If NATO doesn't deter a Russian invasion of the Baltic states, where does NATO fight?
Should NATO's Baltic state members focus on urban insurgency instead of forest insurgency?
Urban terrain is more likely to provide a weaker force the ability to move below the threshold of detection, and only urban terrain provides sufficient hardness and friction to negate the advantages of modern firepower and surveillance. The forests and wooded terrain typical of the Baltics provide none of these mitigations, which can tip the balance in the favor of a weaker defensive combatant. The perception of the Baltic forests and their utility as a defensive barrier is as flawed as allied assessments of the Ardennes Forest in both 1940 and 1944.
I had initially thought of a Tobruk-like defense at the coast around Riga to await rescue. But I became less confident of that option out of worry that America would lose critical troops in a losing defense before the cavalry can arrive.
Insurgency is a different matter. And NATO could support the insurgents from the sea.
I think NATO needs to hold the line somewhere in Lithuania to defend the Suwalki Gap; secure our flank by taking Kaliningrad; perhaps hold an enclave at Riga or maybe more likely control offshore Baltic state islands to support Baltic insurgents and irregulars bolstered by American and NATO special forces; and mobilize and move heavy ground and air forces (which requires the logistics infrastructure) for a counter-offensive to liberate the Baltic states.
Russia should have no doubts that wherever NATO draws the line that the fight will be sustained at that line and that the counterattack will deprive Russia of their early gains against inferior forces.
Russia might eventually feel the effects of the clue bat and end its pointless hostility toward NATO.
