Iran wants nukes and the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal was always a means of shielding that drive.
The U.N. nuclear watchdog found uranium particles at two Iranian sites it inspected after months of stonewalling, diplomats say, and it is preparing to rebuke Tehran for failing to explain, possibly complicating U.S. efforts to revive nuclear diplomacy.
Notice that the Iranians had the power to stonewall inspections for months. Despite the article reference to "snap" inspections. In practice those don't exist. As the article explains about this particular inspection:
The material was found during snap IAEA inspections that were carried out at the two sites in August and September of last year, after Iran barred access for seven months.
The "snap" inspections were delayed by seven months!
Iran’s Compromise With IAEA Taps Breaks on Escalation ...
The head of the UN’s nuclear watchdog says the so-called “additional protocol,” which allows short-notice inspections of Iran’s nuclear sites, is being suspended.
In what alternate world are short-notice inspections something that can be delayed for seven months?
And how is suspending them a compromise with Iran?!
This recent inspection isn't anywhere near the anytime, anywhere inspections we were promised. This is what Obama told us:
It contains the most comprehensive inspection and verification regime ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear program. ... For Iran to cheat, it has to build a lot more than just one building or a covert facility like Fordow. It would need a secret source for every single aspect of its program. No nation in history has been able to pull off such subterfuge when subjected to such rigorous inspections. And under the terms of the deal, inspectors will have the permanent ability to inspect any suspicious sites in Iran. [emphasis added]The Iranians weren't worried about the inspection process:
Araghchi goes on to explain how Iran could handle the 24-day process triggered if the IAEA suspect activities in non-nuclear facilities: "The IAEA has to present us with evidence as to why it thinks there have been illegal activities occurring. After this step, we need to negotiate. Other countries do the same. After the negotiations, if we are convinced, we might allow them access. In cases where their evidence is not entirely unfounded, we can even use substitute methods; for example, we will say we cannot allow you into the main facility but we can allow you access to the area behind it. The other method is for us to videotape it ourselves and present it to them. But if the IAEA refuses our offers and insists on access, this subject has been left unsaid in the Additional Protocol." [emphasis added]
This weakness was obvious to me from the start:
If we think there are unlawful activities or materials or undeclared facilities, the IAEA has to tell Iran the basis for the concerns and request clarification. No time limit is mentioned for getting clarification.
If the clarification doesn't resolve the IAEA's concerns--not our concerns apparently, just the secretive IAEA's--the IAEA may request access to the location and provide Iran with reasons in writing and make available relevant information. May? Not must? What is relevant? The name of whoever provided the information? The type of satellite that spotted something? Doesn't this just give Iran information to refine their ability to avoid detection?
On page 43, Iran can propose an alternative to site visits, which should be given due and prompt consideration! Seriously?
Ah, the first time frame. So that doesn't include the time for clarification of the concerns expressed to Iran. If the absence of unlawful materials or activities cannot be verified within 14 days of the IAEA original request for access, Iran and the IAEA have to agree to a means to resolve the dispute.
And I'll ask whether this will morph into the need for the IAEA to prove there is unlawful materials or acclivities, the way Saddam got the world to reverse his WMD obligations under the 1991 ceasefire.
Anyway, if following that 14-day period, the IAEA and Iran can't agree to means to resolve the dispute, a vote of 5 out of 8 members of the Joint Commission (one each from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, the United States, Iran, and the European Union) would approve advice on means for resolving the IAEA concerns.
China, Russia, and Iran will vote as a bloc, meaning Iran only has to bribe one country to abstain (coughfrancecough).
The commission would have 7 days for this step and the Iranians would have 3 days to implement the means.
So that's the 24 days we keep hearing about for access to nuclear sites. I'm still not confident that clarification efforts won't suspend that time. Lord knows how long that can last. And that is only if the IAEA decides to try to gain access to the site. They don't have to do that and we can't make them try.
And if Iran and the other parties can't agree on solutions to alleged violations?
If a party believes the other side isn't meeting their commitments, the party can refer the issue to the joint commission. There is no word on how long a dispute should last before such referral. I assume this could be months.
Once referred, the commission has 15 days to resolve the issue, unless by consensus the time is extended. No word on limits on that. I assume this could mean months, too.
After the commission has considered the issue and the issue is still not resolved, parties can refer the issue to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This can apparently be parallel to joint commission consideration rather than sequential. How likely is that?
The ministers have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless there is consensus extension. Again, months are possible to give them time to peacefully resolve a highly technical issue that is surely just a difference of opinion.
Then the issue can go to the Advisory Board, consisting of one member appointed by each side of the dispute and one "independent" member. No word on how that is decided. Please God, tell me Russia is not involved in that determination. That board has 15 days to issue a non-binding opinion.
If, after this 30-day (at least) period the issue is not resolved, the joint commission (which includes Iran, remember) has 5 days to consider the non-binding opinion.
If a party believes the issue is not resolved, the complaining party can deem this a "significant non-performance" and cease performing any or all duties under the act.
And when the IAEA confronted Iran over what was found, according to the article?
Five diplomats said that after the IAEA confronted Iran with the findings it gave unsatisfactory answers. Two of them said Iran told the agency the traces were the result of contamination by radioactive equipment moved there from another site, but the IAEA checked and the particles at the sites did not match.
One diplomat briefed on the exchanges but not the detailed findings said Iran had given “implausible answers”, describing Iran’s response as “typical delaying tactics”.
Even with all the time Iran had to scrub the site, the IAEA found something. But it was so little that Iran could lie about its source and nobody will make them reveal what happened.
Indeed, Iran may have delayed enough. With Biden determined to revive the nuclear deal, Iran's past violations will be forgotten in a new and improved deal--much as Iran's past nuclear weapons programs were ignored for the 2015 deal.
Lather, rinse, fission.
Have a super sparkly day.
UPDATE: I can't say the Iranians are wrong:
The messages sent out by Iran’s leaders contain warnings to Washington and European capitals. The gist of these messages is that Iran is ready to close the door on nuclear talks altogether if there is no prospect of a return to the old nuclear deal. In the view of Iran’s leaders, this threat will be enough to incentivise the Europeans to back down like they did in negotiating the first deal.
Praise the renewed trans-Atlantic surrender mechanism!
UPDATE: Any inspections that the Iranians have to agree to is no inspections agreement at all:
In the Sunday agreement between the IAEA and Iran, Tehran said it would allow IAEA inspectors necessary verification and monitoring activities in accordance with the newly passed law for up to three months.
Grossi [the director general of the IAEA] explained that the agreement does not maintain the Additional Protocol and that inspectors will have less access but their technical agreement prevents them from being blind to what is occurring in Iran.
All hail Smart Diplomacy!
UPDATE: Oh, and this whole inspections thing highlights what I noted above--in the nuclear deal the United States subcontracted inspections to the IAEA.
