Are we refusing to admit the war is stalemated out of fear of negotiating "peace"? Well, for one thing, define "peace."
On the land battlefield, Russia's attacks in Luhansk seem to have stalled. The Kherson front is quiet with few Russians holding the front. Is it the same on the Ukrainian side of the river?
Ukraine seems to be inflicting disproportionate casualties on the Russians while slowly clawing forward around Bakhmut and on the road to Melitopol. And Russia lately seems more active than the Ukrainians in those areas. Although that isn't necessarily a sign that Russia is regaining the initiative:
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu celebrated an odd group of Russian armed formations operating in the western Zaporizhia Oblast direction during a conference call with Russian military leadership. Shoigu’s choice of units could indicate he seeks to highlight Russian commanders who continue to follow Russian military leadership’s orders for relentless counterattacks.
But what does this all mean in the big picture? Is the Winter War of 2022 over but for the formality?
The U.S. reached its goal, while Russia and Ukraine have not and will not. However, neither have they been crushed. Ukraine is now a divided country but enough of it is intact to claim victory, and Russia has pushed past its old border enough to claim a small victory. Both could claim humanitarian reasons for ending the war.
No, the current front line isn't the basis for "ending the war." Basically because if the fighting is suspended the war is not ended. It is just a Russian
territorial ratchet pushed up a notch for the next invasion begun
deeper inside Ukraine after Russia recovers from this drubbing. That is not "peace." Or even "ending the war." That is "reloading."
But the author means to say it impossible for either side to win on the battlefield in this war. I don't agree with that. I could be wrong, of course. Both sides are suffering enormously.
And while both may be said to have already lost the
war because of the cost, Ukraine could yet lose much more deeply and
permanently than stalemated war provides. Losing casualties and your very freedom is worse than casualties and some of your territory. Ultimately Ukraine will decide where between those outcomes they draw the line on sacrifice.
Yet I respect the author. He is right that leaders may fight for their survival (politically or literally) even after waging a war is pointless.
He is also right that our interests can diverge from Ukraine's. And in one sense, NATO has already conditionally won. But I think we are still mostly on the same path. Because until Russia is defeated, Russia isn't defeated.
UPDATE (Monday): ISW issued a special report on Ukraine's campaign against Russia's Crimea bases, assets, and lines of supply. This harms Russia's ability to sustain forces in southern Ukraine.
UPDATE (Thursday): I do worry that Ukraine's Avdiivka bulge could be isolated:
Russian forces launched localized attacks towards Avdiivka after intensive artillery preparation of the battlefield in the early hours of October 10, and geolocated footage from October 10 and 11 confirms that Russian troops advanced southwest of Avdiivka near Sieverne and northwest of Avdiivka near Stepove and Krasnohorivka.The Russian advance has been slow. But that bulge gets deeper. I hope Russian troops will crack under pressure from Ukraine's slow advance in the south. But that could happen to Ukraine in this area, no? Or Russia could suddenly throw a couple brigades into the attack.
It would be nice if Ukraine has the reserves to pinch off one or both of those Russian pincer arms reaching around the heavily defended Avdiivka.
UPDATE (Thursday): While there may be a leadership problem in a key Ukrainian brigade that Ukraine's army has to correct, firing leaders is a normal thing that happens in war. War reveals weaknesses--and provides opportunities for unrecognized talent.
Also, Ukraine may be getting a "new" old American air defense weapon. America might have scraped up old Chapparal systems.
UPDATE (Thursday): Economic warfare: "A fresh wave of Russian drone strikes on Danube port installations critical for Kyiv's grain export caused damage and injuries[.]"
UPDATE (Friday): Okay, I knew I had a reason to be concerned about Russia's Avdiivka attacks:
Russian forces’ increased use of armored vehicles and aviation – alongside persistent simultaneous ground attacks – indicates that Russian forces are conducting an offensive effort more significant in scope and intent than ISW previously assessed on October 10 and October 11.[4] ISW is revising its assessment that Russian attacks around Avdiivka are local efforts intended solely to fix Ukrainian forces but is not prepared to assess the exact objectives and likely outcome of Russian efforts in the Avdiivka direction at this time.
The attack hasn't done more than push forward while the Russians suffered significant losses. Also, apparently (from another source on YouTube) Ukraine had to commit some reserves to that part of the front.
UPDATE (Friday): Has Ukraine been forced to severely ration shells for their British-supplied artillery? It seems odd. Wouldn't those be NATO standard 105mm rounds? Or are the American guns facing a similar shortage?
UPDATE (Friday): Ukraine says it struck two Russian warships with surface drones.
UPDATE (Saturday): It is interesting that Russia is increasing offensive operation intensity. Especially in Avdiivka. Russia's military is seemingly under intense political pressure to be on the offensive rather than sit on the strategic defensive and build up a sizable strategic reserve. Or maybe the military has such a fixation on the offensive that they can't help themselves.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
