RAND has a study out on that war (tip to DID). This struck me in particular:
Ground forces fared little better [than their air force] in their efforts to conduct combined arms operations in 2006 southern Lebanon. Tanks were distributed piecemeal in two-vehicle teams and attached to infantry units whose commanders had, in some cases, no idea how to employ them appropriately. The vehicles often advanced at a dismounted infantryman’s pace to provide security for the foot soldiers. On other occasions, tanks sat stationary for hours during village-defense missions. Former armor officers in particular decried these as inappropriate employments of the Merkava; one noted that the only penetrations of tank armor were in the rear, the vehicles’ most vulnerable spot and one difficult to strike if they maneuvered properly. The arguments have merit. A stationary or slowly moving tank is far easier to engage than one moving at a rapid pace. Vehicles sitting in built-up areas are particularly vulnerable; the considerable concealment permits an enemy—one more familiar with the terrain than the infantry tasked with protecting the tank—opportunity to stalk its prey without detection. The consequences were severe, as noted by retired IDF Brigadier General Gideon Avidor: “Sixty-two percent of our tanks were hit. They were hit from villages that we ‘controlled,’ because we went in and just held a few houses rather than truly controlling the village.” The bold maneuvers of 1967, 1973, and 1982 were little in evidence at either the tactical or operational level of war. Overcaution and static defense of hilltop village positions replaced the sweeping actions that were once the symbol of Israeli ground operations.
This is embarrassing for the heirs to blitzkrieg. From 1967 to 1982, the Israelis showed how armor could be used in wars of movement. In 2006, the Israelis forgot that the tank isn't just a mobile bunker. They forgot that the engine and tracks are a weapons system itself that is wasted if not used.
In addition, the report discusses how conventional training up and down the line was virtually ignored as Israelis trained for low-intensity conflict against Palestinian unrest. The Israelis carried out what some here want us to do--training for counter-insurgency instead of major combat operations because we are so superior in conventional operations that nobody will challenge us in that area--and found that a small nonstate opponent outfought the Israelis.
The ability of our well-trained troops to carry out the surge offensive in Iraq because they were simply excellent soldiers (and Marines) rather than excellent low-intensity troops should demonstrate that so-called reformers have it exactly backwards. We needed officers who knew the COIN doctrine so they could give the proper orders. But the tasks needed for COIN are tasks that any good soldier can do because they are good soldiers.
The Israelis can at least be thankful that they learned this lesson against a small enemy incapable of exploiting Israeli weakness and advancing into Israel itself.
Like I've written, I think the Israelis have learned the lesson of that war. I think a new war in Lebanon will see Israeli forces--armored and airborne--pushing deep into Lebanon to control the ground where rockets can be fired at Israeli cities; and to destroy Hezbollah rear areas to degrade their ability to regenerate their military capabilities.
With Syria out of the Hezbollah support business due to pressing concerns internally, Israel has a real opportunity to quiet the threat from southern Lebanon for a good amount of time.
I hope our military's conviction that we need to restore our unbalanced ground forces (unbalanced out of necessity to win the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns) to full-spectrum capability (peacekeeping to major combat operations) won't be wrecked by budget cuts and so-called deep thinkers who want us to prepare for low-intensity conflict as the primary mission. That just prepares us for full-spectrum defeat.
