Walking into a NATO Baltic states trap does not restore American credibility.
Is this the solution to America's Afghanistan-shaken credibility?
Particularly in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the concerns generated over American credibility, only a consistent U.S. military presence in each of the Baltic states can convincingly reassure allies that Washington has their back while also signaling to Putin the rock-solid American commitment to NATO. The seemingly rushed, chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has caused some American allies in Europe to question Washington’s commitment to NATO.
The author isn't proposing a major force--just a tripwire. While I am not against the proposal to permanently station small American combat units there, I worry that the commitment could escalate to the point of being counterproductive.
We have to be careful in the Baltic states. Enough American (or other NATO) forces in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania large enough to slow down the Russians if they invade is a mistake. If NATO forces reach that level, the obvious Russian response is to drive through the Suwalki Gap to link up with its Kaliningrad exclave to isolate the NATO forces further north and turn the Baltic states into a kill sack.
To that end, Russia is improving its logistics and support capabilities in Belarus to carry out such an offensive.
Indeed, the presence of such a force could make the Russians think NATO is a looming threat to St. Petersburg. That might tempt Russia to launch an offensive to "preemptively" isolate and destroy the best NATO forces.
What I would like is to restore the armored cavalry regiment to the United States Army and put a battalion-sized task force with regimental assets parceled out in each of the Baltic states, with the three NATO rotational battalions providing a reserve force to each task force.
These units would fall back to slow the Russians down; inflict losses on the Russian with air and missile power; and allow our Baltic state allies to fall back into national redoubts, retreat to help hold the Suwalki Gap, or disperse to operate as irregulars and guerillas with NATO special forces to harass the Russia occupiers until NATO can counterattack.
Poland would hold the right flank against Russian forces operating in Belarus.
The major NATO counterattack force to restore Baltic state independence would gather in Poland, built around American units stationed and moved there. Some Polish units would contribute and other NATO forces would have to be moved east, too. With improved logistics to actually fight in the east.
Ideally, the Germans would provide the core ground force to defeat the Russian forces in the Russian Kaliningrad exclave. It would occupy the territory or reduce the Russian perimeter to a small enough size to defang the Russian offensive threat in order to protect the left flank of the NATO drive north.
And as one of my older posts linked above reminded me, use NATO infrastructure funds to convert Baltic state railroads to Western gauge rather than Russian gauge to add to Russian logistics problems.
Until the Russians come to their senses and shift their focus to defending their Far East from for-now dormant Chinese territorial claims, you never can tell what the paranoid Russians will do.
