It is interesting that Russia continues to batter forward in the Donbas rather than try to advance north from positions further west to really outflank Ukraine's Donbas defenders. Even after all this time it seems that Russia's logistic system is really only capable of sustaining offensives from positions close to Russia in the east. Can Russia finally win? If it doesn't, what happens?
Russia continues grinding forward in the east as Ukraine struggles with ammunition shortages to hang on. Ukraine is clearly husbanding its Western-equipped units because replacement equipment is not flowing in. But Russia continues to seek battlefield victory.
Budanov stated in an April 17 article in the Washington Post that Russia will launch a “big” offensive in June 2024 with the aim of seizing all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Budanov also stated that Russian forces will try to make battlefield gains throughout 2024 as part of efforts to influence Western decision-making. Budanov had previously forecasted that a future major Russian offensive would begin in late May or early June 2024, and it is notable that Budanov has now narrowed his forecast to June and identified the likely aim of the Russian offensive. Previous major Russian offensive efforts have similarly aimed to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
It seems odd that Russia persists in the east when a drive north from further west might unhinge Ukraine's defensive lines. Does Russia focus on attacks in the east because of the Dnieper River and new fortifications line make the western-most parts of their line a better place to hold with fewer troops? Or is Russia unable to sustain a logistics effort there?
On the other hand, attempting to take Kharkiv makes sense for Russia. Foreign Minister Lavrov is the first senior Russian to claim that is an objective for the 2024 offensive. But who knows if this is a bluff. As ISW notes, it would take a lot of resources to launch a drive on the large city.
And there's this plan to generate the big push:
While the Kremlin is struggling to expand capacity and to develop modern arms that could improve its army’s battlefield performance, it has capitalized on its overwhelming advantage in numbers of soldiers, its ability to arm them with old but reliable weaponry and a willingness to endure heavy casualties.
Russia doesn't really have an overwhelming number of soldiers as much as it has an overwhelming advantage in replacing dead soldiers. And while simple weapons are better for--and necessary for--poorly trained troops, that also means there will be heavier Russian casualties.
Even with the hiccup in American military aid (seemingly about to be revived), Russia has been unable to fully exploit that to inflict a killing blow. The question now is whether Ukraine can rearm and resupply in time to meet the Russian offensive. But if they do, Russian casualties will be even higher.
If Ukraine wins the race and holds the line, inflicting even more losses on Russia, what happens? Can Ukraine attack in the west across the river on the Kherson front or finally figure out how to push through Russia's defensive belt? Or will Ukraine, too, have to focus on the east despite Russia's troops, logistics infrastructure, and fortifications there?
Or does everybody just punch their ticket for 2025?
FFS, how much longer will Russians send their men to die for Putin in Ukraine? "Russia's military death toll in Ukraine has now passed the 50,000 mark, the BBC can confirm." That's just confirmed deaths in a country that hides its losses in a firehose of falsehood.
UPDATE (Monday): Did Moscow really think this taunt through?
The Kremlin warned that American support for Ukraine could turn into a decade-long folly[.]
So the Kremlin is telling Russians to die in large numbers for eight more years to capture Ukraine?
UPDATE (Tuesday): Russia appears to be attacking with more than a tactical focus:
Russian offensive operations in these three areas north and northwest of Avdiivka have succeeded in creating three small salients along a frontline that is about seven kilometers long, but each of these three salients is currently too narrow in isolation to serve as meaningful launch points for further ground offensives that would accomplish a broad encirclement of the general area west of Avdiivka. The force composition, density, and general battlefield geometry of this area suggest that Russian forces currently hope to combine the pushes from all three salients to create a wider breach along the Berdychi-Novokalynove line, predominantly using forces of the CMD.If successful, this might set up Russian forces to be in a position to launch a summer offensive.
American and European aid needs to arrive quickly. Although as I've noted, when Ukraine is confident it will soon receive a flow of Western aid, Ukraine can release ammunition reserves rather than husband them to last as long as possible.
UPDATE (Wednesday): The aid bill was signed and the first big aid package under the new authorization is approved.
UPDATE (Thursday): Russia, from a couple of podcast sources, has apparently exploited a Ukrainian mistake northwest of Avdiivka to take some serious ground in a salient that in theory is vulnerable to a counter-attack but which Russia seems to be expanding. I noted the report of the attacks in that first Tuesday update.
That's an advantage for Russia of being on the offensive despite heavy losses--Russia can exploit mistakes when Ukraine makes them. Russia can have plenty of weaknesses on their front but Ukraine isn't attacking so we'll never know about them.
UPDATE (Friday): ISW describes that salient offensive:
Russian forces are stabilizing their small salient northwest of Avdiivka and may make further tactical gains that could cause Ukrainian forces to withdraw from other tactical positions along the frontline west of Avdiivka to a more defensible line. ... Russian forces have committed roughly a reinforced division’s worth of combat power (comprised mainly of four CMD brigades) to the frontline northwest of Avdiivka and appear to be attempting to widen their penetration of the Ukrainian defense in the area following significant advances into Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) as of April 18. These recent Russian gains northwest of Avdiivka have been relatively quick but still relatively marginal, with Russian forces advancing at most roughly five kilometers in depth since April 18.As long as this isn't a sign of Ukrainian morale cracking--which seems unlikely right now--the gain is real but not likely to lead to a bigger victory for Russia.
I would love to see Ukraine release ammunition reserves--knowing American ammo is on the way--to counter-attack that salient to cut it off and destroy the Russian spearheads. That would fulfill my short term wish.
UPDATE (Friday): Of course, a more significant Russian push does exist:
Russian pressure on Chasiv Yar is more significant. Russian forces currently on the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar have been intensifying efforts to seize the city since March 2024. The offensive effort to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances as the seizure of the town would likely allow Russian forces to launch subsequent offensive operations against cities that form a significant Ukrainian defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast.
UPDATE (Saturday): More on Ukraine's recent battlefield mistakes. In one sense, that's normal in war. Friction is a bitch. The important and more relevant factor is that Russia has the initiative and so could exploit the mistakes.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
