeat it. The complete panoply of firepower from ships, aircraft, missiles and ground forces are required to render PLA attackers combat-ineffective.
I know that asymmetric "porcupine" weapons are the Belle of the Ball these days. Whatever the marketing term of the moment is. And while necessary, such weapons are not enough. Heavy armor and fires will be vital to spearhead counter-attacks to drive the invaders into the sea, as I discussed in Military Review.
It's a relief to see someone recognize that these useful "porcupine" weapons aren't silver bullets.
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NOTE: I made the image with Bing.
