This isn't a huge shift but it does signify a significant shift in priorities:
The Department of Defense announced today the realignment of Counter-Violent Extremist Organization personnel operating in U.S. Africa Command to support priorities outlined in the National Defense Strategy. Over the next several years, the realignment projects a reduction of less than 10 percent of the 7,200 military forces serving in Africa Command.
Optimization preserves the majority of U.S. security cooperation partnerships and programs in Africa to strengthen partner networks, enhance partner capability and support ongoing programs. C-VEO activities in several areas, including Somalia, Djibouti and Libya largely remain the same. In other regions, such as West Africa, emphasis shifts from tactical assistance to advising, assisting, liaising, and sharing intelligence.
Keep in mind that 10% compares the kinetic special forces operators to the total force in Africa. So citing the percent of the total force of all military forces in Africa is misleading.
C-VEO, by the way, stands for countering violent extremist organizations (to avoid saying "jihadis"). Although technically there are non-jihadi problems.
Ideally, the training missions that have been ongoing for a while have strengthened local government forces to make the 700 American special forces unneeded. Army initiatives to use regular Army troops on training missions that special forces traditionally engage in will reduce the need. New drone bases will multiply the effects of those left, too.
And with fewer special forces on the ground, I've suggested a mobile reserve force based on my AFRICOM Queen idea of a power projection asset using a container ship equipped with military equipment housed in standard shipping containers.
Being mobile will allow the fewer American special forces--backed by conventional infantry and fire support--to strike with surprise and move to reinforce local security forces battling jihadis.
With assets being directed away from Africa, does AFRICOM think they will get higher on the list for Navy amphibious assets?
UPDATE: The 4,500-strong G5 force in the Sahel is one local asset that is up and running now that may make the redeployment of American special forces less of a problem for fighting jihadis.
