Saturday, January 05, 2013

There Can Be No Amnesty for Privilege

In Iraq, Baathists and Sunnis resisted majority rule by the Shias and Kurds which ended the Sunni Arab position of privilege that exploited the majority for the benefit of the ruling minority. Apparently, we can avoid that problem in Syria by focusing on removing the Alawite Baathist elites.

A solution to the problem of sectarian slaughter in Syria has been identified!

To help oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, an opposition group has drafted a plan for a transitional justice system that would impose harsh penalties against die-hard members of his inner circle but provide amnesty for most of his Alawite supporters.

The goal is to provide a legal framework that reassures Alawites this isn’t a fight to the death and that they will have a place in a post-Assad Syria. The plan would also encourage the rule of law in areas that have been liberated from Assad’s control, stemming the growing trend toward warlordism and revenge killings.

Huh. Sounds a lot like de-Baathification, which was roundly (and wrongly) condemned in Iraq for "causing" the Sunni Arab insurgency after the fall of Saddam's regime.

One, just what does that inner circle include? In Iraq we are told de-Baathification was too broad.

Two, if it is small enough to reassure Alawites, will in be too small to reassure the Sunnis that this isn't just playing musical chairs to allow the Alawites to remain in power? In Iraq, I argued that it would be a betrayal of the Shias (not so much the Kurds who could retreat to their mountains) to let the Sunni Arabs continue to reap the benefits of their past role as oppressors. How could we continue without the support of the people we liberated by looking like the saviors of the minority oppressors?

Three, will this deal allow the Alawites to continue in their positions of power and wealth to keep them from resisting majority rule? If so, won't that enrage the Sunnis who were kept from power and privilege and who may think they've been betrayed by their leaders after suffering enormous casualties to "defeat" the Alawites who won't really have to face the consequences of defeat on the battlefield? Iraq's Sunni Arabs managed to resist despite assurances provided by an American presence that they would have a new role in a democratic Iraq.

Four, some portion of the Alawites will be upset at their loss of power and privilege because they are closely linked to the "die-hard" members of the Assad regime. Might they not attempt to resist from refuge in neighboring Lebanon or Anbar province in Iraq? You do remember that the pro-Iran Shia Sadrists in Iraq had their own agenda and it did not include forgiving the Sunni Arabs.

Five, jihadis will have their own goals completely separate from any deal that local religious communities negotiate. In Iraq, Iranian jihadis kept the Sadrists stirred up and fighting; while Syria funneled Sunni jihadists in to keep al Qaeda in Iraq killing Shias and Sunni Arabs, simply to kill the former and to keep the latter in line. The jihadis won't go along with this elegant plan and how likely is it that Iran will refrain from supporting Alawites who want to resist the new Syria?

For a war to end rather than just enjoy a ceasefire while all sides rearm, one side has to win and one side has to lose. In Iraq, it took years of battlefield defeat, death, ethnic cleansing and exile, and the terrible realization that the al Qaeda jihadis who came in to fight on "their" side were worse than the problem of Shia rule guided by American might, before the Iraqi Sunni Arabs admitted they were beaten.

How does this deal make sure that the Alawites know they are beaten and that the Sunni Arabs know they have truly won? Letting the Alawites continue to enjoy the benefits of their past dominance of the government and economy is no way to end the war in Syria.

If you want to see how conflicts "end" when neither side is truly crushed, look no further than the Israel-Palestinian problem where even a thorough ass-kicking by the Israelis at the end of last year wasn't fully digested by the "losers" of the war:

Palestinian support for military operations against Israel has registered its most significant jump in 10 years, spurred by the recent Gaza conflict, ongoing Israeli settlement expansion, and frustration over a peace process that has been essentially deadlocked for more than four years.

In the non-Western world, people who haven't lost a war tend not to voluntarily do so.

Yes, we want to make sure that the Alawites aren't killed after the Assad regime falls, but that is what we tried to do in Iraq for the Baathist Sunni Arabs, and it wasn't enough to keep the war from dragging on.

But I'm sure de-Baathification will be much better this time now that the best and brightest are in charge of it.

Heck, I'm almost giddy at the thought of the brilliant solution our bright guys and gals will come up with to figure out what to do about the Alawite armed forces that have been slaughtering Syrian civilians for the past year in large numbers and which have a history of slaughtering civilians when ordered to kill. I'm sure it will be far more nuanced than "disbanding" the hated symbol of oppression by the minority.