So there are 100,000 rebels fighting in Syria:
Opposition forces battling Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria now number around 100,000 fighters, but after more than two years of fighting they are fragmented into as many as 1,000 bands.
The new study by IHS Jane's, a defence consultancy, estimates there are around 10,000 jihadists - who would include foreign fighters - fighting for powerful factions linked to al-Qaeda.
Another 30,000 to 35,000 are hardline Islamists who share much of the outlook of the jihadists, but are focused purely on the Syrian war rather than a wider international struggle.
There are also at least a further 30,000 moderates belonging to groups that have an Islamic character, meaning only a small minority of the rebels are linked to secular or purely nationalist groups.
The 10,000 jihadis fits past estimates I've heard.
The 100,000 total figure is 20,000 higher than estimates I've read in the recent past. So if nothing else this shows that the rebels are not being crushed.
Paired with the problems that Assad has in keeping a loyal military in the fight and it is apparent why I do not think Assad is winning this war.
Assad seems to have about 50,000 loyal army troops. There at at least that many shaky troops kept on base and mostly under the watchful eye of loyal forces. Add in 50,000 secret police types, and that's the core force, as near as I can make out.
Assad recruited 60,000 militia earlier in the year but they have taken heavy casualties--heavier than the army considering that the army has been fighting for far longer than the militias. Assuming Assad continues to recruit to replace losses, we're up to 160,000.
Hezbollah adds perhaps a few thousand and then there is the Shia Foreign Legion that Iran is paying for. I don't know how many they are. If we are generous and call these foreigners 10,000, Assad has 170,000 loyal ground forces to fight.
Air force and air defense troops (100,000 pre-civil war, including reserves) can defend their bases, I assume. So maybe you could say that these represent 20,000 static defense troops at air bases and air defense sites. I'm just guesstimating, here.
So Assad has perhaps 190,000 total forces of varying quality to fight 100,000 rebels. That's not enough. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, our side has had more than 20 times the number of estimated enemy trigger pullers.
While the strength of Islamists in the rebels' forces is extremely worrisome, you can say that the rebel morale is probably better than the government forces' morale.
The estimate of up to 35,000 Islamists separate from the jihadis is troublesome. But this factor doesn't seem to have dissuaded Israel from coming out in favor of overthrowing the Assad regime.
Then there are 30,000 moderates in groups that have an "Islamic character." I'm not sure what that means since virtually all of Syria's population has an Islamic character.
So only 25,000 rebels are left to be secular or nationalist.
But that isn't so bad. We never faced more than that number in Iraq or Afghanistan.
So focus on arming, training, and assisting those 25,000 rebels.
Since the appeal of the more Islamist (and jihadi) groups has been their effectiveness in battle (which has meant they attract foreign arms or seize them more often from the government), arming the secular and nationalist groups can be expected to reverse the appeal of the Islamists. So this 25% of the rebels could grow with new recruits and at the expense of the groups we aren't arming.
Then look for some of the groups with Islamic character to move away from that outlook in exchange for arms, training, and assistance. If they are losing people to the secular and nationalist groups we help, they will have incentive to move away from an Islamic character.
And once the non-Islamists and non-jihadis are more effective, it will be easier to pressure our Arab allies into reducing support for these Islamist elements.
It isn't too shocking that the Islamists are the most important element right now. They fight the hardest and so get more results and attract recruits and arms. In World War II, the most effective resistance fighters against the Nazis were communists. Is it any wonder that communists were so strong in post-World War II Western Europe?
So don't let fear of arms leaking to jihadis stop us from arming rebels. I wouldn't send anti-aircraft missiles just to be safe (and because I don't think the weak Syrian air power justifies that risk), but anti-tank weapons, light mortars and rockets, recoilless rifles, mines, communications gear, and medical supplies are all things that have great battlefield utility without being much of a weapon for terrorist operations--at least in the sense that they can be gotten anywhere and so we wouldn't add to the terrorist shopping opportunities.
Most importantly, don't fixate on the fall of Assad as the end state we seek. The fall of Assad should be one step in making sure that secular and nationalist forces dominate Syria after Assad is driven from power. So prepare for the post-Assad struggle.
And once we've reached this stage, I will reverse my feelings about committing our air power to Syria. If we can use drones and conventional air power to hammer jihadi groups while the post-Assad fight rages, I think we should do that.
If we won't arm non-jihadi rebels, we pretty much guarantee that the outcome of the civil war will be bad--either Assad wins or jihadis win. How smart is that?
UPDATE: I noticed that last summer the rebels were estimated to have 40,000 fighters. At the time I thought this meant that there were 4,000 full-time shooters and 36,000 part-timers. Now that I know the casualties that the Syrian government forces have endured in the war, this must have been an estimate of the full-time shooters.
Assad simply did not turn the tide of war this summer despite press reports that he had. Assad may believe that a chemical deal will buy time and demoralize rebels; and with time he can outlast the rebellion, but I think he is probably wrong--especially if we reassure the rebels that we will still help them defeat Assad.
