The Winter War of 2022 seems to hang in the balance of which way the battlefield advantage could flow. Will either side be able to tip things their way to end this period of battlefield uncertainty?
[A] number of Ukrainian units began to better integrate infantry, uncrewed systems, artillery, and armor. On the frontlines, they were able to create periods of dominance over the Russians that allowed the rotation of troops and even offensive gains. These combined arms tactics helped Ukrainian forces make advances in Kupyansk in the fall of 2025 and in Huliaipole in the spring of 2026. More important, the Ukrainians maintained a favorable casualty exchange ratio, losing fewer soldiers than the Russians, even when they were on the offensive.
Enough to push the Russians back in some places. Can that be scaled up if more corps (really, what we'd call "divisions") improve? And Ukraine is hampering Russian logistics more effectively to hamper the ability of the Russians to attack or even mass forces on the front. ISW describes this, too:
Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) is disrupting Russian logistics across the theater, from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Crimea.
On the other side, Russia can't replace its losses. And despite masses of troops in the theater, the troops at the pointy end of the suicidal meat assaults are thinning out as troops thicken in the rear (back to the first article):
Pay as the primary motive for service has also created an accumulation of personnel in Russian units who are eager to avoid combat.
If the front breaks, those men are primed to run, no? This adds to the Potemkin vibe I have gotten from the Russians since last year:
I have strong doubts that Russia is managing to increase the raw numbers of its troops fighting inside Ukraine to continue its grinding offensive as long as it takes. Does Putin have a Potemkin Invasion Force? Would he even know he only has that?
Indeed, even in 2004 I began to have doubts about Russian troop strength claims, as one link shows.
And of all the reasons I gave to explain why Russia might not have an attack force in Ukraine that Putin thinks is there, it didn't even occur to me that masses of soldiers might have essentially gone AWOL in the rear areas without leaving service. But corruption seems to have done that.
That's a brittle army that counts on being on the strategic offensive so Ukraine can't seriously exploit the brittleness. Could Ukraine deepen Russia's logistics problem, train more corps and concentrate them, and then exploit the thinner Russian front line with an offensive toward a Crimea garrison weakened by logistics difficulties and lack of combat power?
This ground war is seriously getting weird. Yet it is no declaration of Ukrainian victory. Perhaps the Russians restore their capabilities to attack. Or the Ukrainians may prove to be unable to do the things they need to mount a proper counteroffensive while Russia experiences weakness at the front.
Hell, what if China looks at the situation and decides Russia can be coerced to turn over Far East territory or grant economic and legal concessions within Russian territory for Chinese businesses in exchange for weapons or even the right to recruit in China's Xinjiang province for more cannon fodder?
That's fanciful. But is it impossible? Might Russia be that desperate? Might China be that ruthless? Anything seems possible in a war that remains ... different.
As I asked, when the war ends what empire ends, too?
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
