Thursday, November 10, 2011

Speak Slowly and Use Small Words?

We tried to build the wonder tank to replace our heavy armor and after that predictably failed (and you can read my cited article in the Military Review issue that you can download), we think we don't need them at all. I can't believe this is an issue that RAND has to address:

With deep budget cuts imminent, the U.S. Army has been under pressure to demonstrate a valid need for heavy brigade combat teams in the future security environment of irregular warfare and of possible air- and sea-centric conflicts with China—an environment in which many believe that such teams will be largely irrelevant. The purpose of this paper is to explain the utility of heavy armored forces (comprised of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles) against the full range of potential enemies that the United States could face in the future: nonstate irregular, state-sponsored hybrid, and state adversaries.

How can we be debating this issue again? After the Persian Gulf War of 1991, deep thinkers thought heavy armor was obsolete. I addressed that here.

And during the Iraq War, the value of heavy armor was repeatedly demonstrated and--I thought--learned. Except that even our military had to be persuaded they might be useful in Afghanistan.

The RAND report defends heavy armor (Heavy Brigade Combat Teams: HBCTs):

[A] more prudent approach is to base much of a force’s structure and future capabilities on heavy forces that can scale down to confront irregular adversaries as part of a balanced force that includes light infantry. This approach is similar to that taken by the U.S. Army during much of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In that conflict, HBCTs trained for irregular warfare and employed few, if any, of their tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery during operations. Nevertheless, with only a shift in training emphasis, they could have scaled up to confront more-capable hybrid or state adversaries. Light infantry and medium armored (e.g., Stryker-equipped) forces cannot make a similar transition, even with a shift in training emphasis, because they do not have tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. This is a reality that U.S. policymakers should bear in mind as they contemplate the future structure and capabilities of the U.S. Army. America will need a force prepared to face a wide range of adversaries across the range of military operations. HBCTs should have a prominent place in that force.

But we are back to trying to recall just why they are so useful. If we could wrap our vehicles with this kind of density, they'd be darned near invulnerable.

To be fair, no weapon system lasts forever. One day the heavy tank will be obsolete. But recent experience does not indicate that the day has arrived to safely conclude that heavy armor is obsolete.