It would be comforting to think Western military forces could conduct maneuver warfare despite the stalemate that the Winter War of 2022 has settled into. Is this the nature of war with current technology and tactics?
Honestly, the stalemate in the Winter War of 2022 has surprised me:
A new phase of the war is coming. I don't believe it will be stalemate given the often low force-to-space ratio along much of the front lines that look so solid when drawn on a map. The images of firepower-heavy slow-moving trench warfare around Severodonetsk obscure that reality. But I don't know what the new phase will be.
Other than Russia's initial thrusts that exploited surprise and some traitors plus Ukraine's surprise Kharkiv front counteroffensive that rapidly gained ground, the war has been a grinding war of attrition. Russia's army wasn't very good so that was a good excuse for its slow gains after the initial advances. But so far Ukraine is failing, too. Are Russia's fortification belts the reason? Is it the fault of the West's slowness in arming Ukraine? Are the Ukrainians too used to fighting on defense to shift to major attacks? Would NATO armies with ample air support do much better against the Russians?
I have to now assume that Ukraine's survival of Russia's invasion was a close-run thing considering that Ukraine had no reserves for a major counteroffensive since September 2022. I'm guessing my pre-war estimation of what Russia could do with an actual invasion--not the parade Russia initially tried--was probably not far off at all. I kept assuming Ukraine held a strategic reserve as Russia sledgehammered forward slowly. Apparently not. And the delay to build that reserve force gave Russia time to call up new troops and to build defensive belts in their conquests.
Is there such a high firepower-to-space ratio that stalemate
is the default with current technology and tactics? I suspected that might have been the case in the late Cold War era on the central front centered on West Germany. Troop density on the battlefield may have fallen much farther, but firepower may have expanded its reach even more. I can't say I've read anything on this issue for the Winter War of 2022.
Or maybe a successful Ukrainian deep offensive after an initial attrition phase--which Ukrainian troops are doing--will vindicate my early view that we are not doomed to see stalemate in this war:
Philip M. Breedlove, a retired four-star Air Force general who was NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe, said in an interview. “If they were to get through the first, second or third lines of defense, I think you’re going to see the definition of combined arms.”
But that's a big "if" that hangs out there. I can't tell if Ukraine is about to meet that condition for success.
Delay--as necessary as it may have been to build the counteroffensive force--means Ukraine has a tough job to liberate their territory:
"It must break through dense, well-prepared defensive positions, find some running room, and then either move quickly toward an important geographic objective such as the Sea of Azov, hoping to unravel the remains of the defending Russian army along the way, or quickly attempt to encircle a portion of Russia’s sizable forces in hopes of annihilating them."
We can readily see that Ukraine has not successfully started that sequence. Does that mean Ukraine can't?
I keep two things in mind. One, Russia is good at hiding weakness.
And two, that skill enhances Kipling's observation:
Man cannot tell but Allah knows
How much the other side was hurt.
Remember, that kind of perception fog led a lot of Americans to view the Iraq War as a "fiasco" right up
until a "gamble" gave us victory. [Yes, we won.]
We may be drawing too many early conclusions within the fog of war.
UPDATE (Monday): Wow. Ask and I shall receive:
In Ukraine some 350,000 Russian troops are arrayed on a front line stretching 1,200 km (750 miles) – around 300 men per km and, at times last year, less than half that. That is around a tenth of the average for the same area in the second world war, notes Chirstopher Lawrence, head of the Dupuy Institute, which collects such data. Battalions of several hundred men fill areas that would once have been covered by brigades of a few thousand.
In theory, say Mr. Lawrence, this seems a ripe environment for attackers. Thin front lines are easier to break through. And new sensors, more accurate munitions and better digital networks make it easier to find and strike targets. The catch is that attackers must concentrate their forces to pierce well-defended front lines, as Ukraine is now trying to do with its counter-offensive. And such concentrations can be detected and struck 0- not always, but more often than in the past…
I missed that Economist article. The troop density is why I didn't expect a static front. The firepower may be the reason it is.
Then again, as I noted, the front has been static except when it wasn't. The initial Russian drives toward Kiev and out of Crimea; the Russian withdrawals from Kiev and Kherson; and the Ukrainian Kharkiv counteroffensive. Will Ukraine add another example to the "exceptions"?
UPDATE (Wednesday): As Ukraine seeks to adjust its counteroffensive, is the Kherson front an option while the weather is good? Months ago I speculated about Ukraine building underwater bridges across the Dnieper River to sustain an offensive there if the Russian fortifications belt on the Zaporizhia front proved too strong.
UPDATE (Thursday): Russian offensive actions seem more elevated in the east lately. Although still no significant gains.
UPDATE (Friday): Another discussion of the stalemated front. Yeah, I'll repeat that Russia used the time since autumn 2022 well to prepare a fortifications belt and rebuild their shattered army.
But again, while attrition may be necessary now, that doesn't mean a successful attrition campaign won't open up options for maneuver.
NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
