Friday, September 10, 2021

Reform or Else

Putin's Russia has certain continuities with the Soviet Union that don't bode well for Russia. Can Ukraine exploit that?

There are major differences between the USSR and today's Russia. But the similarities may be close enough for government implosion work:

Despite certain important differences in the overall circumstances, the key dynamic for today’s Russia is similar to that faced by the late-Soviet-era leadership: Rapid economic growth requires reforms; reforms frighten entrenched elites; lack of economic growth will eventually force the regime to change—though whether this means more democratization or more repressiveness remains to be seen. ...

In keeping with the famous adage that “you can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time,” mine and Treisman’s theory of informational autocracy implies that eventually a majority of voters will figure out that the leadership is failing to deliver prosperity, which will result in declining popularity and ultimately changes to the regime. This is certainly a likely outcome for Russia in the long run: Without income growth Russia will either democratize or go back to being a traditional fear-based dictatorship (as we saw in Venezuela after the decline of oil prices and the death of the charismatic Hugo Chávez).  

Russia has problems with rule of law. So does Ukraine. Ukraine's best way to hold off Russia's territorial claims on Ukraine is to reform its government and society. If it doesn't, Ukraine will always be a smaller and so weaker version of corrupt Russia.

And God help Ukraine if Russia reforms while Ukraine does not.

I don't know if Russia is done splintering. It is the sick, angry man of Europe looking for threats abroad when its own problems are its biggest threat.

What is Russia's natural end point for shrinkage, anyway?