The Army has a long history of fighting in the Asia-Pacific region in strength. But today the Army seems left out of military strategy except as an auxiliary that could provide some land-based anti-ship or air defense capabilities to help the Navy. That must change in the multi-domain battle concept to avoid simplifying potential enemy worries.
The Army's dwindling peacetime presence in Asia is down to a single combat brigade when in my lifetime I can remember a corps of two divisions holding the line in South Korea.
Certainly, the combination of growing South Korean capabilities and rotting North Korean military capabilities means that the Army is increasingly less than a needed decisive force on the peninsula to defeat the North Koreans.
Yet the Army has provided large-scale forces for the Pacific in Vietnam, Korea, and World War II (here's my reminder from the Guadalcanal campaign that generally credits the Marines as the land force there that the Army provided a corps by the end).
Military Review just published in the March-April issue an article of mine ("The Tyranny of the Shores: Army Planning for the Asia-Pacific Theater") that argues for including the Army's core competency--large-scale combat operation--in planning for the Asia-Pacific theater.*
Not that I anticipate, want, or think such a war is desirable either against China or Russia. But by failing to contemplate such an Army contribution in its core competency of land warfare we simplify the enemy's concerns which allows an enemy to discount the Army to focus on defeating the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
My concern is that ground power is recognized as part of a joint force but is discarded in practice when thinking about Asia-Pacific security.
The Army could achieve real results in a limited objective and limited duration campaign inside China even though the Army can't conquer China; and better results would be possible on China's periphery which may allow the Army to support allies and friends, that have their own armies, in a multi-national campaign.
Bottom line: true multi-domain dominance includes the possibility of using the Army to its full potential on a larger scale to gain true synergy in the all the domains.
For another view that sees an Army role in the Pacific far smaller than what I envision as possible, the previous edition of Military Review has an article that may be of interest.
Those are certainly possible valuable levels of contribution. And depending on the circumstances they be perfectly good. It is quite possible that under the circumstances we might find ourselves in that no large-scale Army campaign will make sense for our objectives.
I just don't understand why a larger role is ruled out. China should have to worry about the Army.
*And for those who think this is a recent reaction to China's rise, let me note that I wrote the first version of this article the year before the 9/11 attacks. There were other versions since then approaching the issue from different directions until this version made it. Persistence counts, I guess.
NOTE: I added the map from the article several weeks later.
