Our efforts over nearly a century from World War I to today gave us a Europe free from significant military threats and allowed America to mostly withdraw our troops from Europe after the Cold War. We left the skeleton of the NATO alliance as a national security insurance policy that could be fleshed out in case a new threat arises. If we leave as the threat begins to arise in Russia, we cancel the insurance policy and encourage catastrophe.
Abandoning Europe would be a strategic mistake for America:
Historically America’s commitment to Europe has been about the fundamentals of geopolitics. The United States is a quintessentially naval power situated in a hemisphere separated from the Eurasian landmass by two oceans. Since the early twentieth century it has been a given that accessing secure maritime routes across the Atlantic – and in a national emergency, controlling them – is in the country’s irreducible national interest. The ability to do so has ensured the security of the American homeland and the Western hemisphere, and equally importantly, the nation’s prosperity and economic growth.
And while the Pacific has grown in importance over the last three decades, Europe remains America’s gateway to Eurasia, the source of its bedrock alliances, and ultimately the cradle of its national and cultural heritage. Suffice it to say that during the last two global conflicts, the United States went to war to prevent one power from dominating Europe and Eurasia. After the Second World War it remained in Europe to ensure that the Soviet Union, its erstwhile World War II ally, did not achieve what German imperialism had sought to accomplish in the first half of the twentieth century.
I've written (see pp. 15-20) about the value of American forces defending Europe both for the deterrent value to keep Europe in our camp and for allowing America to project power into the arc of crisis across North Africa all the way to Central Asia.
Our military footprint in Europe was drastically decreased from Cold War levels to devote more resources to face China, bring troops home, or disband units. Even with the Israel-Iran (and proxy) war straining American naval power, the large American military presence fighting wars in the CENTCOM region is long in the rear view mirror. But we still have national security reasons to keep both regions from being too hostile or dangerous. And when Soviet armies were parked in central Europe through a divided Germany, that was damned near (by about the 100 miles to the Rhine River) too hostile.
Saying we must turn the Asia pivot dial to 11 by abandoning both those regions is retreat disguised as strategy. Don't let the Atlantic Ocean be our eastern first line of defense.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it.
NOTE: The 1987 Cold War era map is from NATO. It reflects France out of the unified military command (but still part of the alliance) and shows Spain as a new member of NATO (in 1982). I guess the map notation simply shows Spain isn't an original NATO member.
