Is the Winter War of 2022 doomed to become a drawn-out war of attrition?
Despite the apparent escalation of Ukraine's attacks in the south to achieve a breakthrough, confidence in the possibility of Ukrainian success is low in the West now. Ukraine might not conduct a successful counteroffensive this summer. If so, this is a problem:
This has become a war of endurance. Just as Putin must hope that Ukraine and its Western supporters will tire before Russia does, Ukraine and its backers must show that they can cope with the war’s demands for as long as necessary.
Pushing Ukraine to take the offensive may well do little more than help exhaust it and raise casualties. A war that many in the United States seem to tactically predict will somehow largely end this year, may also go on and on until one side breaks in the face of the strain and attrition or both sides become locked into a near stalemate that neither side knows how to win.
He thinks it may be dangerous for Ukraine to risk its military power in a futile effort to liberate territory now. I can't say he's wrong. But I can't say that Russia isn't teetering with nothing but a facade of confidence (maskirovka*) concealing their brittleness.
If Ukraine can't achieve that Saratoga-level of victory, Western support for Ukraine might shift to simply helping Ukraine hold the line--with the risks of that kind of nuanced calculations on what is enough--rather than pushing Russia back further. NATO's financial, economic, and military stockpile expenditures might shift away from helping Ukraine win in favor of a ceasefire that actually rescues Russia from the worst costs of its invasion.
The stakes are high. Will that lead Ukraine to be too cautious out of fear of failure? Or possibly too bold in an attempt to achieve victory before it is too late?
Sadly, ordinary leaders often prefer the former decision to not lose because responsibility doesn't obviously fall on your decision. Outstanding leaders can risk the decision to win.
I've said Russia's size and GDP advantage over Ukraine don't automatically mean Russia has the edge. Ukraine has the West's GDP adding heft. And a 3:1 population advantage does not mean Russia can lose three times the soldiers in combat with equivalent results.
As to the will to win, it is often said Russia has more vital interests at stake so will outlast us.
But Ukraine has more will to win because its survival is at stake.
And while the West surely has lower interests than Russia, the burden on the wealthy West is relatively low financially. And no Western troops are fighting and dying. The West can't outlast Russia which is bleeding literally and financially?
While I worry the long-war people are right, I don't assume Ukraine can't achieve a big battlefield victory this summer. It probably wouldn't end the war. I think Ukraine's failure to attack by the winter may have forfeited that option by giving Russia valuable time.
But a battlefield victory would ease Ukraine's problems relative to Russia for a longer war. And keep in mind that a stalemate around the current lines is a Russian victory. It lets Russia regroup and prepare for another lunge into Ukraine in the future. Do that enough times and Ukraine will be conquered.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Strategypage is more optimistic about Ukraine's chances, noting the lack of Russian support for the frontline troops:
This lack of support has led to many Russian soldiers not fighting when ordered to attack or defend. The troops will prepare fortifications, operate artillery and plant mines and explosive devices, and this is what causes most Ukrainian casualties. The Ukrainian troops find fewer Russian soldiers actively attacking or even fighting back.
Russia has built formidable obstacles across the front. My hope has been that if Ukraine can push through the obstacles (fortifications, dragon's teeth, anti-tank ditches, minefields) that Russian troops will be less willing to fight. And may be less capable of maneuvering to respond to Ukrainian advances.
But Ukraine first has to push through the obstacles. That is proving more difficult than I thought it would be. I don't want to be deluded by my hopes that Russia's army is fragile. But I think its ground forces are fragile.
It all depends on whether Ukraine's offensive can crack the ground forces. If Ukraine can't, the fragility can't be exploited. Sadly, Ukraine gave Russia the precious time to build a hard shell to shield what I think are demoralized troops.
UPDATE (Thursday): The reason for the stalemate is that Ukraine has adapted to its inability to push through the minefields:
The New York Times on Wednesday reported that Ukrainian military commanders are now "focusing on wearing down the Russian forces with artillery and long-range missiles instead of plunging into minefields under fire."
That is plausible. Sometimes attrition is necessary to enable maneuver. But sometimes you fail. Fingers crossed.
UPDATE (Friday): Assessing the campaign. As I noted above, sometimes attrition is not an alternative to maneuver as it is necessary to enable maneuver. This is in American Army doctrine, I'll add. Also, I agree that the West needs to perceive what Ukraine achieves as a worthy result of the West's support.
NOTE: The image was made from DALL-E.
NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
*I'm embarrassed to notice recently that over time I seem to have dropped the 'k" and have remembered the term as "maskirova." My bad.
