All through the winter and spring I watched for signs that an offensive in the east would take place during the summer. There was conflicting evidence all through that time. In the end, it is clear that whatever we did in the east, it was not American-led. We assisted the Afghans, but did not attempt to clear the region. This press briefing on operations from July to September 2012 makes it clear that the focus was assisting the Afghans in stepping forward ahead of our 2014 deadline for major counter-insurgency capabilities.
It is also interesting to see another round of press interest in how many battalions of Afghan troops are capable of operating without our supervision. That was a staple of the press during the Iraq War. I was frustrated then that the press didn't seem to understand that the Iraqis didn't have to be as good as our troops--they had to be good enough to beat their enemies. And they were. It seems we are repeating that comprehension issue. Granted, that doesn't mean that the Afghans will be able to win when we pull back after 2014. But remember that the fighting in Afghanistan has never been as intensive as it was in Iraq.
Although the Talban sanctuary in Pakistan is far more valuable than the sanctuaries in Syria were for the jihadis and Baathists or in Iran for the Shia Sadrists that resisted Iraqi security forces.
But back to the other hand, in theory we don't plan to bug out completely in Afghanistan as we did in Iraq. We shall see. Our fast pace of withdrawal doesn't fill me with confidence:
Despite internal Pentagon reports that indicate the Afghans will not be ready to take over combat operations in 2014, news accounts have the White House pushing for cutting the remaining 68,000 American troops in Afghanistan this coming year by another 20,000 to 30,000, with the likely goal of leaving fewer than 10,000 noncombat troops in place by the end of 2014. This is not just a race to the exit but a full-out sprint. And once again it’s a decision made against the best advice of the commanders in the field, who would like nothing more than to hold the current force levels constant through at least the 2013 fighting season.
And I have my doubts that 10,000 post-2014 is anything more than a symbolic force incapable of doing more than rolling over to their rifle if friendly local forces collapse around them.
This year was the last major effort of our ground forces. It wasn't the offensive I expected or we initially planned, but it was what we could do. You go to phase 2 with the army you have and not the army you planned to have.
We shall see if we've done enough to win, rather than provided a decent interval before defeat.
