The Air Force doesn't really like doing close air support for the Army. The Army is reacting.
The Air Force effort to kill the A-10 symbolizes that disregard for close air support. Mind you, the Air Force got really good at the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. When control of the air was uncontested that was the only game in town.
And the Air Force has a point that the A-10 itself is
vulnerable to air defenses while providing ground support in high-intensity combat. The issue less about the A-10 and more about losing the dedicated close air support pilots, embedded air controllers, and institutional knowledge.
When the A-10 finally ages out of the service, the multi-purpose F-35 will be the primary plane for establishing air superiority, deep strike missions, and close air support. You don't need to consult QAnon to predict that the first two missions will always seem to crowd out the close air support missions the Army needs at that moment.
And I will say that the Air Force even has a point about mission priority. The Army does need the Air Force to control the skies to reduce the amount of time the enemy bombs it. But the point is that the Air Force will be deciding the mission priorities and the Army will still need the fire support.
The Army's Plan B for rapid and responsive fire support seems to be the long-range artillery it is developing:
At the end of 2020 the U.S. Army ERCA (Extended Range Cannon Artillery) finally achieved a decade old goal of using a longer barrel cannon firing an extended range Excalibur GPS guided shell to accurately hit a target 70 kilometers distant.
With longer range, more of these guns can provide massed precision fire where needed even when dispersed. And hopefully remain out of range of enemy counter-battery fire.
And the guns can hit targets identified by reconnaissance behind enemy lines.
Even when the Air Force is otherwise occupied. And may not have the skill set to really help anyway.
