For a large country fighting a much smaller target, Russia is not generating the manpower superiority you'd think it could.
Ukraine has been counter-attacking around Pokrovsk and Toretsk. Russia's offensive efforts seem limited to Ukraine's Kursk salient, where renewed attacks including North Korean troops with better tactical capabilities have pinched out much of the salient. Unless Ukraine can mount serious counter-attacks, it will lose its territory bargaining chip. America's brief assistance "pause" was not reciprocated with Russian restraint. Indeed, Putin has rejected the America-Ukraine proposal for a ceasefire prior to talks with conditions that amount to compelling Ukraine to surrender. That's big talk from someone whose major military asset is enduring casualties.
In that light, this is an interesting bit of information:
The 2025 Military Balance records 450,000 Russian forces in Ukraine. They provide overall figures for the Russian Army of 550,000, Naval Infantry 10,000 and Airborne 35,000. They also report 20,000 in private military companies. Around 21,000 are reported deployed from Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova and in the Middle East and Africa). So a maximum total available ground strength of 594,000.
The 2025 Military Balance gives Ukrainian Army strength as 500,000, Marine Corps at 30,000 and Airborne Assault Troops at 45,000 for a total ground strength of 575,000. This is not counting Territorial Defense Forces and National Guard.
It should be no shock that Russian manpower is not unlimited:
The number of soldiers that the Russians were able to maintain at the front seemed to peak in the spring and summer of 2024, above 650,000. By the end of the year, it had fallen closer to 600,000, despite the extraordinary bonuses that the Russian government offers new recruits, amounting to about two and a half times the average annual Russian salary in 2023.
Russian casualties have mounted steadily. According to the British Ministry of Defence, in December 2022, they stood at roughly 500 a day; in December 2023, at just under 1,000; and in December 2024, at more than 1,500. In 2024 alone, Russia suffered nearly 430,000 killed and wounded, compared with just over 250,000 in 2023.
The author cites the impressive German 1918 offensive on the Western Front that gained ground at a high cost. And ultimately weakened the German army fatally.
Although of course, unlike Ukraine (apparently), the Allies had the reserves to exploit that weakness by launching a counteroffensive. Or does Ukraine have such a reserve, as I speculated/hoped last week?
Note, too, that early on I cited the 1980s Iran-Iraq War to refute the notion that Russia's size makes victory over Ukraine inevitable. Iran paused its offensives periodically to rebuilt capacity. Russia could do that, too, rather than attack lemming-like until it runs out of men and materiel.
Of note, Iraq finally defeated Iran after building up the Republican Guard capital (and regime) protection force into a multi-division reserve force. When signs of Iranian morale collapsing emerged, Iraq unleashed its reserves to exploit the cracked morale.
I've noted that I feel Russia is trying to create an image of overwhelming and relentless ground power to demoralize Ukraine and more importantly, the West. But since Russia has the initiative, it can hold sections with fewer troops to concentrate troops in certain sections of the front to maintain a sizable advantage in numbers in order to attack and grind forward. The August 2024 Ukrainian Kursk incursion demonstrates what can be achieved against those "quiet" Russian sectors.
Based on the initial link, Russian ground formations have 615,000 men. Minus 21,000 in Armenia and the rest. So that's 594,000 men available. Minus 450,000 inside Ukraine. So 144,000 free troops left. Plus there are 40,000 inside Russia attacking the Ukrainian-held Kursk salient. So Russia has 104,000 troops for the rest of Russia. Unless Russia has managed to secretly gather and arm a secret strategic reserve--often claimed by some Westerners but never evident--that's a problem for Russia.
And recall reports that said Putin was considering releasing some mobilized "reservists" (some were simply snatched despite lack of prior service) from service by July.
Seriously, in addition to problems in the war it is in, Russia's forces are stretched thin away from the front with Ukraine. How many actual combat formations back up border guards and National Guard in Central Asia and the Far East?
You wonder why Russia flashes it nukes?
Russia needs to end the war more than their propaganda would have us believe. Indeed, if peace talks look serious to Russian troops, getting them to be the last soldier to die in the invasion might be a hard sell. A year ago I speculated that Putin was betting his life on the success of another bloody offensive. An offensive that--like the Kaiser's last-gasp 1918 offensive--has not provided him with battlefield victory.
Is it too late for a deal to save Putin?
UPDATE (Tuesday): Unless Russia agrees to stop strategic bombing with its missile and drone barrages, too, I strongly oppose a U.S.-Russian deal to halt Ukrainian strategic warfare on Russian energy resources. Unless there is more that I don't see, that's bad.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: I made the image with Bing.
