For many months the most basic Winter War of 2022 news has been the same. Russia grinds forward very slowly while paying a high price for those victories. Only the pace changes. Ukraine pays a high price (but less than what Russia pays) to prevent a breakthrough. Russia bombards Ukrainian cities and tries to freeze the population into capitulation. And Ukraine expands its strategic warfare inside Russia to reduce its logistics capacity to sustain the invasion. Things are different now. I don't believe America is abandoning Ukraine. But America has certainly knocked over the board where we once maneuvered to make sure Russia broke before Ukraine did. It's now a different game.
Perhaps with the Russian threat at the base of Ukraine's Kursk salient complicating Ukrainian options, logistics, or morale, Russian forces are apparently collapsing the northern Ukrainian defenses there. Is there a connection between these dramatic territorial losses and the pause in American military and intelligence assistance? I'm not prepared to draw that conclusion. Reportedly, North Korean troops have returned to the fight with better skills. But I hope the pause ends quickly.
And after three years, civilians wonder if it will end. Because of that, a problem for:
both sides is the lack of new soldiers and the growing numbers of desertions and those evading military service. Both sides are suffering from war fatigue and military age men believe there have been so many casualties that being in the military was something of a death sentence for too many soldiers.Alternatives to more more obviously rise up in such circumstances. Back in November 2022, I noted that eventually American, European, and Ukrainian objectives for the war would diverge:
We want Russia as far east as possible. We should want Ukraine safe from future Russian invasion. But we want a functioning and cooperative Russia east of whatever line that is to face China--not a fragmented remnant of the Sick Man of Eurasia. America may need to insist at some point that Ukraine has won enough.Russia's objective--absorbing Ukraine--hasn't changed. But its timetable has gone from a couple weeks to years or decades. We have reached "eventually". And pushing Russia back--by how much?--will seemingly be decided mostly around a table rather than on the battlefield.
Russia has failed to break Ukraine:
Russian forces failed to break Ukraine despite expending tremendous military, human, and economic resources to multiple offensive efforts. Ukrainian forces continue to deny Russian forces the ability to routinely stage massive assaults in most areas of the front, forcing Russian forces to conduct the majority of their assaults in small infantry groups rather than significant mechanized or even motorized pushes. Ukrainian forces blunted many of the Russian offensive operations and drove Russian forces to sustain these casualties for their slow and limited gains.But the war shouldn't be about whether Russia or Ukraine breaks first. A larger goal--what I've been arguing Russia and America should achieve for years, if not decades--is perhaps withing reach:
China is a near-term threat to the U.S. and a recognized long-term threat to Russia. A U.S.-Russia deal, good, bad or indifferent for Ukraine, could benefit both the U.S. and Russia. Should Russia exact security guarantees along its western [borders], along with economic benefits from the negotiations, but accept recognition of Ukraine’s sovereignty, it could focus on the threat to the east, China. In turn, the U.S. would benefit by being able to focus on a singular peer competitor in China, while simply monitoring Russian compliance as Europe reinvigorates its own deterrent capability.
China still claims to be best buddies with Russia:
Chinese President Xi Jinping affirmed his “no limits” partnership in a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday, Chinese state media reported, on the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The leaders held the talks as President Donald Trump has pushed for a quick deal to end the Ukraine war, raising the prospect that Washington could draw a wedge between Xi and Putin to focus on competing with the world’s second-largest economy.
But that's not a shocking statement by Xi given the tensions that could shatter that facade of alliance. I believe the Russia-China "partnership without limits" is merely a frenemies with temporary benefits relationship. China is squeezing Russia for technology and Russia wants a truce to by time to get stronger to defend its Far East taken from China during the Century of Humiliation.
I even speculated about diplomacy pre-Winter War of 2022 seeking to flip Russia. It clearly was not. Yet as Russia found it is pushing its ground forces into a meat grinder, I've wondered if a grand deal of this sort is the only way for Russia--and perhaps Putin himself--to survive this war.
Then toss in the European view. Europe--that is, the European Union--doesn't have a realistic plan for Ukraine. The EU doesn't care if a plan is realistic. The EU cares about having the power to make the plan. Sorry, Ukraine. So do what it takes to stay on the good side of America rather than bathe in the adulation of Europeans.
And yes, I also want a strong American role in NATO to knit together European capabilities; and to carry out the new missions NATO has.
I'm not saying a broad deal that reorients Russia will work to secure Ukraine, end the acute Russian threat, and be better positioned to match the pacing Chinese threat. But it is a path that makes sense for both America and Russia:
One small example tells a significant tale. In 2023, the Chinese government abruptly issued an ordinance that mandates the use of the pre-Russian name “Haishenwai” for Vladivostok, in place of the previous “Fúlādíwòsītuōkè” — which was clearly a meek attempt at a Chinese pronunciation of the Russian name.
And protects Ukraine and other countries on Russia's western border as Russia is pointed east. It also stops the EU ploy, of course.
As an aside, Ukraine spent about 9 months preparing for their highly telegraphed, failed summer 2023 counteroffensive. It is nearly two years later and Ukraine seems to have a front line held so thinly that it can't stop the slow, grinding Russian advance.
I have to ask if Ukraine is holding back reserves it is accumulating from the front to build up a strategic reserve. Was the Kursk incursion really a smaller-scale practice run for a larger attack as Russian forces get depleted even more? Are increased small local counter-attacks around Pokrovsk an attempt to shape that battlefield?
And is the American push for peace talks sincere, but with a Plan B of "Well, we gave Putin a chance for peace"?
Or Ukraine is really stuck on the strategic defensive. I can't tell.
UPDATE (Monday): The U.S. is considering adding new economic and financial pressure on Russia for "pounding" Ukraine. Lifting the pause on military hardware and intelligence would be good, too.
Our enemies fight while they negotiate--including exploiting any actual ceasefires to resume fighting. Why do we too often think that talking and fighting are mutually exclusive?
UPDATE (Monday): If we can end the war that includes flipping Russia to NATO, China won't win the Winter War of 2022.
UPDATE (Tuesday): The U.S. will resume military and intelligence assistance to Ukraine. The price is agreeing to a U.S. proposal for an immediate broad ceasefire.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: I mined the image from my old DALL-E stockpile.
