This is explained in this Army press conference. The Army secretary demonstrates that we are not in fact without a ground option for any crisis, and explains our surge capacity:
We have a readiness deployment tool which really -- a fundamental tool by which we operate the Army. We call it the Army Force Generation Model, which, God bless you -- which you may be -- it is called -- (inaudible) -- which you may be familiar with. And this is a model in which we take the forces, both in the Reserves and the active, and we rotate them through various stages prior to deployment: a reset, remanufacture stage, recapitalization stage, and then followed by -- part of that training, rest, refreshment, all in the first year. Second year: intense training. Third year: deployment. So -- that's for the active.
So if you have in today's world 18 to 20 brigade combat teams deployed, we can surge, with the Army Force Generation Model, another 18 to 20 brigade combat teams.
So as these forces come around these circles of deployment, these cycles of deployment, they go from low stages of readiness in the first year and to increased readiness, and then, in mid-second year, they're ready to go. And the Reserves -- so one year deployed and two years at home station is our baseline cycle for the active, and one year deployed and five years at home station is the baseline cycle for the National Guard and the Reserves.
So we have the capability -- to answer it straightforward -- to surge to any crisis that the president may ask us to do.
So with active component forces planned at 42 brigades, we could surge 14 brigades on top of 14 deployed. This would leave 14 recovering from deployment. With our planned 28 Guard combat brigades, we'd have 4-5 available in any given year. One could add three Marine regimental combat teams based on the Army active component ratio and another 1 or 2 reserve battalions. This is illustrative only since the Marines operate on different schedules. And even the Army numbers are not good now since we don't have 28 Guard brigades ready (we have 15 enhanced separate brigades and I think 18 other brigades in the divisions that are at much lower readiness and not easily deployed for combat missions and a couple other separate brigades at lower readiness) and we don't have 42 active brigades yet. I think we're up to 40 or will be this year anyway.
Still, there is no question that our Army is stretched right now. But I'm always suspicious of Krepinevich's work. I'm not sure why, but when I read his material I often have to go "huh? Is he serious?" This article is no exception. Our Army is well trained and equipped and is gaining valuable combat experience as an institution and for the individual soldiers in the Army.
It is true that this operational tempo could eventually break the Army, but we don't know when that point will be reached. And until that point is reached, our Army is getting better--much better. Heck, our Army was in a race against time by the end of 1944. We didn't have a rotation base. Hell, we didn't have a strategic reserve of ground troops. Everything was committed and the Army was running out of steam. We were in a race between winning the war and breaking the Army. Luckily the Germans wore out even faster. And luckily we didn't have to transfer the European Army to the Pacific. I wonder if it could have handled this stress. But I digress. The problem our Army has is nothing new.
Not that it means we can ignore the issue. It could become a serious problem. But don't get your panties in a twist quite yet (or organize the retreat party under the guise of "saving" the Army). With more brigades being created and a smaller commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan, we can reduce the stress and keep the Army the best fighting machine on the planet. But remember that the Army exists to protect the nation. The nation does not exist to support a pristine Army never exposed to danger. If the Army looks in danger of breaking while we are at war, the proper response is to fix the Army and not end the war short of victory.
So if we do surge brigades for an Iran crisis, for example, we would probably have to do a general mobilization to put enough troops in the field for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran, plus have some troops in reserve for North Korea (or Venezuela for that matter). On the bright side, the Guard would be better prepared to put effective brigades in the field once mobilized.
Or maybe we really are prepared to overthrow the mullahs despite the appearance of inactivity.
UPDATE: Secretary Rumsfeld defends the Army's status and this exchange confirms that the reports only suggest the Army could break if the status quo keeps going:
Q Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you about this report that the Pentagon paid good money for from Andrew Krepinevich, and two things of that --
SEC. RUMSFELD: (Inaudible.)
Q -- two -- two things that he said that I'd just be curious about. First of all, all these reports make a distinction between how the U.S. Army is performing now and what they're -- what the risk is in the future. And one of the central premises of this report is that recruiting and retention problems are going to get worse, and that's why there's a danger of breaking the Army in the future.
SEC. RUMSFELD: Okay, they don't say it's broken, as was characterized.
Q Not what I've read.
SEC. RUMSFELD: Okay.
Um, well duh. But things won't stay the same. Deployments will hopefully drop. Recruiting will be addressed. More brigades will be added. We will react to the potential problem. Like I said, something to worry about but get off the kitchen stool and stop shrieking. Another bloody plastic turkey issue.
