The war looks static. Is it?
The Russians are holding firm with Ukraine only making relatively shallow gains since early June. Westerners are eager to see something positive on the ground but have been disappointed.
Ukraine appears to be weakening Russian forces holding the line with offensive action designed to use firepower to destroy Russian military power while minimizing Ukrainian losses. I suspect the Russians have few reserves beyond local reserves. So the stout defense may be a crust that relies on bluff to get the Ukrainians to give up even as they get close to winning.
I'm hoping that eventually Ukraine's efforts to erode Russia's ground forces without suffering too many losses of their own will lead to a crack in Russia's line and an opening for Ukraine to commit a good portion of their reserves to push through and advance. And I'm hoping that Russian morale and command and control will not be able to adapt to a fast-moving situation, leading to a collapse of Russian defensive cohesion as units try to escape.
In completely unrelated news, what's going on with the arrest or dismissal of various Russian commanders in some of the most effective ground forces in the war? Insubordination is in the air.
This well-known author thinks slow progress is no reason to declare failure. He sees this slow-moving Ukrainian assault as a phase to stretch the Russian defenders and undermine their logistics, with the hope Ukraine can commit their uncommitted reserves to quickly drive through the Russian lines:
Some units are now close to Russia’s main defence line, though most are not. We can note evidence of poor coordination between Russian units and how they often, but not always, lose out in small-scale engagements, but also that Russian defences have not yet buckled. This remains a tough and costly fight for Ukraine. During this attritional phase we can see the potential for progress but it has yet to be realised. Only when and if the strike phase is reached will we be able to measure Ukrainian progress on the map.
The Allies did this after landing at Normandy in 1944.* I can't say this pattern will hold true today. After all, the Allies had much more materiel superiority--including air superiority--to grind away despite suffering higher losses until the Allies could break out with speed.
On the other hand, the Germans were more skilled than the Russians are today. And maybe Ukraine's ground-based precision rockets can replace air power as long as Russia's aircraft are kept off of Ukraine's advancing armored forces.
Fingers crossed. I try very hard not to let my hopes exceed the facts. But the facts seem open to success or failure at this point. As war all too often is. And too many seem to be letting their hopes for proving their long-held positions that Russia can't lose (and that America is responsible for the war and not Russia) exceed the facts so far known.
What I can say is that Ukraine's tactics could work. Russia has suffered heavy losses already and I don't know what their breaking point is. On the other hand, Russia is buying time with their troops' lives. Eventually, Russia might buy enough time for the Ukrainians to run out of campaigning weather. And buy time for Russia to restore their army.
*After I wrote this, an American general cited the D-Day experience.
UPDATE (Monday): Ukraine apparently damaged the Kerch Strait bridge linking Crimea to Russian territory in new attacks. Does this mean Ukraine's counteroffensive is getting ready to scale up?
NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
