Sunday, November 28, 2010

Military First--And Last?

This author says that the March corvette sinking and this month's artillery barrage demonstrate that Kim Jong-Un has gotten military backing based on a "military first" policy of giving the army priority on limited resources, and signals a new hard line government:

Growing evidence of North Korean drone flybys and threats in the months leading up to the raid hint at a premeditated attack. But the move looks to be directed inward, suggesting that the Dear Leader’s third son, Kim Jong-un, has already begun the process of cementing his power base in the military-first society.
This is ominous. And not because this might mean a return to Cold War-level tensions and provocations, as the author writes. That would be bad enough, but if the North Koreans are really embarking on a military first policy, it could be the least of our problems.

I mentioned that the problem with the military first policy is that there is no money for it. North Korea's kooks had demoted the army in favor of a policy of spooks and nukes--the latter to keep out invaders and the former to control the people and make sure the army remains a tool of the kooks to control the people and not be a threat to the regime. Where does North Korea get the money now when they are worse off than years before when they abandoned military first?

North Korea may assume they can extort money from Japan, South Korea, and America with more threats. Or they may think they will get it from China. Or maybe they believe that Iran will cut them a large check for a working nuke and blueprints to build more.

Or, and this is the really ominous part, they may think a short-term burst of spending for a few years on the army to get it up to decent standards of training and readiness is all they need. Maybe as they think about their slow decline that shows no sign of reversing, they will roll the dice and invade South Korea to knock over the figurative bank of wealthy South Korea before North Korea collapses.

Continued attacks by North Korea on South Korean targets, under this way of thinking, might also tend to dull South Korea's reactions and slow down South Korean mobilization when North Korea gears up for a major strike.

And as I've mentioned, I'd guess that even with a burst of spending, North Korea could not hope to smash through the South Korean army without massive use of chemical weapons.

Fortunately, in the initial weeks of war, South Korea will need our air and naval power most, which are the services least stressed by the war in Afghanistan and the stabilization mission in Iraq. Although it would be nice if we had some heavy brigade combat teams that are retrained for high-intensity combat operations, just in case.

Have a nice day.