Distance is the Carrier's Friend

Carriers can last half a century, or more. So I do like to keep them useful for all missions given we will have them for a long time even if other weapons are better for sea control missions.

Can we include enough MQ-25A Stingray drone aerial tankers in a carrier air wing to increase the range of fighter squadrons? 

The MQ-25A Stingray is a carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed primarily as an aerial refueling tanker for carrier air wings. 

It represents the first operational carrier-compatible unmanned aircraft in US naval aviation history and is intended to dramatically extend the reach of fighter aircraft by providing organic refueling capability at sea.

Secondary missions include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support.

This is useful for their already potent power projection role. I wonder if aerial combat drones could extend the range of carrier air wings enough to make them sea control apex predators rather than expensive prey.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article. 

Proximity is Opportunity

American forces hammered Iranian warships in their ports and in waters near Iran at the start of Epic Fury. This seems like a test for coping with China's large and growing fleet.

America smashed up a number of Iranian warships at the start of the America-Israel attack on Iran:

Destruction of the Iranian Navy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy is a priority of the ongoing Operation Epic Fury, Pentagon officials have said since the start of the operation.

CENTCOM shows that the campaign has damaged or destroyed over 155 Iranian vessels. We're clearly getting down to the small stuff. Except for two (?) Iranian navy ships sitting out the war in India.

Naval targets includes Iranian anti-ship missiles kept in safe bunkers that American bunker busters destroyed. 

Of course, Iran has lots of smaller coastal assets that can do damage in the narrow Strait of Hormuz. But the damage inflicted is still a big deal. 

Well, hello target-rich environment:

China’s coast is well within range of American bases in the western Pacific. Add in American land-based missiles and aircraft placed on the Philippines and even Taiwan, and China’s ports and shipyards are well within range of American strike assets.

Truly, the Iran War of 2026 is a good test of this capability. And we may get a second production line for the B-21 that could strike in the western Pacific and the mainland from distant less vulnerable bases. 

All is not lost in INDOPACOM.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from the article.

Be Careful What You Wish For: Allied Rearmament Edition

Europeans strangely want to buy European weapons as long as they are going to spend more money on national defense.

America wants Europeans to defend themselves but isn’t happy Europeans want to buy European weapons systems:

U.S. President Donald Trump's administration has threatened to retaliate against European countries if the EU favors domestic weapons-makers in a drive to rearm the continent.

The U.S. Department of Defense objected to any EU effort to limit American arms-manufacturers' access to the European market and warned that would trigger a reciprocal response.

When we insist our European allies do more to defend themselves, they might just do more to defend themselves. Expecting them to simply buy more American weapons was assuming too much. I mean, nice work if you can get it, of course. But our European allies see things differently. As I've mentioned in other contexts.

The old strategy of doing more than allies made perfect sense when a war begun by an ally might escalate into strategic nuclear war between America and the Soviet Union, eh? We assume that problem no longer exists. Fingers crossed.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.

The Folly of the Imminent Standard

The size of the Iran War is daunting to many who watch it. It is also the consequence of relying on an "imminent threat" standard to justify military action. 

Long ago I warned against the "imminent" threshold for justifying military action as "the last resort" (quoting a 2003 post):

When you believe that any path, no matter how unlikely to bear fruit, keeps you from that "last" resort, then military force is practically speaking never an option.

In regard to Iran I wrote:

And while many here continue to insist that military action must be the last resort, the more the knowledge of nuclear weaponry becomes deeply embedded within Iran. More people acquire the knowledge of how to proceed and unless we kill them all, destroying buildings is the least effective way to slow them down. Iran can rebuild structures if they have the scientists and technicians who take decades to train ready to pick up the pieces. Indeed, Iran could rebuild in other countries and subcontract various stages of the work in locations that may be immune to future attacks. 

Sure, time may provide a solution other than military action. But it can also lead to stupid paper deals to achieve seriously farcical "solutions" resting on fantasy:

President Barack Obama has spoken of his ambition to bring Iran in from the cold, saying the long-time US foe could be “a very successful regional power” if it agrees to a deal over its nuclear programme.

I long worried that a president confronted with finally being the one standing when the music turned off in the game of musical Oval Office chairs in the nearly fifty years of mullah rule in Iran would take the easiest option by unleashing the four-step plan.

Yet here we are with time short but not out, working the much larger Iran problem rather than shrugging our shoulders and hoping the mullahs are not as mad as their rhetoric and violence would indicate.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

The Winter War of 2022 Negates Russia's Size Advantage

Early in the war I assessed the balance between Russia and Ukraine via the example of the Iran-Iraq War and judged Ukraine had the GDP edge and that Russia's population edge didn't give it the advantage you would expect. The GDP edge and casualty edge is now clearly in Ukraine's favor.

Well hello arsenal of democracy:

A prominent Russian ultranationalist military and political commentator claimed that Western economic potential is “orders of magnitude” larger than Russia’s and is becoming militarily evident as “Western-backed” Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia have increasingly involved hundreds of drones.[1] The commentator claimed that the size of such strikes will only increase, and that Russia cannot produce enough interceptor missiles to compete with Western economic potential[.] 

So Ukraine has the edge in the production war, notwithstanding Europe's slow pace of restoring their defense industrial base. Not that ours is blazing fast except by comparison.

And to add insult to injury:

The European Union (EU) will transfer €1.4 billion in proceeds from frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine. 

As for casualties, Ukraine seems to be inflicting KIAs at more than twice the numbers overall, with 200,000 Ukrainian troops killed and 460,000 Russian troops killed (using maximum estimates for both).

Over the last year Ukraine has leaned into a thin line that trades space for time to kill Russian soldiers. That seems to indicate Ukraine has a much higher kill ratio than the overall ratio.

The cumulative effect of that attrition combined with Russia's communications problems have translated to changes on the battlefield (back to the ISW report):

Russian pro-war information space voices are beginning to acknowledge Ukraine’s frontline successes, mid-range BAI campaign, and drone adaptations. A prominent Russian ultranationalist milblogger complained on March 26 that Russian forces will be unable to reverse an unfavorable battlefield situation in the coming months and that “rather successful” Ukrainian counterattacks have disrupted Russia’s ability to pursue offensive efforts in 2026. 

Back in July 2022, based on a comparison to Iran and Iraq in their 1980s war, I wrote that Russia didn't necessarily have an advantage in people and economic strength that would enable Russia to bulldoze through Ukraine in the short run:

Like Iran, Russia has a 3:1 advantage in population. But Russian morale as a conqueror, that is clearly not liberating people from Nazis, is not superior. This could break Russia before Ukraine. Just how do we define the transition from the short run to the long run?

What about GDP and defense spending? You'd think Russia clearly has the edge with a 9:1 GDP advantage. 

But Russia is under Western sanctions that will harm Russia's ability to go to war production levels. Russian Soviet-era stockpiles will run low in time--or reach the material and ammo almost more dangerous to Russian users than Ukrainian targets.

And Ukraine is being supplied by the West, which has an immensely greater GDP advantage than Russia's advantage over Ukraine. So you can't just count the value of the arms and services provided to Ukraine when comparing the economic advantage. You'd have to count the research and development and logistics value on Ukraine's side of the ledger that provides the weapons, supplies, and services.

And the effects after four years of relentless Russian ground offensives seem to be tilting against Russia a bit:

Russia’s position on the battlefield has changed over the past six months (October 2025 through March 2026) as Ukrainian counterattacks and mid-range strikes, the block on Russia’s use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine, and Kremlin efforts to throttle Telegram have exacerbated existing issues within the Russian military.

Maybe this is just a blip in Ukraine's favor. It is tempting--and safer--to say things tomorrow will be the same as yesterday. And after the same old thing for years now, with only the obvious blip of Ukraine's 2024 offensive into Russia's Kursk region to break the trend, it would be easy to call this another blip that doesn't change the trajectory of the war. 

But it seems significant. Is the war on the knife's edge finally tilting in Ukraine's favor? 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: Territorial change chart from ISW. 

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: The Forty-Five Year Oil War

In case you missed it on Substack: A Dangerous Lesson From the Winter War of 2022

In case you missed it on Substack: Four Lessons From the Iran War of 2026 for Taiwan?

In case you missed it on Substack: Protracted War?

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

Is America's Military Build Up a Long-Term Shiny Mirage?

Don't build a hollow military. Fielding a military that looks capable is more dangerous to American security than having a military obviously ill-prepared for war.

This is worrisome:

By pouring billions into procurement for new ships, planes, and sensors, without a corresponding transformation in how we budget for their operations and sustainment across their lifecycle, we are jeopardizing future readiness for acquisition speed today.

This doesn't mean we won't budget for operations and sustainment--and the realistic training to use the weapons and systems--in future appropriations acts. But readiness isn't something we can assume just happens. I want a reverse emphasis:

Readiness in materiel and leadership/training is hard to maintain but easy to squander.

If we repair our defense industrial base, readiness, and leadership first, expansion of our military forces to global war standards could be done when threats become more active and imminent. We could expand to the limits of our revived industrial capacity. If we reverse that we risk having an impressive-looking but hollow military. Which is a problem.

Granted, my focus was on the problem of expanding the force structure at the expense of sustaining our military in a war. But focusing on modernization at the expense of readiness gets us to a similar bad place of not being able to sustain what we send to war.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Welp, grabbed the image from someplace and forgot the source. Or it was a DOD source.

Iran's Eroded Proxy Force in Iraq

I've long been frustrated at the apparent inability of the Iraqis to dismantle the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Force militias established during the ISIL 2014 offensive. Perhaps I have been wrong to worry.

I recognized both the threat of the PMF militias. Yet recognized forcefully disbanding them could be too much of a short-term threat:

I've written about the need to bring the militias under control or ultimately disband them. The weak Iraqi government has to be careful but the job must be started before the militias are as entrenched in Iraq as Hezbollah is in Lebanon.

The militias have largely been unwilling to rise up to support Iran. Seemingly, Iraq has slowly been working the problem:

They painted a picture of a proxy network hollowed out by years of targeted assassinations of hard-to-replace leaders; the loss of secure bases for training and weapons transit; and the transformation of Iraqi commanders into wealthy politicians and businessmen with more to lose than gain from confronting the West.

One commander said he believed only two or three of dozens of the militias would fully obey Iranian orders to strike.

It seems like the Iraqis took a smart, slow path to de-fang the militias. Crushing the mullah regime in Iran might finish them off whether or not the mullah regime survives. 

UPDATE: That's timely news:

Iranian-backed militias have been increasing their attacks in Iraq in part because Tehran has lost its control over these groups since the launch of Epic Fury, a retired tier one special operator who just left Baghdad told The War Zone.

Perhaps I'm mistaken about the pro-Iran militias not being as effective as I'd expect. The update article speaks of "chaos"; but I don't see news reports about that. Surely, much of the media would eagerly report that, no? 

Something to watch. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from here.

Combined Arms Changes

New weapons should change Army combined arms operations.

This is fair:

Drones are profoundly changing the Army’s approach to aviation and combined arms training, Maj. Gen. Clair A. Gill, commanding general of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence, told Military Times in an interview.

I wonder about attack helicopters over the modern battlefield. 

As for drones, of course they change combined arms. And widely fielded counter-drone systems could eventually do the same. So this is relevant, too:

However, fighting methods from Ukraine should not be broadly applied to American forces, he noted, due to differences in U.S. tactics and capabilities. 

Endorsed! And let's not forget difference in the drone defense issue.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article. 

Changing the Terms of NATO: Spanish Edition

I read complaints that America has changed the terms of Article V by insisting allies earn American help by doing more to defend NATO. Spain is one of the countries that changed the terms of Article V long before America did.

Spain doesn't spend much on defense and never has in NATO. And the current justification is that Spain is far from Russia:

Madrid had little incentive to ramp up defence spending. It languished further after Spain reeled from the 2008 financial crash, standing at just 0.9 percent when Russia annexed Crimea. And since the likes of Germany were slow to raise their tiny military budgets after what should have been a turning point, faraway Spain could be forgiven for stepping up inadequately. Especially seeing as Ukraine is on the other side of the continent. 

Just going to note--notwithstanding my longstanding support for arming Ukraine and my even longer support for preventing Russia from being a threat--that America is even farther from Ukraine and Russia, from the perspective of looking across the Atlantic.

While America may be revising the terms of Article V--never an automatic trigger--Europeans had already revised the terms of Article V by disarming far more ... enthusiastically ... than America did after the Cold War. Those European states counted on America defending them regardless of their contribution.

Much of NATO has or is correcting that mutual defense deficiency. Spain has not. Although it did decide to help defend Cyprus. And if the initial author is correct, internal politics will prevent Spain from spending more. Spain's failure to let America use its air bases for the war against Iran is not a promising sign. And it got worse. 

Perhaps another NATO ally would like to host the ballistic missile defense destroyers we base in Spain now.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo of the Spanish destroyer ordered to Cyprus from the last article.

Yes, I Have Another Site

I experimented with linking my individual Substack posts here to increase their search engine visibility. But I think I was addressing a non-problem. So I'm not doing it any more notwithstanding my lovely illustration for the tag.

As long as you are here, head on over to my Substack, The Dignified Rant: Evolved, for more dignified rantiness on a new platform. 

I've been blogging since July 2022. I started on Geocities. Partially moved from the absorbed Yahoo!Geocities when my storage ran low to Blogger. Then fully relied on Blogger when Yahoo!Geocities died. 

And now I've moved partially to Substack. I would like escape the nightmare of again moving old site content to my latest site.

FUN FACT: When I started The Dignified Rant, I thought that one day I might move away from the more whimsical early Blogosphere vibe to the more buttoned down The Dunn Report--thus keeping the TDR shorthand intact. Screw that. Dignified and ranty will endure.

Small Drones Graduate From Ammunition

Small suicide drones are really loitering smart bombs with a small payload. Some are evolving back into platforms as modern attack drones began.

Small attack drones are now small bombers:

Explosive first-person-view drones get a lot of the attention, but the most dangerous drones in the sky over Ukraine—especially for the Russians—are heavy bomber drones.

Where an FPV explodes on contact, making it single-use, a heavy bomber drone is reusable. It can strike repeatedly with a payload of several grenades and then return to base for more munitions.

Hovering to drop the grenades may be accurate but that makes them more vulnerable to being shot down when troops increase their awareness of this threat, no?

Could we see these bomber drones become dive bombers to use speed at bomb launch for aiming and some protection? And how long before its all just a Bonsai Air Force doing all the things big aircraft can't do close to the ground? But even then, we won't have victory through tiny air power.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Image from the article.

The Winter War of 2022 Says "This Time For Sure"

Russia's 2026 primary offensive season kicked off with armored combat vehicles again part of Moscow's arsenal. This time for sure? Or is Russia's home front getting unstable? Will the fires spread?

Russia again intensified their ground attacks against Ukraine:

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces intensified ground attacks across the theater in the last week, which is — consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have launched their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.

Russia's tired troops who may no longer have any delusions about their chances of survival will go up against Ukrainians who once again have to endure the Russian hammer blows.

And Russia's economy seems to be reaching its limits:

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly requested that Russia’s top businessmen provide funding for the Russian government, indicating that the Kremlin may be growing desperate for economic relief and may be setting conditions to nationalize their assets to support the war effort.

Yet if Russia's troops, people, or financial pillars can't endure this pace of war, going on the strategic defensive may not only be domestically risky but give Ukraine its opening. 

Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to counter-attack successfully this year. But can Ukraine's ground forces expand that to a counteroffensive if the opportunity presents itself? The possibility still seems open notwithstanding the beginning of Putin's latest Big Push:

Ukrainian counterattacks continue to make gains in southern Ukraine, creating operational and strategic effects against Russian forces going into the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt.

And Ukraine's strategic bombing campaign is growing in scale and reach:

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure near the Baltic Sea on the night of March 26 to 27, marking the fourth strike in five days against Russian oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast.

One aspect of Ukraine's war effort is focusing on destroying Russia's air defense assets. This can aid either the ground or strategic bombing efforts by opening the door for more bombardment or troops support. Even Ukraine's small air force could add their weight to those battles instead of being kept mostly on air defense missions. 

Will Putin's need to finally win this war before the stresses building up in the ground forces, economy, and population openly crack a foundation of the war effort? Will Ukraine recognize an opportunity even if they have the forces to attack on a larger scale?

UPDATE (Monday): Predictions of stresses breaking Russia's war effort have been repeated over the last four years:

Russia can no longer afford its war in Ukraine. Since 2022 Russia has spent nearly $700 billion and lost 1.3 million troops, with over a million Russian men fleeting the country to avoid the war. There is a labor shortage and a growing number of protests against the war and its human losses and growing poverty.  

Yet the stresses never broke Russia. But the stresses are real. One day the effects will happen. And perhaps Russia's rulers will ignore real signs because they endured past false predictions of doom.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: Image from ISW.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s defense and national security news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

HOP ON OVER AND READ IT! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: Israel Returns to the Hezbollah Problem

In case you missed it on Substack: Securing Ground Lines of Communication

In case you missed it on Substack: Combined Arms and Joint Warfare

In case you missed it on Substack: Geography, Strategy and U.S. Force Design (and to my eternal shame I forgot my Oxford comma in the title)

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section.

Let's Not Pretend European Freelancing is New

Europe may deal with Russia separately from America. Don't act as if this is new.

Oh?

If the United States pursues its own deal with Russia to end the Ukraine War, it cannot expect the Europeans to refrain from engaging with Russia on their own.

Ah, the old European "strategic autonomy" goal. Which means the European Union. Which means that the EU doesn't actually care about Russia policy. The EU cares about the authority to have a Russia policy. 

Europeans can pretend this is America's fault. But during the Cold War, Europeans reached out to the Soviet Union separately from unified NATO action. Remember Ostpolitik? Mind you, I concede they had reasons to worry. 

But don't pretend Europeans would be happy if America was aggressive in its leadership in Europe through NATO. Or in the Middle East, for that matter. It's a geopolitical Goldilocks problem. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo of Ostpolitik in action from this site.

Geography, Strategy and U.S. Force Design

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction to essays here and see what happens.

Geography shapes America’s strategy, which shapes American military strategy, which shapes force structure in unique ways that our Eurasian allies and enemies do not reflect given their own geography. Since the 1898 Spanish-American War, America transitioned from holding our ground against stronger European military powers sailing here to intervening in Europe (and then Asia) to prevent threats from growing to a size to cross an ocean and threaten America directly. And the military capabilities of our allies and potential enemies influence our force structure and foreign policy, including a decision to use military force.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Thickening the Thin Blue Line in INDOPACOM

The Air Force is reinforcing the Navy for the job of sinking enemy ships.

The Iran War has demonstrated the ability of American air power to sink ships.

This is needed when scarce air bases close to China for tactical aircraft are well within China's aircraft and missile reach:

U.S. naval aviation equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles and a B-2 stealth bomber held an integrated maritime strike exercise off California, the Air Force announced Tuesday.

Fighters from Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 11 – the naval aviation component of the Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group – trained alongside at least one Spirit strategic bomber from the 509th Bomb Wing, flying from Whiteman Air Base, Mo., at an unspecified date.

I worry about risking our carriers within China's A2/AD envelopes. But by working with appropriately equipped and trained land-based planes to create a temporary bubble of protection so carriers can dash in and strike before retiring, the carrier wartime role in the western Pacific may be feasible.

We don't have many B-2s. But we will have many B-21s able to do what we test today.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from the article. 

Combined Arms and Joint Warfare

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction to essays here and see what happens.

The Iran War of 2026 is impressive in the ability of air power to kill bad people and break their things. It provides positive and negative lessons about the importance of combined arms and joint operations. I look at three broad lessons already evident.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Air Defense Returns to European Cities

Europeans are remembering the value of homeland air defense. 

Belgium will defend the Antwerp region with NASAM air defense missiles to defeat a drone threat:

Belgium's Prime Minister Bart De Wever said the Port of Antwerp-Bruges will get its own anti-aircraft defenses by next year, as the Belgian government moves to fortify one of Europe's most critical trade gateways. 

The title says the defense will be with anti-aircraft guns. But the text says missiles. I say guns are the way to go for volume against lots of cheap suicide drones. But missiles will work against more expensive threats.

Still, Belgium is rightly restoring priority for air defense as a logical response to the new threats. We need to protect those land corridors from the ports to NATO's eastern front. If the Winter War of 2022 and the Iran War of 2026 aren't driving home the lesson, I don't know what will.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Photo from this site.

Securing Ground Lines of Communication

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction to essays here and see what happens.

Drones in many ways are just new forms of a threat that ground forces once had to take into account to carry out operations. To be fair, the revived unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) threat to lines of communication (LOC) in the Winter War of 2022 is easier to carry out than old means of insurgents, partisans, special forces, or newer air-or artillery-delivered mines. But that just means the old methods need to be restored and updated. ... [CONTINUE READING]

In For a Penny

The big news is that a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division has been ordered to CENTCOM. Other ground forces will be available, too. What could they do?

This is the big news:

The Pentagon is preparing to deploy about 3,000 troops from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division to the Middle East, adding to the thousands of Marines already headed to the region to assist with operations in Iran.

Separately I heard that the division's headquarters element is going, too, so it could command more troops and coordinate joint support for the units it commands.

One Marine Expeditionary Unit (a reinforced battalion) is in the area and another is heading there. 

Add in rumors of special forces flowing into Jordan that I read elsewhere. That might include a Ranger battalion.

And we have artillery and helicopters in the region taking part in the war. And air and naval power, of course.

Another Army infantry battalion is in Djibouti, but I assume it remains a regional reserve force. We used to rotate an Army brigade through Kuwait, but I see nothing recent about that. But throw in a set of equipment in Kuwait for an Army brigade that could be manned by troops flown in.

America isn't massing an invasion force, for sure. But it could do a number of things: Capture Iranian-controlled islands in the Strait of Hormuz; capture Iran's Kharg Island oil export hub; defeat an Iranian ground attack through southern Iraq and into Kuwait; deploy to Iraq's Kurdish region to shield Iranian Kurds fighting Iran by providing a sanctuary; attack pro-Iran Iraqi militias; secure Iranian enriched uranium to move it out of the country; other raids into Iran; or base/embassy security.

The Strait of Hormuz mission seems the most likely.

Kharg makes no sense to me. Capturing it would destroy it during the battle. Why not bomb it if that is the end result? And the Marines there would be a missile (and drone) magnet for Iranian forces on the mainland. We can more easily blockade the island or lay naval mines around the island. But who knows? Maybe there is an angle I'm not seeing.

With artillery and air power, defeating a desperate Iranian offensive should not be a problem with American and Kuwaiti forces. Hopefully Iraq would resist an invasion. But just being attacked that way would be a shock. 

Deploying to the Kurdish region of Iraq to establish a sanctuary for Iranian Kurds to rest and regroup could be a mission if the war gets to the revolt stage in Iran. We did drop the 173rd Airborne Brigade (stationed in Italy) in Iraq's Kurdish region to support them in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 

We and the Israelis already bombard pro-Iran militias inside Iraq. Hitting them with ground troops to add to the damage and capture or scatter them would be useful. This is Phase IX of the Iraq War, after all. 

The most ambitious would be Army and Marine combat units plus special forces landing inside Iran to secure Iran's enriched uranium. This seems more likely to be a post-conflict operation that Iran agrees to. But perhaps we know where the uranium is and we think we can reach it, secure it, use air power to keep the Iranians from massing troops to attack in forces, and move it out by loading it on ships or flying it out. But I really doubt it. 

Related, I suppose it could be for another type of raid on the mainland. Special forces going in with big units as reserves in case things get hairy. Think Blackhawk Down territory--but without the FUBAR part.

Finally, maybe it is just to reinforce base security in case Iran starts infiltrating their covert guys into the Arab states. We don't want a Khobar Towers or Beirut Barracks attack, eh? Or another embassy attack like Tehran or the Benghazi consulate one.

Those are the missions that I see right now as possible. As I've noted, Iran is too large even for the entire Army and Marine active and reserve forces to pacify. Too big. Too many people. Too mountainous. And too many religious nutballs willing to fight us.

Really, in some ways it seems like standard operating procedure for coping with mullah-run Iran. That deployment looks familiar, no?

UPDATE (26MAR26): Confirming story about the 82nd Airborne deployment:

Elements from the 82nd Airborne Division headquarters and a brigade combat team will deploy to the Middle East, the Pentagon confirmed in a statement Wednesday.

UPDATE (29MAR26): Next phase?

Thousands of US Marines would be sent to the Middle East to conduct raids that include Special Operations forces and conventional infantry troops, the Washington Post reported, citing sources.

Interesting. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Map adapted from WorldAtlas.com

Israel Returns to the Hezbollah Problem

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction to essays here and see what happens.

Israel is edging toward an invasion of Lebanon to make a serious attempt to destroy Hezbollah. The effects of the aerial pounding that decimated and suppressed Hezbollah have worn off. I’ve long held a deep multi-division ground raid into Lebanon is required.

That Israel has resumed ground combat operations in Lebanon calls into question their victory through air power theory about defeating Hezbollah. It also raises the issue of whether Israel believes the American-Israeli strike campaign against Iran can set the conditions for the overthrow or collapse of the mullah-run Iranian regime.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Fear is the Beginning of Wisdom

When an enemy issues a threat, too many here quake in their boots. And when one of our leaders makes a threat to the enemy, too many here quake in their boots. Stop that. 

General Grant put it well to his subordinates during the 1864 Wilderness Campaign after they pestered him with worries about what Lee could do when Grant's army marched:

Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.

Precautions are good. But force protection is not the objective when America goes to war (quoting my 1997 Iran-Iraq War paper):

Our soldiers' lives are indeed valuable, and our country's insistence that we minimize risks to them is laudable (as well as being necessary due to the small size of the Army). Undue concern, however, is false compassion and, as was the case for Iraq in 1980, could result in even greater casualties in a prolonged war should we refuse - because of the prospect of battle deaths - to seize an opportunity for early victory.

Obsessing on force protection measures should not paralyze our war effort. Our enemies should spend more time terrified about what America will do to them. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: Portrait from here.

The Winter War of 2022 Peeks Behind the Facade

Did Ukraine's winter counter-attacks expose the Russian ground force juggernaut as a hollow facade? Is this just the most apparent problem? Things seem different enough from the continuity of the big picture over the last several years to make me wonder if Russia has serious problems.

The war goes on. But things seem ... different:

Ukraine has been imposing increasing challenges on Russia at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels since the beginning of 2026.

ISW in early March assessed the Ukrainian counter-attacks exploiting Russia's loss of Starlink communications:

The cascading effects that the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka, Hulyaipole, and Zaporizhia directions have generated in other sectors of the front show how constrained the Russian force structure in Ukraine really is.

And as the counter-attacks have continued, ISW stated:

Ukrainian counterattacks in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are forcing Russia to redeploy forces and means from other areas of the frontline and likely from operational level reserves.

If Russia needs more than local reserves to cope with apparently smaller scale counter-attacks, what does this say about the supposed juggernaut of Russian troops that continues to grow? 

Over the last couple years I've repeatedly called into question the reality behind the image of a relentless steamroller that Russia tries to create with reports of always expanding troop numbers:

I have strong doubts that Russia is managing to increase the raw numbers of its troops fighting inside Ukraine to continue its grinding offensive as long as it takes. Does Putin have a Potemkin Invasion Force? Would he even know he only has that?

Russia has maintained the strategic initiative with continuous attacks somewhere along the long front. This helps to conceal any Russian weaknesses on the ground. Ukraine exposed the weakness in its August 2024 offensive into Russia's Kursk region. There are probably more such weak points. Ukraine's strategic defensive strategy of trading space for time to inflict much heavier casualties on the Russians than the Ukrainians suffer has supported Russia's strategy, in effect, by leaving those Russian weak points untested.

How much will Ukraine's counter-attacks cascade? Can Ukraine's new corps formations exploit this to create a counteroffensive? 

Russia is still living in another world:

The Kremlin is likely setting informational conditions to expand Russian demands of Ukraine and NATO by making it clear that its current demands are no longer sufficient.

Really? Putin and what army? 

Could this troop shortage I've suggested exists, if true, push Putin--if he is aware of it--to change course to end the war? 

Are Russia's threats to NATO at Narva, Estonia, and aid to Iran to target American and allied targets around the Persian Gulf desperate efforts away from the main war to change the apparently ... different ... situation in their invasion of Ukraine? 

And (okay, this is my last string of conditional events that lower the overall odds of it happening) would that plan explain Russia's new efforts to be able to shut down the Internet in Russia? Can't have angry or confused Russians using it to express opposition, eh? Tip to Instapundit.

I've often said I try not to let my hopes guide my analysis. It is difficult. But there is an opposite problem. When the situation has been mostly the same for years, it is easy to assume current trends will continue. 

Is this a blaring alarm about Russia's capacity to wage war?

Russia suffered its deadliest day of the year in Ukraine on Tuesday, losing more than 1,700 troops in 24 hours.

Ukraine’s general staff said it had killed or wounded 1,710 Russian troops on March 17 and destroyed 29 artillery systems as well as 230 vehicles and fuel tankers.

It could just be a bigger example of the same old thing as Russians batter themselves against Ukraine's defenses. Russia is now using armored vehicles again:

Russian forces are increasingly conducting mechanized assaults on the frontline, possibly as part of intensified preparation for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.

Perhaps Russia over the past year got the Ukrainians used to fighting infantry assaults and calculates that resuming mechanized assaults with accumulated armored vehicles will break those defenses optimized for slower attacks.

Maybe. But things seem ... different ... now. 

UPDATE (Monday): This certainly doesn't contradict my gut feeling (that is hopefully a distillation of lots of data points bouncing around in my head):

Even with all this money spent on recruiting, after four years of war in Ukraine and over 1.3 million soldiers killed, disabled or missing in combat, Russia is having problems recruiting soldiers. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. 

NOTE: Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump on Substack. You may read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: Map of Ukrainian gains in this year's counter-attacks from ISW.

Weekend Data Dump

The Weekend Data Dump is a compilation of short entries about the previous week’s news that I found interesting. I couldn’t possibly comment on everything in my news flow or delve into everything that interests me. So most news that interests me doesn’t make the cut for a post. The rest go in the data dump. Enjoy!

Duplicating the Weekend Data Dump here and on Substack is too much of a hassle. I'm just moving it THERE. So hop on over and read it! On the bright side, you can comment on Substack!

In case you missed it on Substack: Conventional Air Power as a Counter-UAV Asset

In case you missed it on Substack: Chum, Despondency, and Whiplash

In case you missed it on Substack: Distributed Artillery

In case you missed it on Substack: NATO's Achilles Heel

Help me out by subscribing on Substack and by liking and sharing posts. I occasionally post short data dump-type items (or not-so-short) on my Substack "Notes" section. 

The Strategy That Dares Not Be Named

There is method to Trump's apparent madness on the global stage.

One aspect of America’s foreign policy of strengthening America's position in the world is weakening our foes:

Donald Trump’s behaviour during this presidential term reveals a surprisingly deep strategic logic.

The core goal remains to restore absolute American superiority over China and Russia. But Trump wants to avoid confronting these major rivals directly. He is rather working to isolate Beijing and Moscow from their international partners and deprive them of any major means of external support.

At the same time, Trump is building a program of sustained economic, technology and other sanctions to markedly weaken the Chinese and Russian economies over the longer term.

Pushing our allies--often done bluntly without running the language through the State Department to sand down the rough edges--to spend more on defense rather than rely on America is another aspect.

Consider too that talks to end the Winter War of 2022--publicly bolstered by some kind words from Trump--may (and this is sheer speculation by me) quietly involve discussions on splitting Russia from China, which is the ultimate prize for isolating this shaky alignment. 

Will Russia or China decide it wants to be the partner with America on economic cooperation rather than a target of economic isolation and potential war?

I've long wanted this type of shift. It makes sense to try. But I can't say I know we are doing this, of course.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing. 

NATO's Achilles Heel

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

NATO is vulnerable at the city of Narva on Russia’s border. While its Russophile citizens may not actually be happy with experiencing the loving embrace in practice as Ukrainians have suffered under and rejected, Putin could pretend they do to justify invasion. Ultimately, Narva’s main defense is prying Belarus from Russia’s imperial grasp.  ... [CONTINUE READING]

Will Russia Bow Or Pivot?

Is Russia going to settle into vassal status under China's thumb? Or will it stand up and finally pivot east to the real threat?

I've long figured vassalage is the path Russia is on. The war against Ukraine is accelerating that journey. This author looks at the question:

To what degree will Russian dependency on China continue after the war? I predict this dynamic will be centered on two competing forces: China will serve as the economic lifeline for Russia, with the latter expected to align within the former’s sphere of influence. At the same time, Russia will attempt to reduce this dependency by developing alternatives to China with success depending on its level of geopolitical isolation following the war.

In the short run, Putin wrecked his military enough to require him to continue his post-Soviet policy of appeasement of China while he rebuilt Russia and its military. The result should be alarming in Moscow:

Russia is increasingly dependent on China for economic support and help in rebuilding an economy ravaged by more than four years of war in Ukraine. China is willing to help, but not as an ally but as a patron for its new Russian client state. China seeks to turn Russia into a vassal state. 

In the long run, to break free Russia will have to erase the long-term need for China and the pointless and insane framing of NATO as a threat to Russia. Does anybody doubt Europeans would reverse rearmament if Russia pivoted east and stopped behaving like total a-holes?

If Russia can admit that China is their primary enemy, as Russia rebuilds its military--again--it could have the power to organize resistance to China if Xi's priority of undoing the Century of Humiliation hits too close to home, and earn NATO support to do so.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here. 

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. It's the right thing to do!

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.

Distributed Artillery

Because Substack apparently doesn't allow search engines to identify articles there, I'm going to try publishing the introduction here and see what happens. 

Can the Army get rocket launchers that roam the battlefield for ground support and air defense? I’m skeptical of filling a complex battlefield with unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) that we can command and control in large numbers. Artillery robots might be a proof of concept before trying to bring in direct-fire UGVs.  ... [CONTINUE READING]