For quite some time, my impression of the Afghanistan campaign has been that after focusing on the south, we'd shift our emphasis to Regional Command East where we'd been involved in a shaping operation to prepare the battle space for a major effort this year. We've held the south despite Taliban threats, and before we draw down much more of our troops we need to settle the east where Taliban forces have refuge in Pakistan across the border. Even with the reduction of our last surge, officials spoke of a major effort in the east this year.
But then word leaked that by the middle of next year we hope to stand down from routine combat missions (except for special forces raids). Still, that left barely enough time for a campaign this year and a winter campaign following it to put the Taliban on their heels in the east.
But what am I to make of this briefing by our ISAF commander?
As I conduct battlefield circulation to assess our progress and challenges, I emphasize the following priorities and these are my priorities presently for the campaign: Maintain the momentum of the campaign, we must relentlessly pursue the enemy and sustain the tactical defeat of the insurgents in the decisive terrain of the south and expand the security zone surrounding Kabul, denying insurgent support areas, caches, and infiltration. The second: Accelerate the development of the Afghan national security forces and move them into the lead as soon as possible. Third priority: Assist GiRoA's efforts to improve public administration; assist in the hiring, placing, protecting of civil servants and the delivery of basic services to the people. The fourth is communicate visible, tangible and recognizable progress; it's really our communications. And then fifth: To maintain our agility and planning and force posture, both in the coalition and the ANSF. And finally, we must sustain the coalition: The diversity and strength of the coalition has been and will continue to be essential to our success in Afghanistan.
In early January 2012, the Afghan defense ministries, in coordination with IJC, began implementation of Operation Naweed, which means "good news" in Dari. Op Naweed will expand on the success of Op Lomed, its predecessor. It will focus both Afghan and coalition forces on deepening the gains we've achieved and expanding them during 2012.
We will continue to ensure security in the major population areas like Kabul, Kandahar, Helmand, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat, and we'll protect the commerce routes that connect them. In particular, we'll connect Kabul to Kandahar to Lashkar Gah, and focus on the improved border security in this coming year.
His priorities don't mention the long-anticipated offensive in Regional Command East. His mention of insurgent support areas, caches, and infiltration seems narrowly focused on Kabul itself and not the east as a whole. Remember, the plan had long been to focus our surge sequentially with the south (Helmand and Kandahar regions) as the first priority. We held in the west and north while we prepared the east to be the main effort once the south was reasonably secured.
The last part, with the list of cities to be secured, makes sense in that it focuses on the ring road of Afghanistan. That has to be done. But it still isn't an indication that we will push in the east. Unless the general mention of border security refers to more efforts in the east in particular.
Why is there no mention of RCE in our priorities when until now I've read reports that both implied and directly stated we'd move east this year?
Is the move east still assumed? I could be drawing a conclusion based on nothing. Maybe nobody wants to telegraph the effort.
Does the rapid drawdown of surge forces preclude the effort? I think we have enough to make the effort in the east even if we have to rely more on Afghans to secure the south while we do it.
Or is this election related? Sadly, the optics of American troops in heavy action in the east during a glorious coronation convention while our future defense posture assumes we don't need to fight on the ground any more might not be to the liking of the Chicago reelection crowd. I have no difficulty imagining this is why Regional Command East was not explicitly mentioned. I hope I'm wrong.
