Ukraine continues to be brutalized by Russia, although Russia has fought Ukraine to a perhaps fragile stalemate. Don't think a debate about what to give Russia is a way out of the war.
Russia seems more active in using new military power in new piecemeal assaults on large sections of the front. It seems designed to achieve political goals in Moscow rather than military goals. in Ukraine.
On the other side of the line Ukraine will, as I hoped they would do a year ago, continue their offensive through the fall and into the winter. Ukraine now understands what even a weakened Russia can do with time. The defensive belt built by Russia in the last winter and spring that Ukraine has been unable to shatter in the summer is Exhibit A.
But the Ukrainian failure to achieve a big win is getting Westerners to glance around for the exits. Fighting the bigger enemy China is the current flavor of the exit strategy.
Russia is deepening its bow to its China master as Russia flails in the west. So sure:
The only genuine option, then, is the West—principally, the United States. Only Washington and its partners can provide Russia with the commercial opportunities, technological cooperation, and geopolitical options that it needs to preserve its strategic autonomy and avoid becoming a permanent junior partner to China.
But appeasing China was Russia's choice. And helping Russia break free from China's grip must not be done by feeding Putin victims in the west. That's a path to regular meals. Saving Russia rests on Putin's survival instincts--not on the West's willingness to sacrifice others. Putin has to make hard decisions to cut his losses in the west and pivot east before it is too late.
I worry that attempts to "understand" Russia flow too easily into rewarding Russia for aggression.
Mind you, after Russia is clearly defeated, those opportunities can be considered. I've said as much, in a potentially more extreme form. Although the longer Russia persists in destroying Ukraine, the less willing I am to give them a territorial fig leaf--even land that could be a Russian Trojan Horse given who lives there if brought back into Ukraine--to cover defeat. Especially since Ukrainian victory is less certain now.
But we're far from that point of admitting Ukraine can do no more. Yes, a war of attrition can peter out. Or one army can break and finally lose.
UPDATE (Monday): More on Russia's Avdiivka offensive effort.
UPDATE (Tuesday): This would be a good use for them:
Volodymyr Zelensky has hinted that US-supplied long-range ATACMS missiles were used to strike Russian helicopters in key airports controlled by Moscow’s forces.
Especially if they have cluster bomb warheads rather than the unitary warheads that would be more useful against bridges.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Apparent confirmation:
The Ukrainian military on Tuesday used U.S.-supplied longer-range missiles to strike nine Russian helicopters in eastern Ukraine, after Washington secretly shipped the weapons in recent weeks.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Russia will adapt but Ukraine will be able to exploit the ATACMS until Russia adapts. But it will likely weaken Russia's ability to use air power on the battlefield. Still, did America provide Ukraine with enough missiles to really exploit the gap before Russia adapts?
And this information:
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that units of the 120th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade, the 6th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade, and the 19th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade conducted combat readiness checks and combined arms exercises.
Notwithstanding Belarusian claims they won't enter the war, Putin continues to integrate Belarus into Russia. At what point does Russian control mean it can successfully push Belarus into entering the war and reopening the northern front? And brigades are having their readiness increased.
UPDATE (Saturday): Is Russia unfazed by high military casualties? Good question. But I think we need the Definitions Section here:
For Russia, every dead soldier in Ukraine constitutes a step towards victory and reclaiming the great power image of the country’s Soviet past.
Does "Russia" mean the people providing the dead soldiers or the leaders who might get "the Great" tacked on after their name in the Russian history books?
Russian leaders had believed Russians wouldn't tolerate high losses. That may have twisted their analysis of how hard Ukrainians would resist Russia's invasion. They may be pleasantly surprised that the Russian people have mutely accepted the war.
But in 1917, the Russian army drawn from a peasant
class presumably more compliant than modern Russians--who have fled Russia in large numbers to avoid being drafted--had enough of dying
in a losing war without supplies and weapons to fight. And while the author speaks of the appeal of "martyrdom" for Russians dying in war, even the Iranians saw their soldiers' morale break in 1987 and into 1988 after the slaughter they endured after Iraq invaded them in 1980--despite what I can only assume is a higher sense of martyrdom within Islam.
I think Putin is closer to Tsar Nicholas II than to Stalin in his ability to rally support or inspire fear in the trenches.
UPDATE (Saturday): Russia and Ukraine are having problems coordinating units larger than companies for effective offensive operations. This poses a dilemma for Ukraine over the winter:
If sustaining a high casualty rate suppresses Russia’s ability to regain the initiative, the question becomes whether Ukraine and its international partners can refine the training pipeline – better connecting training inside and outside of Ukraine – to enable Ukraine to exploit the opportunity in the spring. This is complicated by the need to keep up the pressure on Russian forces.
Ukraine discovered what happens when you leave the Russians alone over the fall, winter, and spring as Russia regrouped and built defensive belts. So Ukraine has to keep the Russian army deployed to resist Ukrainian attacks:
The winter once again poses an opportunity to maximise Russian losses. If Russian troops are drawn into the defence along a wide front, with Ukrainian troops pushing into opportunities rather than trying to break through defended areas, then Russian forces will be outside, getting wet and cold. If targeted strikes can degrade their logistics, then the limited training and fieldcraft of Russian forces can maximise climactic injuries. It is notable that Russian casualties last winter were exceedingly high, even when Russia had fires superiority.
Yet even a fatally weakened Russian army won't shatter without a big hit. Can Ukraine form that kind of a fist while breaking up Russian efforts to rebuild?
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
