Tuesday, November 08, 2011

A Test of Deterrence

So the idea that we can deter Iran from using their nukes rests on the idea that our vast arsenal will prevent Iran from attacking us because they know we will retaliate.

We'll ignore the small-scale test based on Iran's attempt to attack our capital with conventional explosives. We'll just call that the no-harm, no-foul rule. So Iran can only safely conclude that if they attack us with a nuclear weapon that either misses or doesn't work, we'll call it even Steven and go on our merry outstretched hand way. Iran deters us with their scary talk of disproportional retaliation:

An Iranian semi-official news agency says that a top commander in the country's Revolutionary Guard force has threatened to kill "dozens" of American military commanders, should the U.S. kill any one of theirs.

Remember, "proportional" responses only apply to Israel (and America, of course). Nobody complained about proportionality when Russia slammed into Georgia in what was clearly a set up back in August 2008. But again, I digress.

Anyway ...

But we could get an actual test of how well a nuclear arsenal deters Iran. If Israel uses non-nuclear means to strike Iran's nuclear infrastructure, the theory holds that Iran will be deterred from striking back at Israel (let alone against a non-participating America with our far larger nuclear arsenal) because Israel has nuclear weapons.

So what's your confidence level about that theory? I think I've measured the losses that Iran would accept without being deterred. What's your estimated level of damage? And do you think we'd inflict that level? And if you think we'd inflict that level of carnage, do you think that Iran's leaders believe we'd inflict it?

Still having a nice day?