The Winter War of 2022 Tempts the West to Pursue "Peace"

Real peace only follows the absolute defeat of the enemy. Pursuing anything less simply gives the enemy more incentive--and opportunity--to win.

Did the West blow the opportunity to end the war quickly when Russia was at its weakest because of its slowness in making decisions to aid Ukraine and then its slowness in providing that aid?

This deficiency is being demonstrated at great cost in Ukraine’s current offensive. That Ukraine would need to be on the offensive by late 2022 was already acknowledged in assessments as early as April of that year. The capability requirements for such operations were becoming apparent from July, and reports to Western capitals were articulating clear training, equipment and support needs from September. Despite the requirements being known and understood, the decision to provide this support was not taken until January 2023, with the implementation of these decisions still in the process of being carried out.

I've certainly been calling for a Ukrainian counteroffensive as the fall and winter of 2022 and 2023 progressed. I've lamented the failure of the Ukrainians to exploit Russia's culminated offensive before Russia could mobilize new resources. This gave Russia the most precious commodity of all in war--time. Russia wasted resources but seemingly bought more time by throwing Wagner-recruited convicts (who died in large numbers) at Ukraine's Bakhmut during the winter and spring of 2023. 

And so far in the much-delayed counteroffensive, Ukraine is not using the good weather to drive the Russians back in large chunks. Oh, Ukraine is inflicting disproportionate losses on the Russians. And Ukraine does seem to be making accelerated progress in the south in recent weeks. Around Bakhmut it seems static. And in the east, Russia is periodically pushing forward with a heavy concentration of forces.

Perhaps with enough time Ukraine's southern progress will give Ukraine the opportunity to exploit Russian weaknesses to make dramatic gains.

The West's problem seems broader than simply deficient stockpiles to wage an extended war. Our governments can't produce enough rapid decisions and implement them rapidly to cope with reality. We have multiple alarms going off in our cockpit.

But I digress.

But the West expects more than it is seeing now--despite the modeling that NATO used that created those expectations--and continued support is implicitly linked to Ukraine proving it can win the war and lower Western expenses supporting Ukraine.

It may be tempting for the West to say that Ukraine can't win by driving the Russians out of Ukraine. The hope that Ukraine can be forced to fight for a draw is dangerous. Because once Russia knows NATO won't help Ukraine win, Russia has the valued knowledge that it can't lose on the battlefield because Russia controls the pace and scope of fighting. Which means if things get rough, Russia can scale back until it can ramp up the fighting again. And once the Ukrainians appreciate that NATO wants them to fight on to hold the line as long as Russia is willing to attack, Ukrainian morale may erode and then collapse. 

ISW judges Ukraine is still in this fight:

ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations are significantly degrading defending Russian forces and that the overall degradation of the Russian defensive line creates opportunities for any Ukrainian breakthrough to be potentially operationally significant. 

The problem is that reaching that operationally significant advance is taking time. Russia clearly thinks sacrificing lives to buy time until the campaign season ends is worth the price. And if that happens, Russia can hope to escape this war and try again later. When the West is distracted or undermined enough to keep it from supporting Ukraine to the same level.

A nuanced, negotiated settlement is not possible. The war has to be faced with the resolve that either we win or they win. And we need to try to win. With a sense of urgency.

UPDATE (Monday): Russia will gain with even a difficult victory over Ukraine. Exactly:

The best alternative to this bleak scenario is simple: to give Ukraine the weapons it needs to defeat Russia while putting real pressure on the Kremlin. Victory is still achievable. But we have to want it as much as the Ukrainians do.

UPDATE: (Wednesday): Prigozhin apparently died in a plane crash within Russia: 

Earlier, Wagner-linked Telegram channel Grey Zone reported the Embraer aircraft was shot down by air defences in the Tver region, north of Moscow.

I'm shocked. I assumed he'd fall out of a window. Do Prigozhin's fans wait patiently for their turn or take action to live? Tip to Instapundit.

UPDATE (Wednesday): Prigozhin's death is nothing to mourn. He and his Wagner mercenaries were monsters in Ukraine. And harmful in Africa and Syria. 

The question is whether his death is useful to the West. I wonder if his death in such a blatant manner--after Putin's apparent promise to let him live--will prompt Russians fearful of following Prigozhin to act against Putin. 

The lesson that if you strike a king you must kill him might be more dangerous than Prigozhin ever could have been.

UPDATE (Wednesday) Yeah:

Some [Russian] milbloggers claimed that Prigozhin’s assassination will have “catastrophic consequences” and that this incident is a lesson that one must always continue going until the end – implying that Prigozhin should have continued his march on Moscow.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.