Okay:
Rather than sacrificing American values and interests, Washington should drop its fantasy expectations and establish a more realistic relationship with Erdoğan.
But what does that mean in practice?
I'm fully on board quietly pulling our nukes out of Turkey to prevent Erdogan from seizing them (for just the raw materials even if Turkey could never use them); refusing to sell Turkey advanced F-35s that Turkey could let Russia examine (sell them "monkey" versions way scaled back in critical technology and capabilities); downgrading intelligence sharing with Turkey; keeping Turkey out of the most sensitive parts of the alliance structure; and seeking alternatives to Incirlik air base in Turkey.
But I wouldn't eject Turkey from NATO. And I would try to bolster the still-present pro-American forces inside Turkey to strengthen them rather than abandon them and give them no choice but to submit to Erdogan's Islamist drive.
The relationship is not all bad and we shouldn't try to make the it all bad.One day Erdogan will be gone and we want a core of pro-American factions in Turkey to strengthen and rebuild the alliance.
I don't want to walk away and give Russia a free hand to open up the Turkish straits to secure the path between the Crimea base complex and the eastern Mediterranean Sea.
We need to contain the damage and work the problem for long-term benefit.
Also, I'm not sure why the first author is so sure that Russia would never attack a NATO ally.
