One, did Ukraine's President Poroshenko spark the crisis to increase his low favorability ratings ahead of 2019 elections?
Or maybe Putin is worried about his approval ratings and that is why he escalated the war by attacking the vessels openly after his subliminal campaigns to seize Crimea and parts of the Donbas in the east where to this day Putin denies Russia did anything at all.
But there are military reasons for these actions. Russia's economy and Putin's popularity are threatened by a not-so-frozen conflict that Russians don't want to die for. And Ukraine seems to be making very slow progress in grinding away at Russian control.
So Russia may feel they need to escalate to win and escape Western sanctions and the war of attrition. And escalating at sea by imposing a stealth blockade of Ukraine's Sea of Azov coast escalates in an area of clear Russian superiority--naval and air power--rather than on land where Russia would suffer significant losses if the war escalates or broadens on land.
Although if Russia does escalate on land, my thoughts from early 2014 are still relevant.
And Ukraine knows it will suffer if they quietly go along with the blockade. They need to break it and they need Western help to do it. So a confrontation makes sense from their point of view.
Of course, Ukraine wants an escalation only to highlight Russian actions because an escalation to an open war at sea will expose all of Ukraine's coastline to potential blockade. Ukraine just wants an escalation to gain Western help for non-military means to break the Russian blockade of the Sea of Azov.
But there is a bigger and more important aspect of the war here. If Poroshenko isn't thinking strategy and is just thinking politically, Ukraine's parliament isn't going along:
So when Mr. Poroshenko asked Parliament on Nov. 26 for far-reaching powers under martial law, he got plenty of push-back. Instead of circling the wagons against Russia, lawmakers rushed to defend their democracy.
In the end, martial law was granted only in selected regions bordering on Russia and only for 30 days. Poroshenko was forced to assert that constitutional freedoms would not be limited and that daily life, such as banking, would not be disrupted. And yes, the election would proceed.
Unless Poroshenko is planning a significant escalation on land--or perhaps beginning rocket and missile barrages against the prize of of Putin's Ukraine adventure, his Crimean military bases, to pressure Russia on the Sea of Azov--I'd worry that the corruption-abiding president had non-military goals in mind.
Right now, Ukraine faces more problems internally than from Russia:
The problem is that Ukraine isn’t doing much to help itself. The 2014 Russian invasion helped unite Ukrainians — even Russian–speaking ones — behind a genuine sense of nationhood. National day rallies in Russo-phone Kharkov and Dnipropetrovsk have attracted record turnouts, their squares filled with a sea of yellow and blue Ukrainian flags. Without Crimea or the pro-Moscow populations of the separatist Donbass, the electoral maths of Ukraine has swung unequivocally westward. But instead of implementing the pro-European, reformist hopes of Maidan, the country remains an economic basket case whose economy, media and politics are dominated by a tiny group of warring oligarchs.
This does not diminish the crimes of Putin in invading and dismembering Ukraine. But to win the war Ukraine needs to get its own house in order. It has not.
Because as I've warned, if Ukraine fails to tackle corruption to really join the West in practice rather than just have a common anti-Russian policy, Ukraine is doomed to defeat as just a smaller and weaker version of Russia:
Ukraine needs to do more to fight corruption and the West needs to help/push Ukraine to build rule of law.
As I've mentioned more than once, if Ukraine remains just a smaller version of Russia, Ukraine will lose their struggle to remain independent of Russian domination or outright control.
Only by becoming more like the West can Ukraine build the economic and military power to remain a free country, just as a free West built on rule of law defeated the USSR.
Remember, Russia is fine with a corrupt Ukraine. It allowed Russia to weaken and dominate Ukraine's government before 2014, and it will allow Russia to buy influence and control in Ukraine once again.
Stalemate, even tilted toward Ukraine as I noted in this post, in the Donbas won't matter if the real fight for Ukraine takes place in the secret bank accounts of Ukrainian officials and business people.
This February it will be 5 years since Russian special forces appeared in Crimea as the famous "little green men" who nearly bloodlessly seized Crimea from a revolution-wracked Ukraine unable to resist. If another 5 years go by without Ukraine making progress in achieving rule of law, we might be speaking about "the Ukraine" again.
It may be a race between whether Russia tires of the subliminal war first or whether Ukraine breaks down first. But the consequences for losing this contest are far more dire for Ukraine. Ukraine needs to break their corruption's hold on Ukraine before they can break Russia's hold on the Sea of Azov--or regain their lost territory.
UPDATE: Martial law in border regions so far doesn't seem to be doing much to increase Ukrainian warfighting capacity:
Martial law came into effect in 10 Ukrainian oblasts on Nov. 28, but the Ministry of Defense and General Staff have so far reported very few changes to the nation’s defenses as parts of the country go to full war footing.
Although it is early yet, the purpose eludes me given the war will be 5 years old in February and there hasn't been a need for martial law yet.
We'll see if there is an actual Ukrainian military action that needed this or whether it was all about an election battle.
