I've argued that we should send arms to the rebels in Syria, although I'd withhold surface-to-air missiles on the reasoning that Syria's air power isn't that decisive and that the risk of such hand-held missiles leaking to terrorists is too great.
Gates agrees on the shipping list:
He advocated identifying credible partners within the Syrian opposition and increasing support, including weapons — but not surface-to-air missiles, which could be seized by militants for terrorist acts against civilian aviation.
Mind you, heavy machine guns or even 23mm anti-aircraft weapons would still be useful against helicopters--and even induce some caution for aircraft pilots. So the rebels would have some capacity to fight Assad's air power even without hand-held SAMs.
So come on, open up the spigot to arm the more reasonable rebels. This will bolster their morale, potentially reverse the brawn drain to the jihadi groups who attract Syrians who want to fight Assad even if Islamism isn't their thing, and put the Russians and Assad in a tough position regarding implementing the chemical weapons deal.
That is, if the Russians and Assad think the deal saves Assad, will they really go through with the deal at all? Make them squirm as they decide what to do about this dilemma.
Shoot, insist we must have exclusive use of Syrian air space to monitor chemical weapons sites or the deal is off! That would keep the Syrian air force off of the rebels' backs, no?
And allow civilian transport planes in or out of Syria only if they land in Turkey, Cyprus, or Jordan on the way in or on the way out for inspections we can trust (sorry, Iraq, but you know it is true) to keep aid for Assad's regime from reaching Syria.
Give us the excuse to declare Assad in material breach of the accord. If this diplomatic track isn't just another means to achieve the objective of making Assad go, as President Obama once declared, what is the point? Is the concept of harming our enemies (and no, Republicans in Congress don't count) really so hard to grasp?
We scored on our own goal with this deal. But we can still win the game.
UPDATE: I think we are too ready to say Syria has met the first deadline. One, how can we know so early that Assad has made a full disclosure? Are we simply assuming that since Assad reported more than we thought he would (as a senior administration official says) that it is complete and meets the declaration requirement?
“We were pleasantly surprised by the completeness of their declaration,” said the official, who declined to be identified because he was not authorized to speak publicly on the matter.
“It was better than expected,” he added.
That statement is not encouraging. It implies that we were prepared to accept far less as an acceptable level of cooperation, doesn't it?
Look, this is a bad deal. But we can still try to implement it right by insisting that Assad dots every 'i" and crosses every "t" on the timetable we set. At best, we get rid of Assad's chemical weapons and do clear the deck for really dealing with Assad (which is why I don't think Assad or Russia are serious) and at worst we get out of the deal by making Assad break it.
