Russia's offensive and Ukraine's current counteroffensive are not conforming to our models of how war unfolds.
The Winter War of 2022 has been very different than what was expected:
One of the main reasons experts believed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would be fast is that they focused mostly on what would happen when the Russian and Ukrainian armies exchanged fire on the battlefield. In doing so, they put a huge emphasis on the weapons that each side had at its disposal—an area where Russia had a clear advantage. Moscow’s firepower exceeded Kyiv’s in quantity and, before the conflict began, in quality.
Yeah, garbage in, garbage out.
Even though I was not fooled by Russian boasts and Western panty-flinging, I over-estimated what Russia could do. To be fair, I assumed Russia would start with a firepower-driven hammer and not resort to that after their parade was destroyed.
And
despite the West helping Ukraine wargame their counteroffensive
options, Ukraine's results have not matched expectations.
Remember, the stalled Ukrainian counteroffensive had to be reconfigured notwithstanding all the wargaming that NATO helped Ukraine carry out to model their counteroffensive on. What failed in predicting Russia's invasion has failed in Ukraine's current counteroffensive.
Is this intrinsic or a problem of who is fighting? Hard to say. I've worried since the Cold War that the firepower-to-space ratio is so high that stalemate is the norm. But I thought the troop-to-space ratio was so low that a competent military could conduct maneuver operations. Seriously, Russia has concentrated much of their troop strength in Luhansk:
[If estimates of Russian losses and mobilization are correct, that puts] Russian manpower on or near the frontline as high as 200,000 people. And if a recent estimate from the Kyiv Independent is accurate, the Kremlin has concentrated perhaps half that force in and around Kreminna for the countercounteroffensive.
Yes, Ukraine had to send some of its reserve brigades to bolster that front. But I figured that was a possibility. More to the point, that means the Russian lines on the rest of the front are amazingly thin.
So far we may have solid tactical lessons and weapon performance data from the war. Operational lessons may have to wait until the war is over. Is the biggest lesson going to be that the best strategy is to strike first with surprise and a big numerical advantage, grab territory while it is relatively easy, then go over to the strategic defense to dare an enemy to throw themselves at your robust defenses until they accept their territorial losses?
UPDATE: This may or may not be true:
Weeks into Ukraine’s highly anticipated counteroffensive, Western officials describe increasingly “sobering” assessments about Ukrainian forces’ ability to retake significant territory, four senior US and western officials briefed on the latest intelligence told CNN.
I am worried. But right now I want to know why there weren't sobering assessments before the offensive after NATO extensively helped Ukraine wargame their counteroffensive options. Because I don't recall doubts before the attacks kicked off.
NOTE: The image was made from DALL-E.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
