As that article indicates:
Traditionally, the PLA has been dominated by the ground forces and organized with large infantry armies to defend against invasion along its long land borders, as well as serve as the ultimate guarantor of internal stability.
China's military had been a lump of proletarian fury designed to be a sponge that absorbs an invasion until the invaders are exhausted.
A Chinese military that is smaller and higher tech makes it more formidable but it becomes a small force that cannot endure casualties and replace losses as easily as it could do when giving some peasants rifles, grenades, and mortars was all you needed to be a sponge. What kill ratio would the invaders need to achieve to defeat that kind of enemy?
So now if China's better army is beaten in battle, they lose a lot of combat power for quite some time because of the difficulty of replacing a higher quality military.
This change from a large poorly trained and equipped but stubborn and resilient peasant army to a high tech force gives the United States Army a new opening to be a major factor in the Asia-Pacific region, as I explore in this Military Review article, "The Tyranny of the Shores."
One could even envision opportunities on the Chinese mainland short of an invasion (the People's Armed Police in theory could provide the bulk infantry to resist an invasion).
If the landing was a raid designed to really tear up Chinese power projection assets or to set up temporary bases to enable deeper air raids or to shield military operations in the littorals, the Army could have a role on the Chinese mainland.
Indeed, what if there was civil war within China that provided local allies to support?
I still think there are more options around China's periphery in support of allies for the most part that could justify a major Army role not focused on being a naval and air defense auxiliary.
And given the combat experience of the Army, America may have the greatest advantage, quality-wise, in the land domain rather than in the air or at sea. Assuming we re-balance from the long counter-insurgent focus of this century to major combat operations, of course. Which our national defense strategy commits America to doing.
Mind you, I did not in that article and am not advocating an invasion of China. But I do think that a refusal to plan for using the Army for its core function of large-scale combat operations simplifies China's military planning and allows them to focus on air and naval power.
